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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The authors of this study participated in a prior project (Haas, Massey, Valenty,
and Werbel, 2000) involving case studies of four local ballot tax measures for
transportation packages with a substantial passenger rail component. In-depth
interviews with knowledgeable individuals were used to obtain information
about the process used to determine the transportation package, the nature of
the package, and the communications campaigns used by both proponents and
opponents. Although the study revealed quite a bit about how these factors
influence the results of this type of ballot measure, the conclusions drawn were
tentative at best, due in part to the small number of cases studied.
The current study uses the same case study methodology as the prior study to
obtain data on recent ballot measures in eleven communities from the past four
years. As in the prior study, each of the ballot measures had a substantial rail
transit component. Four of the communities had two similar ballot measures
within a three-year interval, with substantially different results between the
two measures. The existence of two recent measures in these communities
allowed systematic comparisons, facilitating an understanding of how the
transportation package and the process used to determine it, as well as how the
communications campaigns used by proponents and opponents may influence
the outcomes of these measures.
The small number of cases included the qualitative nature of most of the
potential explanatory variables, and the interactions and correlations among
these variables prevent the use of rigorous quantitative analytical techniques
that isolate the quantitative impact of explanatory variables on voting behavior.
A simple quantitative analysis was conducted that consisted of identifying
instances in which the result of the ballot measure was the opposite of what
would have been predicted based upon the value of each of a series of
explanatory variables. As an example, extensive stakeholder involvement in
the development of the transportation package was predicted to be a
component of a successful ballot measure. If a community was found to clearly
exhibit stakeholder involvement, and yet the measure in that community failed,
an “anomaly” was identified. Similarly, an anomaly was also indicated if a
community did not clearly exhibit stakeholder involvement, and still managed
to pass a measure. The number of anomalies was tabulated separately with
each explanatory variable and the number was used as a general indicator of
the extent to which each variable was a good predictor of success or failure.
Most of the explanatory variables had only a small number of anomalies,
suggesting that these variables may indeed have some explanatory and even
predictive value. Some of the important conclusions are identified as follows:
Executive Summary
Mineta Transportation Institute
2
• The combination of energetic and credible opposition and a questionable
reputation of the transit agency and/or the transit system make it extremely
difficult for a ballot measure to be successful.
• When a community has no prior rail transit system, a comprehensive rail-
only package is extremely unlikely to be successful.
• Without approximately $1 million or more to spend on a combination of
direct mail and television advertising it is difficult for proponents to be
successful. (The amount needed may be less in smaller communities with
lower costs of local television advertising.)
• It is extremely difficult to be successful in fundraising without having the
business community and key elected officials enthusiastically support the
ballot measure.
• The degree of enthusiasm that the business community and key elected
officials hold is apparently influenced by the degree to which they are
involved in developing the transportation package. They are more likely to
be enthusiastic supporters if they are involved in the development of the
package.
• Involving the business community, key elected officials, and possibly
representatives from environmental organizations can make it difficult to
develop a consensus about a specific transportation package that can be
enthusiastically supported by all groups and key individuals. Each group
often does not have a common vision on the desirability of different modes
of transportation, let alone a common vision of the specific aspects of a
package.
• Developing a consensus transportation package depends on the specific
details of the package and it is very difficult to generalize about the needed
details. They will vary from community to community. As a general
example, the inclusion of a highway component was important with some
successful measures but this same component might have hindered success
in other communities that were successful when a highway component was
absent. An understanding of the importance of the specific dimensions of a
transportation package can be gained only from reading each specific case
analysis.
• Under certain circumstances, voters do not appear to place significant
importance on the existence or length of the expiration date of the tax used
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to fund the transportation package. Based upon the results of prior studies,
it was predicted that an expiration date of 10 years or less typically was
needed for success. This prediction was not valid with any of the successful
cases.
Many aspects of the communications campaign do not lend themselves to even
the simple analysis method used. As with the nature of the transportation
package, the specific dimensions of the communications campaigns are
extremely important and yet to generalize about the appropriate specific
dimensions is very difficult. The information contained in each case analysis
may provide ideas about the successful (and less successful) aspects of
communications campaigns used by proponents and opponents. Proponents
who conduct opposition research prior to the commencement of a campaign to
try to predict both the nature of the opposition and the arguments likely to be
used are more successful. This research is important largely because the
opposition typically relies on communicating its message through the news
media and short response times exist in dealing with these media. In addition,
because news coverage of these ballot measures tends to be at least moderately
intensive even during a general election, some of the more successful
proponent campaigns took a proactive and energetic approach with the news
media. Conversely, none of the unsuccessful cases took such an approach.
Executive Summary
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INTRODUCTION
AND DESCRIPTION OF METHODOLOGY
BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF REPORT TOPIC
This research project seeks to identify factors contributing to the success, as
well as those contributing to the failure, of local transportation ballot measures
with a substantial passenger rail component. More specifically, the focus is on
actionable success and failure factors related to the transportation package and
the process used to develop it, and the communication campaigns employed by
both proponents and opponents of each measure.
Recent ballot measures in eleven different communities have been studied,
with data collected through interviews and written documentation. The
communities are listed below, with both the result and year of the election in
parentheses.
• Alameda County, California (approved, 2000).
• Austin, Texas and other smaller communities in the Capital Metro Transit
District (rejected, 2000).
• Charlotte, North Carolina and other smaller communities in Mecklenburg
County (approved, 1998).
• Columbus, Ohio (rejected, 1999).
• Denver, Colorado and other smaller communities in its Regional
Transportation District (approved, 1999).
• Phoenix, Arizona (approved, 2000).
• St. Louis County, Missouri (rejected, 1997).
• Salt Lake, Davis, and Weber Counties, Utah (approved, 2000).
• San Antonio, Texas and other smaller communities in its metropolitan
transit district (rejected, 2000).
• Santa Clara County, California (approved, 2000).
• Sonoma County, California (rejected, 2000).1
1Approximately 60% of voters supported a sales tax measure to fund a rail transit system,
which is the fifth highest supporting percentage of all cases studied. However, since California
requires a supermajority two-thirds voting percentage for specific purpose local tax measures,
the Sonoma County measure did not receive a sufficient approval percentage for passage.
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Four of these eleven communities presented a prior measure to voters within
three years of the most recent measure. Adding these four ballot measures
results in a total of 15 ballot measures studied, with seven of the measures
receiving support from over 50% of voters and eight receiving support from
less than 50% of voters.
This study is a follow-up to a prior study conducted by Haas, Massey, Valenty,
and Werbel (2000). Part of this prior study, which is briefly summarized later
in this chapter in the “literature review” section, had essentially the same
objectives as this current study. However, because the prior study included
only four ballot measures, with two of them being in the greater San Francisco
Bay Area, the current study includes a larger sample of ballot measures, with
the hopes of identifying more nationally relevant findings.
IMPORTANCE OF THE RESEARCH TOPIC
The study of factors influencing voting patterns on local ballot measures
involving funding for transportation improvements with a substantial rail
component is important for two reasons. First, based upon prior voting results,
it is difficult to obtain voter approval of these ballot measures, particularly on
the first attempt, with the success rate being less than 50% on first-attempt
measures. Those considering such measures need to have a good
understanding of things to both do and avoid doing when only a few mistakes
possibly can cause a measure to fail. Second, for reasons discussed below, it is
likely that a large number of communities will attempt to obtain voter approval
of ballot measures to provide funding for transportation packages with a
substantial rail component in the next ten years or so.
A number of factors, including typical linking of federal funding to local
matching of funding, have contributed to the need for a local funding source
for transit improvements. Although a number of communities were able to
obtain a dedicated source of transit funding a number of years ago, most of
these communities did not have sufficient funding to construct, let alone
operate, a substantial rail transit component prior to 1990.
Rapid population growth, particularly in many Sun Belt communities during
the past ten or twenty years, has resulted in rail transit becoming a feasible
option in a larger number of communities. This increased feasibility of rail
transit in a larger number of communities, combined with the need to provide
additional local funding for the construction and operation of rail transit
systems, has resulted in a relatively large number of recent ballot measures.
For example, based upon the above list, at least nine communities had a ballot
measure to provide funding for a transportation package with a substantial rail
transit component in 1999 or 2000 alone. Continued population growth in
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other communities, combined with successful ballot measures in midsize but
high growth communities, such as Salt Lake County and Phoenix, probably
will result in additional communities attempting to obtain voter approval of
funding for rail transit systems. In addition, communities, such as Austin, San
Antonio, Columbus, and Sonoma County, which have been unsuccessful with
recent ballot measures, probably will attempt to obtain voter approval in the
future. Even communities, such as Denver, which have been successful in the
past, probably will try to obtain future funding to expand their current rail
transit system.
LITERATURE REVIEW
A literature search identified only three prior studies that have studied factors
that influence voting behavior in local ballot measures providing funding for
transportation. Each of these three prior studies is discussed in the remainder of
this section.
The Prior Study (Haas, Massey, et al., 2000)
The prior study, upon which this project is based, consisted of both a case
analysis approach, primarily using qualitative depth interviews with key
participants, and regression analysis, using secondary data, to study factors
influencing voting results with local transportation ballot measures.
The case analysis portion of the study included ballot measures in four
communities. Each of the four communities had ballot measures with a
substantial rail transit component, with the proposed funding source being a
sales tax increase. Variables pertaining to a) the transportation package, b) the
process used to determine the transportation package, with a focus on both the
roles of research and coalition building, and c) communications campaign
approaches used by proponents and by opponents. The four communities are
listed below, with the year of the ballot measure and the result included in
parentheses.
• Denver, Colorado Regional Transportation District (1997, rejected).
• Santa Clara County, California (1996, approved).
• Seattle, Washington greater metropolitan area (1996, approved).
• Sonoma County, California (1998, rejected).
Two different datasets were used in the regression analysis. One was a national
dataset consisting of 57 local transportation ballot measures between 1990 and
1998. The second was a California only dataset consisting of 63 local ballot
measures between 1980 and 1998. Only a limited number of the ballot
measures in each dataset had a substantial rail component and some did not
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have a transit component. A wide variety of funding sources were used, and
significant variance existed in the costs of the transportation packages. Of the
nine independent variables included in the national dataset, only one involved
a characteristic of the transportation package (the number of modes included in
the transportation package). The remaining variables measured a) demographic
characteristics, such as the percentage of people over sixty-five years of age in
the community, b) transportation characteristics, such as travel time, and c)
size of the community, population growth, and population density. The eight
independent variables used in the California dataset were similar to those used
in the national dataset with the biggest difference being the omission of the one
variable in the national dataset that measured a characteristic of the
transportation package.
Of the two approaches, the case analysis approach appears to generate more
significant results because it focuses on variables that appear to have a greater
impact on voting behavior than the variables studied with the regression
approach. More specifically, voting behavior appears to be more sensitive to
differences in both the transportation packages and the communication
campaigns used by proponents studied with the case approach than to
differences in community characteristics studied with the regression approach.
The Seattle case study was particularly useful in demonstrating that
characteristics of the transportation package, the process used to determine it,
and the communications campaign used have a significant impact on results.
This case allows a within community comparison, since a measure somewhat
similar to the 1996 measure had been defeated in 1995. The 1995 measure
received support from 47% of voters compared to a supporting percentage of
56.5% with the 1996 measure. Since the community characteristics in Seattle
were virtually identical in 1996 as in 1995, this moderately large difference in
results could not have been caused by community characteristics. Rather, the
difference in results appear to have been caused by a combination of some
differences between the 1995 and 1996 transportation packages and
differences between the 1995 and 1996 communication campaigns used by
proponents. Four communities included in this current project also allow a
within community comparison because each one had two ballot measures
within a three year time frame. As identified in Table 1-1 below, the within
community difference between two ballot measures in the percentage of voting
support is larger in each of the four relevant communities in the current project
than the difference in Seattle. Thus, the results in Table 1-1 demonstrate that
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voting behavior is quite sensitive to differences in both the transportation
packages and the communication campaigns used by proponents.
Table 1-1. Within Community Differences in Voting Results
(In communities with two ballot measures within a three year period)
Although the differences in Table 1-1 above cannot be explained by
community characteristics, none of the cases in the table were structured in a
manner to measure the impact of community characteristics on voting results.
An across community study would be needed to accurately access the degree
of impact of community characteristics on voting results. The regression
analyses used in the prior study did allow such an across community analysis,
but the only variable that appeared to be correlated with voting behavior with
both datasets was the percentage of the population in each community
consisting of people at least sixty-five years of age. Moreover, the direction of
the correlation with the California dataset was opposite the direction found
with the national dataset.
In sum, the campaign and proposal characteristics appear to have more impact
on voting behavior than do community characteristics. In addition, because the
transportation package, the process used to formulate it, and the
communications campaign used all are largely actionable, focusing on the
impact of these characteristics on voting behavior will provide more useful
information to those communities developing transportation ballot measure
and attempting to obtain their passage than focusing on the impact of
uncontrollable community characteristics on voting behavior. Accordingly, it
appears to be more important to study the impact of transportation package and
communications campaign characteristics on voting behavior than to study the
impact of community characteristics on voting behavior.
Supporting
Percentage in
First Ballot
Measure
Supporting
Percentage in
Second Ballot
Measure
Difference in
Supporting
Percentage Between
Two Measures
Alameda County 58% (1998) 81.5% (2000) 23.5 percentage points
Denver 42.2% (1997) 66% (1999) 23.8 percentage points
Phoenix 49.9% (1997) 65% (2000) 24.9 percentage points
Sonoma County 47.6% (1998) 60.2% (2000) 12.6 percentage points
Seattle 47% (1995) 56.5% (1996) 9.5 percentage points
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Beale, Bishop, and Marley (1996)
These researchers also studied the impact of the transportation package and the
process used to formulate it, along with the impact of the communications
campaigns used, on voting results with local transportation ballot measures,
using onsite visits to 22 sites. In addition to these 22 cases, the authors listed 82
additional cases that were included in the study. The authors did not describe
the nature or amount of the information collected with these 82 additional
cases.
The conclusions of the Beale, Bishop, and Marley study helped identify
relevant variables for questioning in both our prior (Haas, Massey, et al., 2000)
and current studies. Beale, Bishop, and Marley presented only two conclusions
related to the nature of communications campaigns used. One of these
conclusions discussed the conditions in which a special election is more likely
to succeed vs. the conditions in which a general election is more likely to
succeed. The second conclusion focused on ballot language recommendations.
Our prior study, as well as the current one, have been designed to break more
new ground concerning communications campaigns than Beale, Bishop, and
Marley apparently learned about the nature of the impact of these campaigns
on voting behavior.
Since Beale, Bishop, and Marley did not provide a categorization of the nature
of the transportation options involved, the number of cases they studied that
did not involve a substantial rail component cannot be identified. However
their discussion suggests that many of their cases did not have a substantial rail
component, or even a transit component. Some transportation package and
funding issues probably are more difficult to resolve with transportation
packages involving a substantial rail component. For example, since many
communities considering a rail system have no current rail system in place and
since rail systems are expensive to construct, it is difficult to propose a rail
system that provides benefits to a majority of voters while not significantly
increasing taxes for a lengthy time period. In contrast, many of the cases
studied by Beale, Bishop, and Marley apparently involved funding only for
road maintenance and improvements. It is relatively easy to provide these
benefits at a low cost while, at the same time, making improvements
throughout the community. In addition, the communication campaigns used by
opponents, as well as the nature of the opposition itself, tend to be different
when rail is a substantial component of the transportation package than when it
is not a component. Since some of the issues involving ballot measures with a
substantial rail component are different than the issues involving measures
without this component, the Beale, Bishop, and Marley study has limited
relevance to the focus of our research project.
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Middleton (1998)
Unlike Beale, Bishop, and Marley’s study, Middleton focused exclusively on
ballot measures with a substantial rail component. Middleton’s approach
involved asking approximately six transit officials to identify the factors
influencing voting behavior and to make recommendations likely to increase
the chances of voter approval. The 1995 and 1996 ballot measures in the
Seattle metropolitan area are the only ones described in any detail. The primary
problem with Middleton’s approach is that the recommendations are not
systematically tested against actual ballot measures. In addition, the
recommendations do not discuss a number of critical issues such as the
existence and length of expiration dates, magnitude of tax increase, whether
and how to respond to opposition, what combination of media and messages to
use for advertising, and when and how to combine rail and highway
components.
Summary of Literature Review
The literature review has demonstrated the need to generate a larger number of
actual ballot measures with a substantial rail component than has existed in
prior studies. In addition, as demonstrated previously by the large difference in
the results of two ballot measures within a short time period in the same
community (see Table 1-1), characteristics of the transportation package, the
process used to formulate the package, and the communications campaign used
by proponents can have a significant impact on voting results.
DESCRIPTION OF METHODOLOGY
The two primary methodological decisions with this study were a) the number
and identity of the ballot measures selected, and b) the nature of the
information collected and the means of collecting it. Each of these two
decision areas is briefly described below.
The Identity and Number of the Ballot Measures Selected
Each ballot measure selected had to meet three criteria. The first two of these
three criteria were based upon the focus of this project, which is on ballot
measures that involve funding for transportation packages with a substantial
rail component. Thus, any ballot measure selected had to a) have a substantial
rail component, and b) have a funding component. The third criterion, which
involved eliminating any ballot measure prior to 1997, was needed because
much of the information has been collected through qualitative depth
interviews. Since a failure of interviewees to accurately recall all relevant
information would compromise the integrity of the information, it was
necessary to eliminate ballot measures prior to 1997. A systematic search of
Introduction and Description of Methodology
Mineta Transportation Institute
12
ballot measures identified 11 communities with ballot measures meeting these
three criteria.
As a group, the ballot measures and communities included in this project have
a number of desirable characteristics that make them appropriate for in-depth
study.
• As discussed previously, four of the eleven communities have had two
ballot measures since 1997. Since this characteristic allows community
characteristics to be held constant, it facilitates an understanding of the
extent that changes in the nature of the transportation package, and/or
changes in the communications campaign used by proponents can
influence voting behavior.
• A wide range of voting results exists. Supporting percentages range from a
low of 30% in San Antonio to a high of 81% in Alameda County. Since the
percentage of voters supporting a measure essentially is the dependent
variable in this study, variability with the dependent variable is needed to
derive an understanding of the variables that influence voting behavior.
• More than token opposition existed to the ballot measure in eight of the
eleven communities. Since opposition to passenger rail often exists, much
can be learned from the strategies and tactics employed by opposition. In
addition, much can be learned about the effectiveness of various means that
proponents employ in attempting to counter opposition.
• Variance exists in both the nature of the transportation packages and the
process used to determine them. Some of the measures consisted only of
passenger rail transit, other measures had both a passenger rail and a bus
component, and still other measures had a passenger rail and/or bus
component combined with a highway component, with the highway
component either being in the same measure or in a companion measure. In
terms of the process used to formulate the package, significant differences
in the degree of both public and political involvement exist across
measures. This variance is required to understand how the nature of the
transportation package and the process used to formulate it influence
voting behavior.
• Variance exists in the communications campaigns employed by proponents
across measures, particularly in the approaches employed to deal with
opposition. In some instances the opposition was essentially ignored, and
in other instances the opposition was attacked with differences in both the
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nature and intensity of these attacks.
Means of Collecting Information
The information to be collected included a) the process used to formulate the
transportation package along with the characteristics of the package itself, b)
the communications campaign used by proponents, c) the communications
campaign used by opponents, d) relevant background information on the
transportation system, the political and legal environment, and characteristics
of the population, e) the nature and extent of coverage by the mass media,
particularly local newspapers and radio stations, and f) research results
identifying voter attitudes and voting motivations.
Much of the information could be collected only through qualitative in-depth
interviews with different people within each community. Although the nature
of the people interviewed varied somewhat from community to community, at
least one person typically was interviewed from:
• The transit agency;
•; The transit Board;
• An ad hoc committee or task force involved in formulating the
transportation package if such an organization existed;
• The business community, typically a Chamber of Commerce;
• An environmental organization;
• The group responsible for developing the proponents’ communications
campaign,;
• The leaders of the opposition;
• The local newspaper, and
• The political structure, typically a local elected official.
Unless a person interviewed was a prominent elected official, the name of the
person typically has been omitted from the case discussions in the remaining
chapters.
In addition to the interviews with people from most or all of the above
categories, documentary information was collected. Much of the documentary
information was collected prior to conducting the interviews, since this
information often was helpful in identifying specific interview topics and
issues. The different types of documentary information collected were:
• Newspaper articles and editorials;
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• Copies of ads used by proponents and opponents;
• Long range transportation plans;
• Major investment/corridor studies and other similar studies conducted.
(For example, opponents often prepare reports or studies that discuss costs
and ridership of light rail systems.);
• The actual ballot measures;
• Ballot arguments in voter information pamphlets;
• Population, demographic, and transportation statistics; and
• Survey and/or focus group results of citizen attitudes toward the
transportation system, and the ballot measure.
The last item in the above list is one of the most useful types of information. In
a study, such as this one, which attempts to understand voting behavior,
information obtained directly from the voters, such as exit polling, is extremely
useful. Results from surveys and tracking studies conducted prior to the
election often were conducted and were provided to the researchers involved in
this project. Unfortunately, exit polling and other types of post election voter
research were not conducted with the vast majority of the ballot measures
studied.
To insure that the description of each case is accurate and complete, at least
two people interviewed were sent drafts of each onsite case for review and
feedback and at least one person interviewed was sent a draft of each telephone
case.
ORGANIZATION OF REMAINDER OF THIS REPORT
Chapters two through eight each focus on a single case with which onsite
interviewing was used. Chapter nine includes four cases with which telephone
interviewing was used. The results of the cases are integrated and synthesized,
and conclusions are stated in chapter ten. Since insights can be drawn through
contrast, the chapters are sequenced by whether or not they were successful,
alternating between an unsuccessful one and a successful one.
To facilitate reading, the organization of each chapter is the same. After a short
introduction, relevant background information is described about the
transportation system, past ballot measures, population and demographic
statistics, geography, and the political/legal environment. Following this
background information, the process used to develop the transportation
package along with a description of the package and its funding is discussed.
The communications campaigns and strategies, along with the coverage of the
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measure in the media are then described. Each chapter concludes with an
evaluative discussion of important and unusual issues involved with the case
and a concluding discussion of factors contributing to the success or failure of
the measure.
Since this is a lengthy report, readers will be tempted to read only the final
chapter. This approach is not recommended as many specific ideas and insights
will be lost with this reading approach. At a minimum, readers are encouraged
to read the evaluation and conclusion sections of each chapter.
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ST. LOUIS: A SETBACK FOR MEASURE M
AND METROLINK (1997)
In November of 1997, voters in St. Louis County rejected, by a 58% to 42%
margin, a 1/4-cent sales tax increase that would have primarily funded
additional lines for an existing light rail system known as MetroLink. Voters in
St. Louis County voted “no” on Proposition M, 58% to 42%. Although voters
in St. Louis barely passed the measure, 50.4% to 49.6%, both jurisdictions
needed to pass it for the tax increase to occur. Supporters of the measure
estimated that the tax hike would have brought in about $43 million a year.
They claimed that two thirds of the money would have gone to MetroLink
expansion; the remainder would have helped fund existing bus and light rail
service. Adding to the failure was the defeat of a similar measure in
neighboring Madison (Illinois) County that would have funded expansion
eastward. (See Table 10-1 in the last chapter).
For supporters of the measure, the defeat was ironic in that MetroLink is
considered a popular and successful light rail system. Tracking polls conducted
prior to the vote suggested that public support for the measure was substantial.
How and why was the measure rejected by a substantial majority of the voters?
This case represents an example of how fragile support for public
transportation projects can be, and how proposals to improve transit can
become mired in petty political squabbles.
BACKGROUND: TRANSPORTATION AND TRAFFIC
Located in both Illinois and Missouri, the St. Louis metropolitan region has a
population of nearly 2.5 million people, including 1,324,442 registered voters.
Eight major jurisdictions comprise the region, which covers 4,487.3 square
miles. Within the region there are 904,743 households whose average size is
2.6 persons. 8.1% of the region’s families have incomes below poverty level
and 10.8% of the total population has incomes below the poverty level. There
are 17,662 miles of roads in the region including 490 miles of interstate
highways. There are 9,850 miles of urban roadways and 7,812 miles of rural
roadways. Most people in the region drive to work and 79.9% of them drive to
work alone. About 3% of the workforce uses public transportation to get to
work. The region is home to 21 Fortune 1000 companies and ranks sixth in the
United States as a headquarters location for Fortune 500 companies (East-West
Gateway Coordinating Council, 2000a).
The City of St. Louis includes a population of 341,869. The City is poorer than
the surrounding County, with a median household income of just $19,458
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annually, versus $31,837 annually in the County. 20.6 percent of City families
and 24.6% of the total population have incomes below poverty level. 66.5% of
workers drive to work alone in the City and about 12.2% take public
transportation. The City of St. Louis voted to separate itself from St. Louis
County in 1876 and is the only city in Missouri not within a county. (East-West
Gateway Coordinating Council, 2000b).
Other important components of the metropolitan area include St. Charles
County in Missouri and Madison and St. Clair Counties, both located in Illinois
across the Mississippi River. Thousands of workers commute into and around
the metropolitan area from these jurisdictions and beyond. As the population
and economy of the region continue to expand, traffic and congestion have
worsened. Among the factors contributing to the region’s traffic woes are the
following:
• St. Louis residents make 6 million vehicle trips each day. Of these 6 million
trips, 5 million are single occupancy vehicle trips.
• 80% of the St. Louis workforce drives alone to work. In the City of St.
Louis, 66.5% of all workers drive alone to work. In St. Louis County,
84.3% of all workers commute alone to work.
• Only 3% of the work-related trips are made on local transit.
• On average, people make 3.9 vehicle trips per day. (Citizens for Modern
Transit, 2000)
However, St. Louis has been proactive in attempting to ameliorate its traffic
problems. In 1994, MetroLink, the light rail system, was opened. Voters at that
time approved a 1/4-cent sales tax increase, which helped to fund the system.
Additional funding came from the Federal Government. MetroLink presently
consists of an 18-mile line that runs from East St. Louis (across the Mississippi
from St. Louis) to Lambert Field, the St. Louis airport. An expansion into St.
Clair County opened in May of 2001; in 1993 St. Clair County voters approved
a 1/2-cent sales tax to help pay for the new line, which is also receiving federal
funding. In 1995, voters in St. Charles County (west of St. Louis) twice voted
down proposals to fund a light rail extension into that part of the area.
In many ways, the MetroLink and the St. Louis area Bi-State transit system
exemplify success in American mass transit. In 1995, MetroLink became the
most popular light rail line in the United States; 54.2 million St. Louis residents
rode public transportation in 1997-1998. MetroLink ridership continues to
grow, and now averages 44,500 riders per day. On a single day (July 4, 1999)
160,883 rode MetroLink. The American Public Transit Association selected
St. Louis: A Setback for Measure M and MetroLink (1997)
Mineta Transportation Institute
19
MetroLink as the first recipient of its Outstanding Achievement Award for
Light Rail. The number of riders has exceeded projected ridership from the
start, increasing every year.
Thus, when community figures began plans to ask voters for an additional 1/4-
cent sales tax increase that would have helped expand the MetroLink system,
optimism about the proposal’s chances for success was justifiably widespread.
BACKGROUND: POLITICAL HISTORY
Transit in the St. Louis area is the responsibility of the Bi-State Development
Agency, which operates the MetroLink system, as well as bus and paratransit
van transportation. “Bi-State” refers to the States of Missouri and Illinois. In
St. Louis (both the City and the County), Bi-State services are funded via the
sales tax; in Illinois, individual counties contract with Bi-State for the
provision of transit services.
A Mayor and a 28-member Board of Aldermen govern the city. A seven-
member County Council governs surrounding St. Louis County. Local
elections are partisan, meaning that partisanship can and does enter into public
debate about local transportation issues. Additionally, the East-West Gateway
Coordinating Council is the Metropolitan Planning Organization (MPO) for
the area. Its six-member Board of Directors represents eight area counties, as
well as the City of St. Louis and the State of Missouri. Additionally, Citizens
for Modern Transit is a nonprofit organization that provides campaign support
for transit-related issues. On the whole, according to interviewees, elected
officials—as opposed to transit agency staff—have tended to be the instigating
forces behind the push for expanded rail transit. Particularly, the East-West
Gateway Coordinating Council has played a leadership role in developing
plans for the transit system, although as a federally funded agency, its role in
ballot campaigns is circumscribed.
According to interviewees, the original 1/4-cent sales tax for the MetroLink
system (passed in 1994) was inadequate for the planned expansion of the
system. The increases in the proceeds from the tax that had been projected
were not materializing. In fact, the system was generating a shortfall in
operating expenses without expansion. Additionally, federal funding for
MetroLink operations had been slated to be drastically curtailed.
Discussions about the need for an additional source of funding for MetroLink
expansion began in earnest early in 1997. Impetus for the tax increase proposal
came from a variety of civic leaders, spearheaded by the St. Louis business
community. Civic Progress, a group of the region’s largest firms, bankrolled
much of the pro-proposition campaign.
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Focus groups and public opinion surveys were commissioned, both initially
revealing reasons for optimism about the prospects for such a proposal.
Although the proposal had the nominal support of the Mayor, he did not
wholly embrace or actively campaign for it. The nonelected County Executive
also supported the measure.
Public transit, and specifically MetroLink, is very popular in St. Louis. The
existing MetroLink line is extremely accessible and useful to many areas of the
city – it provides a direct link between the airport and downtown St. Louis,
including the Kiel Arena and Busch Stadium, both professional athletics
venues. The MetroLink is, in fact, a point of civic pride for the region,
according to several interviewees. For example, the polling consultant used by
the measure’s supporters found that survey respondents tended to exhibit
greater support for any tax measure that mentioned the MetroLink system by
name.
Moreover, a 1994 survey found extremely broad support for not only
MetroLink, but also the Bi-State agency and the City. Predictably, perhaps, the
survey also found that those who rode the transit system were more likely to
hold it in favorable regard. The poll further found that 45% of City respondents
and 40% of those in the County had made at least one trip on MetroLink —
numbers that were likely higher at the time of the 1997 vote. Support expressed
for bus services was somewhat less, although still formidable with a majority
finding bus services “excellent” or “good.”
For these reasons, and perhaps because of the significant federal funds that had
enabled creation of the system, the 1994 1/4-cent sales tax increase measure
passed comfortably, with 66% of St. Louis, and 60% of St. Louis County
residents voting in favor. In some respects, proponents of the 1997 measure
had little reason to believe that passing an additional tax would prove
problematic.
CREATING A TRANSPORTATION INITIATIVE
The ballot initiative that was advanced by the coalition of transit supporters
was notable for its lack of specificity. It simply asked whether voters favored a
1/4-cent increase in the sales tax “for transportation purposes.” In the early
1990s, the East-West Gateway Board of Directors agreed on a general plan that
outlined which areas would get extensions first, although this plan was hardly
set in stone.
By their own admission, supporters of the tax initiative did not seek to use a
open, broad based approach to crafting a ballot proposal or an accompanying
transportation plan; Proposition M was planned more or less behind closed
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doors. Given the looming threat of an operating funds shortfall, the emphasis
was on ensuring that MetroLink was able to garner the additional funds (i.e.,
1/4-cent sales tax) enabled by the state earlier in the decade. Although a
general plan for the location of additional lines had been circulated for years,
relatively little effort was paid to delineating the specifics of how the increased
revenues would be spent. This lapse would prove to be potentially a costly one
to the supporters’ efforts to pass the tax measure.
The failure to open up the planning process was perhaps a result of the
perceived contentiousness among factions in St. Louis. “We have one of the
best, new light rail systems in the country. But now we have so many factions,
we can't agree on how to expand it—so it may not expand,” said Les Sterman,
executive director of the East-West Gateway Coordinating Council.
Had the measure passed, the tax would have begun in January 1999 and was
projected to generate $34 million per year, primarily to be put toward a
MetroLink extension each year. The existing 1/4-cent tax generates about
$33.5 million in St. Louis County and more than $8 million in St. Louis. Two-
thirds of the money was planned to go to MetroLink expansion and one-third
to help the Bi-State agency operate the bus and light rail service. Although Bi-
State was not legally committed to spending the proceeds from the tax in a
specific way, East-West Gateway Coordinating Council officials said the
money would have financed MetroLink extensions in south St. Louis County
and to suburban Florissant by 2010. The money might also have paid for one to
three possible routes in south St. Louis and St. Louis County, north St. Louis
and St. Louis County, or west St. Louis County by 2015.
USE OF RESEARCH TECHNIQUES
Supporters of the tax measure used market research extensively, primarily in
the form of public opinion polling. Indeed, according to interviewees,
favorable polling numbers in the months prior to November election were an
important factor in convincing supporters to place the proposal on the 1997
ballot. Ironically, some observers believe that errors made interpreting the
market research data may have led to strategic errors on the part of the transit
tax measure’s supporters.
Terry Jones, a political science professor at University of Missouri - St. Louis,
conducted tracking polls. In April of 1997 (approximately six months before
the election), a survey was conducted that tested support for increasing the
public transit sales tax from 1/4- to 1/2-cent, preferences about how to spend
the additional funds, and reactions to arguments for and against increasing the
tax. The survey asked, “what if there was an election this year to raise the
public transit sales tax in order to speed up the development and construction
St. Louis: A Setback for Measure M and MetroLink (1997)
Mineta Transportation Institute
22
of MetroLink lines. Would you vote for or against raising the public transit
sales tax from 1/4- to 1/2-cent to speed up the development and construction of
MetroLink?”
Responses to this key question were overwhelmingly encouraging to
supporters of a ballot measure: in both the City of St. Louis (70% yes, 26% no)
and the County (68% yes, 28% no), imposing majorities favored the idea of a
tax increase proposal. However, among those saying they were “very certain”
about their vote, the margins were closer to 50-50. Interestingly, support for a
tax increase expressed in this poll exceeded that measured in 1994 (just prior to
passage of the initial Proposition M) by about ten percentage points. In its three
years of existence, MetroLink has actually helped to increase support for
public transit in the St. Louis area.
Analysis of the April 1997 tracking poll results provides insights into the
nature of support for transit tax measures. The pollster (Terry Jones)
highlighted the following patterns of support (Jones, 1997):
• The best predictor of support for a transit tax increase was experience with
the MetroLink system: the more a respondent reported riding it, the more
likely he or she was to indicate support for the tax. For example, a 39-point
difference existed between frequent and nonriders of the MetroLink
system! Education was the second most important predictor, with
differences as large as 22 points between the most and least educated voters
in the sample.
• Whereas patterns of support were found (such as those above), the most
striking pattern was “the lack of any demographically or politically based
source of opposition.” Republicans were found to be about as supportive as
Democrats were, for example.
Given these encouraging results, the decision to go ahead with the sales tax
increase seems to have been made on a solid basis. Indeed, a series of tracking
polls conducted during the campaign for Proposition M seemed to provide
more ambiguous evidence that passing the measure would be a relatively easy
task. The polls, conducted several times after the initial April survey described
above, indicated relatively stable and strong support for the measure, ranging
from 53% to 66% in favor in the City and from 50% to 67% in the County.
However, these results may have provided supporters of the measure with a
false sense of security. This is because, whereas the survey questioned
respondents about their willingness to support a tax increase to pay for
expansion and development of the MetroLink system, the actual ballot
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proposition made no explicit mention of MetroLink. Thus, supporters may
have been overconfident and perhaps too complacent about prospects for the
measure at the voting booth. (In fact, opponents seized upon the wording of the
ballot—and the omission of explicit reference to MetroLink—as a means of
fomenting distrust about the measure among voters.)
DEVISING AND IMPLEMENTING A COMMUNICATIONS
CAMPAIGN STRATEGY
Supporters
According to interviewees, the basic strategy behind the supporters’ campaign
was to capitalize upon the existing positive affect for MetroLink identified in
the public opinion polls, while avoiding the potentially conflictive mention of
specific routes. This sort of strategy has been referred to as a “stealth
campaign,” in that it generally seeks to avoid specific issues that might
generate controversy. The idea is to motivate supporters to come and vote for
the proposition, while leaving potential opponents little cause to get interested
in the campaign. Light turnout was forecast for the election, because the
measure was the sole item on the special election ballot.
However, the stealth approach seems to have backfired against the measure’s
supporters. As questions about the routing of the already-funded Cross-County
expansion line began to create controversy, the campaign opted to avoid the
criticism. In the meanwhile, media attention to a small, poorly funded group of
outspoken opponents escalated. The lack of competing campaign issues and
candidates created a vacuum in which the media—in attempting to be fair to
both sides—provided opponents with a bonanza of free coverage. In the view
of measure supporters, opponents of the measure seemed to be receiving as
much coverage for free as the supporters were able to garner with their
relatively immense budget. Although the region’s major newspaper, the St.
Louis Post-Dispatch, endorsed the measure, Proposition M supporters were
ultimately unable to “control the message” about the tax measure.
As suggested by the following figures, campaign resources were divided fairly
equally between mass media and direct mail expenditures.
The supporters’ committee—known as “Connecting St. Louis”—reported
raising $922,095, with $500,000 of that total coming in the form of loans.
Some of the major expenses were:
• $229,739.36 for television and radio advertising production and television
air time.
• $199,738.20 for polling and a telephone bank.
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• $207,869.02 for direct mail expense.
• Approximately $80,000 for campaign management expenses.
• Approximately $25,000 for campaign contributions to local Democratic
campaign committees.
The campaign had originally planned to spend $500,000 and limit its broadcast
advertising to radio. When the opposition appeared stronger than had been
anticipated, the campaign decided to raise additional funds and turn to
television advertising (Post-Dispatch, Oct. 29, 1997). The ads began just days
before the election, consisting of reactions to opposition from some elected
officials and neighborhood organizations in various parts of the area. The
campaign treasurer stated, “We had to increase the budget because of mis-
information.”
Opponents
By contrast, the opponents’ committee, “Citizens Against Proposition M,”
reported raising a total of $13,900 and spending $14,123.02. More than half of
the total raised ($7,700) was in the form of in-kind services from an advertising
company owned by an opponent. The opponents’ largest monetary donation
was $100.
Opponents seized upon the vagueness of the ballot language—which did not
specify that funds would necessarily go to MetroLink expansion—to tap into
the larger public distrust of government. Additionally, the opponents were able
to make the argument that the transit agency (Bi-State Development) had not
delivered upon its promises made in the 1994 campaign. (Supporters concede
that the 1994 campaign did overpromise on what could be delivered with a 1/4-
cent tax level.) Opponents were thus successful in framing the issue as “trust in
the transit agency” or “trust in government,” rather than “support for
MetroLink.”
One opponent felt that the supporters failed to provide answers to basic
questions. “People wanted exact answers to questions like where is MetroLink
going, what route will be next, how much will expansion cost and when will it
arrive. I don't think people were expecting it to be at their door tomorrow, but
they wanted to know when they would see it, whether it was now or 20 years
from now.” Some perceived the vote as a demand for accountability, rather
than as a vote against light rail. One County Council member said she
commissioned a private poll among county voters before the election and
found that 69% of those surveyed felt their input wasn’t sought before the
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proposition was pushed. “They didn't feel involved...Slick advertising was not
enough.”
An editorial written by two opponents of the measure sums up the appeal
opponents successfully made to voters:
Advertisements for Proposition M claim two-thirds of the
revenue would go for MetroLink expansion. But that is a
meaningless campaign promise. It has no legal basis. The
legislation for Proposition M, which was passed by the St.
Louis Board of Aldermen and the St. Louis County
Council, does not require any of the funds to be spent on
MetroLink.
Nothing is definite about how these funds would be used.
There are no specific plans for MetroLink expansion and
no certainty on what the expansions will cost to construct
and operate (Post-Dispatch, Nov. 2, 1997).
Opponents also used the insufficiency of funds for all proposed routes in the
1994 measure to feed the cynicism of voters. One opponent stated that the tax
would give the transit agency only enough to build one of the possible
expansion routes: “Everyone needs to look closely at that map and see what
they're not going to get…two groups are going to be suckers” (Post-Dispatch,
Nov. 3, 1997).
EVALUATION
Ultimately, voters in St. Louis County disapproved of Proposition M, 58% to
42%. Voters in the City of St. Louis barely passed the measure, 50.4% to
49.6%. However, these percentages mask the extent of the defeat; the measure
lost by nearly 22,000 votes in the County, and passed by only 300 in the City.
Both jurisdictions needed to pass for the tax increase to take effect.
In hindsight, the defeat illustrates how precarious public support for transit
taxes can be. Despite encouraging polling results that suggested an easy
victory for the measure, a number of factors inveighed against a positive
outcome for Proposition M. The following section provides a discussion of
possible reasons for the failure of the measure, in no particular order.
Placement of the Proposal on a Special Election Ballot
Special elections are normally associated with a more conservative, anti-tax
electorate, but supporters of Proposition M were confident that they could
marshal a sufficient number of pro-transit voters. However, they did not
St. Louis: A Setback for Measure M and MetroLink (1997)
Mineta Transportation Institute
26
anticipate the extent to which opponents would receive free publicity and, in
effect, equal standing in the court of public opinion in the absence of other
races and issues. Turnout for the election was just 26%, and supporters failed
to attract adequate numbers of pro-transit voters.
Failure of Supporters to Identify a Specific Use of the Funds, Including a
Transportation Plan
Some observers blamed the defeat on the failure of supporters to clearly define
a transportation plan to provide voters with specifics about how the revenues
generated by the proposed tax would be spent. Pollster Terry Jones noted that
“many voters want a detailed plan about how money will be spent on which
lines in what order before they will commit to a yes vote. Talk about a planning
process is not sufficient.” In Jones’ view, opponents were able to use the lack
of specificity in the proposal to tap into voters’ more general distrust of
government. The campaign had suggested general corridors for the planned
expansion, but given the rapid timeline for the election, supporters did not have
time to conduct a full-scale planning process with public participation. Again,
the supporters were counting on the general public goodwill toward Metrolink
to carry the day. As it happened, specifics about the use of the tax funds did
appear to matter.
The lack of a well-publicized plan dovetailed with the ballot proposition
language, which was also vague. Pollster Jones concluded that, “If the issue is
whether the voters are willing to pay higher taxes for more Metrolink lines,
over 60% are favorable. If the issue is whether the voters trust government
institutions to spend the money on MetroLink expansion and operations, less
than 50% are favorable.” The failure to deliver on the promises made in the
1994 campaign may have contributed to the lack of voter trust in the claims
made by proponents in the 1997 campaign. To some extent, the lack of
specificity reflected a strategy that sought to mask disagreements among
transit supporters about funding priorities for new MetroLink routes. As
discussed below, additional routing disagreements developed nevertheless.
Controversy About Specific Routes for Extensions That Were already
Funded
Approximately one month before the vote, controversy erupted with respect to
the routing of an additional MetroLink line. Although this line had already
received sufficient funds from other sources to begin construction and was
therefore essentially irrelevant to the proposed tax increase, it was nevertheless
a source of great controversy. Briefly, the conflict arose over the decision to
take a route north of Forest Park from St. Louis to Clayton. Some community
leaders had wanted this route to take a more southern approach, which would
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have involved building a rather expensive tunnel. The City’s new Mayor,
Clarence Harmon, was a vocal opponent of the proposed route for the new
extension although he supported the tax measure. This placed him at odds with
the (elected) County executive, Buzz Westfall. Thus political leaders were
squabbling over the system at a time when a uniform stand might have
benefited the cause of MetroLink expansion.
The debate over the route decision became extremely contentious, and also
contained some seeds of partisanship because of the demographics of the
neighborhoods involved. Unfortunately, the conflict deepened and lasted until
the election was about to occur. Much of the dissatisfaction over the new route
was centered in western St. Louis County, a wealthier area whose approval was
viewed as critical by supporters of the measure.
Some supporters of the tax measure believe that this imbroglio poisoned the
well for the fortunes of the proposal. Voters may have begun to associate the
disagreement about the path of the extension with the funds to be generated by
the new tax. In any event, the event comprised extremely negative publicity for
MetroLink at a time when it needed to maintain its traditionally very positive
image. This controversy might not have sunk the measure, had the vote
occurred in a more complicated general election. However, in the absence of
other issues, the routing conflict easily spilled over into the Proposition M
campaign.
Partisan Opposition to the Plan
Although some of the polling data obtained by the measure’s supporters
suggested that partisanship did not affect support for Proposition M, the
campaign did ultimately invoke a degree of partisanship. Among the more
vocal opponents of the plan were several Republican members of the St. Louis
County Council, whose opposition may have served to mobilize “no” voters
from the western suburbs. On the Democratic side, the Mayor was at least a
nominal supporter of the measure, but his involvement in the routing
controversy (described above) tended to effectively nullify that support.
In any event, after the election officials from both parties accused one another
of allowing partisanship to affect the outcome. Democrats contended that
Republicans staged an orchestrated effort to defeat the proposal, and pointed to
its especially weak showing in Republican strongholds in St. Louis County.
Meanwhile, Republican opponents denied that and accused Democrats of
abusing their contributions from Republican-leaning companies because some
campaign spending went to Democratic operatives and party ward leaders
(Post-Dispatch Nov. 6, 1997).
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Dissatisfaction with Bus Service and the Transit Agency
Because Proposition M did not specify that the tax increase would be dedicated
to the expansion of MetroLink, opponents of the plan were able to appeal to the
relative unpopularity of the bus system. Responses to focus groups conducted
after the election confirms that the positive feelings for MetroLink are matched
by equally negative feelings about the bus system. Generally speaking, voters
like, and are willing to fund, rail transit much more than bus transit. The transit
agency has battled annual operating losses and suffers from a poor public
image (Post-Dispatch, Nov. 6, 1997).
The Other Proposition M Loses
Across the Mississippi in Madison County, Illinois, another Proposition M was
also defeated. The Madison tax measure would have raised the sales tax by
1/4-cent, raising an estimated $276 million by the year 2014. According to
supporters, the tax increase would be used to fund MetroLink route extensions
into Madison County, although no specific plan was offered to voters. In fact,
officials said that receipts from the tax, had it passed, would have been held in
escrow until planning began on the route.
Madison County’s Proposition M suffered a fate similar to the more publicized
St. Louis effort. Voters rejected the measure by a 62% - 38% margin. As in St.
Louis, supporters of the measure were encouraged by pre-election polling that
suggested an easy victory.
According to supporters, the Madison “M” campaign was only lightly funded
(approximately $70,000 was spent on radio ads and a direct mailing). The local
Democratic Party organization did not actively support the effort in the belief
that it would pass easily. At the same time, the local Republican leadership
vocally opposed the measure. The supporters’ strategy was to tie in the vote to
the St. Louis election, which backfired when the St. Louis measure lost.
CONCLUSIONS
Because no exit polling data are available, the cause for the defeat of
Proposition M may never be definitively known. However, the sum of the
potential causes here seems quite plausible as an explanation. As the St. Louis
Post-Dispatch (November 6, 1997) observed after the election:
Many [voters] wanted more specific routes, costs and
construction timetables. Many wanted a better public
process. One group wanted more money to go to bus
service. Others wanted all funds to go to build MetroLink.
Some thought the wording on the ballot – “for
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transportation purposes”—was too vague. Some wanted
assurance that MetroLink would go underground in their
neighborhoods. Others wanted light rail built on railroad
rights of way above ground so more money would be left
for extensions in their neighborhoods. Others were upset
because nothing had been built since the first sales tax for
public transit was passed in 1994. Some simply may think
the sales tax rates are too high.
The decisive defeat of Proposition M provides a crystalline example of the
fragility of public support for transportation related tax increases. That this
defeat occurred in the context of widespread public support for the MetroLink
system and apparent early support for the tax increase (as suggested by public
opinion polls) serves to accentuate this fact. Indeed, supporters of Proposition
M were perhaps blinded with overconfidence to the extend that they failed to
fully recognize the difficult task it would be to succeed, given the unfortunate
circumstances in which the election occurred.
Whereas it is difficult to assign accurate weight to each of the factors and
events that appeared to impact negatively on the outcome of the ballot
measure, a degree of consensus about the importance of several emerges from
interviewees and other resources. No one could have predicted the negative
atmosphere created by the strong and public disagreement over the route of the
already funded MetroLink expansion, which every interviewee cited as a
critical event. However, several lessons appear to emerge from this defeat.
First, although the controversy over the MetroLink expansion route was
possibly unavoidable, it is possible that it would not have been quite so
influential in the context of a general (and preferably presidential) election.
Similarly, the arguments put forth by opponents, both organized and otherwise,
might not have been nearly so salient were other issues and elections at stake.
The entire strategy of waging a so-called “stealth” campaign during a special
election is questionable.
Second, it appears likely that the lack of specifics provided by the tax
measure’s supporters harmed its credibility and popularity among some voters.
Given that the decision to vie for the tax increase came only months before the
election, this may have been more of a factor than the result of a hurried
decision making process. In hindsight, the measure’s supporters would have
done well to take additional time to involve and educate the public about how
the tax revenues would be spent. They clearly overestimated the value of the
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general popularity of MetroLink vis-à-vis deep-seated public skepticism about
management by government and the transit agency.
Thus, two conclusions emerge from this defeat: (1) supporters of transit tax
measures ought to weigh carefully the dangers of placing them on isolated
special election ballots, particularly if they plan to run a low-key “stealth”
campaign, and (2) although there may be a potential pitfall over specifying the
details of a transportation improvement plan, avoiding them altogether may
leave a campaign vulnerable to opponents’ likely counterstrategy. Hindsight,
of course, makes a complicated and difficult process seem much clearer and
simple.
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APPROVAL OF A LIGHT RAIL LINE IN THE
DENVER REGIONAL TRANSPORTATION DISTRICT
INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW
In November of 1999, voters in the Denver Regional Transportation District
(RTD) voted to allow the RTD to borrow $457 million with a repayment cost
of $779 million to fund a 19.7-mile light rail line along the Southeast I-25
corridor. (Hereafter, this will be termed the “SE Corridor.”)
Voters were not authorizing any change in the tax rate in this election. For
quite some time, the RTD had been receiving revenues from a .006 sales tax
(the equivalent of a 3/5-cent sales tax) within the District for the transit system.
Due to both population growth and increases in spending resulting from a
robust economy, the RTD estimated that the current tax rate would generate
sufficient revenue to fund the SE Corridor light rail line in conjunction with
$500 million of federal funding. Nevertheless, voter approval was required
under the statewide Taxpayers Bill of Rights (TABOR) through a TABOR
override election. TABOR override elections are needed in Colorado to
determine if voters give permission to spend, rather than being refunded, tax
revenue already collected in excess of TABOR limits.
The success of the 1999 measure, with 66% of voters supporting it, came on
the heels of a defeat of a passenger rail measure in 1997, which received
support from only 42.2% of voters. The primary difference between the two
measures was the magnitude of the light rail system. The 1999 measure
included only one light rail line along a single corridor, while the 1997
measure included a comprehensive passenger rail system along at least four
corridors. Another interesting feature of the 1999 ballot measure is that it was
accompanied by a separate statewide highway measure. Both the decision to
include only a single light rail line, and the decision to pair the measure with a
separate highway measure, were made to minimize effective opposition from
Bill Owens, the conservative Republican governor and other prominent elected
officials, one of the two leading newspapers, and others who opposed the 1997
measure. Since these decisions were extremely effective in minimizing
opposition, this case demonstrates how a transportation package can be
developed in a way that minimizes opposition in an environment in which it is
extremely difficult to minimize opposition.
Although this chapter focuses on the 1999 light rail ballot measure, some
relevant factors from the 1997 measure will be incorporated into this
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discussion. Readers interested in a detailed description of the 1997 measure
should refer to Haas, Massey, et al. (2000).
BACKGROUND: THE RTD AND ITS BOARD
The RTD includes all or parts of six counties and covers a large geographical
area. For example, Boulder, which is approximately 25 miles from Denver, is
in the northwest part of the district, and a portion of Douglas County, including
parts approximately 30 miles southwest of Denver, is also included.
The RTD Board consists of 15 elected members and is responsible only for
transit. Each member represents a designated district and each district is
constructed to have approximately the same population. As a result of an
election in 1998, the composition of the Board was significantly different in
1999 than it was in 1997. In 1997, less than a majority of the 15 members were
strong supporters of the GTR measure and one of the Board members led the
opposition to the measure. After the defeat of the 1997 transit measure, an
organization entitled Metro Transit, affiliated with the Chamber of Commerce,
was formed to recruit and elect pro-transit people in the 1998 election. These
results were successful as five of the seven people who were either opposed to
GTR or were less than enthusiastic supporters of it, including the lead
opponent, were replaced by pro-transit representatives in this election.
BACKGROUND: THE POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT
The Denver RTD is quite diverse politically. Both Denver and Boulder tend to
elect representatives from the Democratic Party while other portions of the
district tend to elect representatives from the Republican Party. This political
diversity also is represented at the statewide level, particularly in recent
gubernatorial elections. The governor during the 1997 ballot measure was a
Democrat. In 1998, Bill Owens, a conservative Republican, was elected as
governor in a very close election. Transportation was an important issue in this
gubernatorial election. Bill Owens’ position on transportation focused on
highway improvements and, along with other conservative Republicans, he
publicly opposed the 1997 RTD ballot measure.
Largely because of the political diversity within the RTD, transportation tends
to be a partisan political issue within the RTD, with many Republicans
opposing rail transit, particularly when it involves a tax increase. In this
environment in which transit is a partisan issue, and also one in which
Republicans are influential in many portions of the RTD, proponents wanted to
develop a package that would, at a minimum, prevent opposition from
Governor Owens and other prominent elected officials from the Republican
Party within the RTD. Of course, proponents hoped that they could obtain the
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endorsement of Governor Owens for the 1999 measure and this hope was
fulfilled. For reasons discussed in a later background section, Governor Owens
did endorse the 1999 light rail ballot measure.
BACKGROUND: COMPETING NEWSPAPERS
Two newspapers, the Denver Post and the Rocky Mountain News, are strong
competitors within the RTD. As might be expected, particularly in a diverse
political environment, each newspaper attempts to differentiate itself from the
other based in part on its editorial positions. The Rocky Mountain News tends
to take a more conservative editorial position than the Denver Post. The two
newspapers took different editorial positions on the 1997 measure, with the
Post supporting the measure and the News opposing it.
The objective of having the News take either a neutral position or a supportive
position on the 1999 measure was not as important as accomplishing this
objective with Governor Owens. However, it was perceived that
accomplishing this objective with Governor Owens would, at the same time,
accomplish it with the News. This perception proved to be accurate, as the
News did endorse the 1999 ballot measure.
BACKGROUND: THE TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM AND VOTER
ATTITUDES
Prior to the 1999 election, the transit system consisted of buses, including
some express buses using expressways and freeways, along with a 5.5-mile
light rail system in Denver that had been operating for a few years. In addition,
construction of a light rail line along the southwest corridor in Jefferson
County, connecting to the southern end of the prior line, was close to
completion. No new taxes were needed for the construction of this line.
The metropolitan area had a designated nonattainment status until the mid-
1990s, which precluded significant highway improvements. The only highway
changes involved the addition of high-occupancy vehicle (HOV) lanes on a
section of I-25 running north from Denver and on C-470, which runs in an
east-west direction south of Denver.
According to all people interviewed, the public viewed traffic congestion as a
high priority problem that was getting worse. In addition, the SE Corridor,
which was the only district corridor identified for improvement in the 1999
transit and highway measures, was viewed as the most congested corridor in
the district.
Voter research conducted after the defeat of the 1997 transit measure did not
signify a general rejection of light rail. More specifically, the five most
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common reasons stated by those voting against the 1997 measure are listed
below, along with the percentage of voters who stated each reason. Only the
fourth of these five reasons represents a general rejection of light rail.
• Plan too vague/don’t know what it costs/costs keep changing (33%).
• Too expensive/too big a project/taxes too high (31%).
• Don’t trust board to manage it/too much Board conflict/divisions (15%).
• Won’t be used/won’t reduce congestion/won’t reduce pollution (11%).
• Our area doesn’t get benefits/doesn’t help suburbs/our area doesn’t get
light rail (9%).
BACKGROUND: THE SOUTHEAST BUSINESS PARTNERSHIP
(SEBP)
A number of industrial parks are located along the SE Corridor and the number
of employees who work on this corridor is approximately the same as the
number who work in downtown Denver. One interviewee estimated that
approximately 122,000 people work along the SE Corridor, compared with an
estimate of 115,000 who work in downtown Denver (Neukirch, March 30,
2000). Many of the employees working along the SE Corridor are concentrated
in 15 office parks within a 4.5-mile area.
With the large number of employers in the SE Corridor, it is not surprising that
a business association was formed. Different specific associations and
partnerships have existed in the recent past, not all of which have consisted
strictly of employers. Only the two most recent associations are discussed here.
Shortly after the defeat of the 1997 transit measure, an association entitled the
Southeast Corridor Mobility Coalition was formed. This coalition consisted of
governmental representatives, as well as representatives from area businesses.
It advocated a multimodal solution to the transportation problems on the SE
Corridor and lobbied the federal government for funding of a multimodal
solution.
The SEBP was formed in January of 1998. Although this organization focused
on other issues, such as housing, it continued to advocate a multimodal
solution to traffic congestion on the corridor. The SEBP played a major role in
fundraising for both the highway and the transit ballot measures. According to
a representative of this organization, it also had an important role in
encouraging Governor Owens to enthusiastically support the transit measure.
This representative argued to Governor Owens that a multimodal solution was
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needed to obtain federal support. The fundraising ability of this organization
may have given it some leverage with the Governor.
BACKGROUND: GOVERNOR OWENS AND THE HIGHWAY
BALLOT MEASURE
Governor Owens is not a strong supporter of light rail and he also is publicly
opposed to tax increases. While he was State Treasurer, he publicly opposed
the 1997 RTD transit ballot measure. During the hotly contested 1998
gubernatorial campaign, Bill Owens pledged to oppose tax increases and also
pledged to widen I-25 along the SE Corridor, along with additional highway
improvements in the state through highway bonding. He did not recommend a
multimodal solution involving both highway widening and light rail
construction during the campaign. In addition, Governor Owens announced in
his inaugural address that he would withdraw $90 million of state funding for
light rail promised by the prior governor.
Once elected, Governor Owens tried to move quickly to obtain authority for
highway bonding. He thought that working through the legislature would be
the fastest route and he was able to obtain legislative approval for his highway
bonding proposal. The authority of the legislature to authorize this bonding
was successfully challenged in the courts. The court decision was announced
around May of 1999. This response from the judicial branch of government
forced Governor Owens to try to obtain highway bonding approval through a
statewide ballot measure and he moved quickly to get this on the ballot for
November of 1999. A significant portion of the $1.7 billion in Governor
Owens’ statewide measure was proposed for highway widening along the
same SE Corridor where the light rail line would be constructed. The highway
measure also was successful, with a supporting statewide percentage of 62%.
Two reasons were identified in interviews for the Governor’s decision to
support the 1999 RTD transit measure even though he opposed the 1997
measure. First, he knew that an environmental impact study of the highway
widening on the SE Corridor would need to be redone if the light rail project
was not approved. This environmental study would have significantly delayed
the highway widening and it also would have given environmentalists another
chance to block the highway construction through the environmental impact
process. The governor’s awareness of the importance of the light rail project to
the success of the highway project is demonstrated by his application of
pressure on the RTD to act quickly on the SE Corridor light rail project. He
exerted this pressure by having the state legislature pass a bill enabling him to
control federal transit formula funds if the RTD did not act on the SE Corridor
light rail project in a specified time period. Second, he expected the RTD to
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use their connections with environmental organizations to encourage
environmentalists to remain neutral on the highway measure.
BACKGROUND: VOTING PROCEDURES
Voters in Arapahoe, Adams, Douglas, and Jefferson Counties were required to
vote by mail. Only voters in Denver and Boulder Counties were allowed to
vote at actual polling places on Election Day. Mail ballots were mailed to
registered voters during the second week of October. Apparently, about 30%
of those voting by mail return their ballots within a few days of having
received them and about the same percentage tend to return them within a few
days of the deadline. The remaining mail ballots are spaced roughly equally
over the remaining three weeks or so.
THE TRANSIT PACKAGE AND THE PROCESS USED TO
DETERMINE IT
The transit package in the 1999 ballot measure was a subset of the one in the
1997 measure. The package in 1999 involved a total of 19.7 miles of light rail.
The proposed line started where the current line ends, which is about five miles
south of downtown, and ran 15.2 miles in a southeast direction along I-25
through Arapahoe County and part of Douglas County. A 4.5-mile spur along
1-225, running mostly east from the main line also was included in the
package.
Reasons for Proposing an Incremental Approach in the 1999 RTD
Measure
Although the light rail line included in the 1999 RTD ballot measure was
consistent with the recommendation in the SE Corridor MIS, this package was
significantly different than the package in the 1997 RTD ballot measure. In
addition to the light rail line on the SE Corridor, the 1997 transit package
included rail lines on both a west and east corridor, along with unspecified
transit improvements along two northern corridors, one through Boulder and
the other through Adams County. The estimate was about $8 billion for the
1997 measure compared with an estimate of less than $1 billion with the 1999
measure. The general manager of the RTD still plans to develop a system
similar to that in the 1997 measure. However, a decision was made to take an
incremental approach rather than a comprehensive approach, with the first new
increment being the SE Corridor. Three reasons existed for this decision and
each reason is described in the remainder of this subsection.
First, in a post election survey cited previously, the comprehensive nature of
the 1997 transit package was a significant concern to many respondents who
did not support the 1997 measure. In this study, 31% of those surveyed who
Approval of a Light Rail Line in the Denver Regional Transportation District
Mineta Transportation Institute
37
voted against the 1997 measure cited the high costs as a primary reason for
their opposition. Based on this result, the Board realized that being able to
present a transportation package with no tax rate increase would eliminate a
primary reason for voter rejection. A tax increase could be avoided only with a
single-corridor package.
Second, an incremental single-corridor package was required to obtain support
from the Governor and other conservative Republicans who normally would
not support an expensive light rail package. Since the Governor had publicly
pledged in the 1998 gubernatorial election to avoid any new taxes, he was
willing to support the Board’s measure only if it did not involve new taxes.
Having a transit package that did not require new taxes obviously was possible
only with an incremental package. Having the support of Governor Owens was
valuable for a few reasons. First, his support, which was mentioned in
advertising, was said to be important in a pre-election survey by many voters
who opposed the 1997 measure. Second, multiple interviewees indicated that
the Governor was helpful in persuading conservative Republicans, who were
opposed to the 1997 measure, to support the 1999 measure. Given that two of
the main claims advanced by proponents, namely less highway congestion and
less air pollution, were not convincingly supported by the MIS, minimizing
opposition was important.
Although it probably was a secondary factor considered by the RTD in their
decision to have a single-corridor package, this approach was needed to obtain
the editorial support of the Rocky Mountain News. The Denver Post had
supported the 1997 comprehensive measure in editorials. However, the Rocky
Mountain News opposed the 1997 measure in their editorials, due largely to the
high costs which required a significant tax increase for a lengthy period of
time. Proponents essentially knew that this newspaper would support a transit
package that focused only on the congested SE Corridor and did not involve a
tax increase. Proponents used this support in one of their two television ads, as
well as in their mailers and literature handouts. A lead political consultant
indicated that they would not have identified the support of the Denver Post in
these ads if the Rocky Mountain News had opposed the 1999 measure.
THE COMMUNICATIONS CAMPAIGN USED BY PROPONENTS
The Communications Budget
The total budget proposed by the political consultants in 1999, consisting of
slightly less than $1 million, was very similar to the one proposed in 1997.
This goal was met in 1999 while only about 50% of the goal was met in 1997.
Somewhat surprisingly, the fundraising efforts were more successful in 1999
even though the single-corridor package seemingly reduced the pool of
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potential contributors. In addition, the 1999 fundraising efforts commenced in
August, which allowed only about three months for these efforts. The
fundraising efforts were organized and lead primarily by business
organizations, namely the SEBP, the SE Metro Chamber of Commerce, the
Denver Metro Chamber of Commerce, and the Downtown Denver Partnership.
The fundraising efforts were more successful in 1999 than in 1997 for three
reasons.
• People who were less enthusiastic about transit improvements than
highway improvements contributed to the transit campaign, as well as to
the highway campaign, realizing that an additional environmental impact
study of the highway widening on the SE Corridor could be avoided only if
voters approved the transit measure. The fact that both campaigns shared
their list of potential contributors indicates that fundraising efforts were
perceived to be synergistic rather than competitive.
• Lists of contributors from 1997 were used by fundraisers in 1999. This
made fundraising efforts more efficient and focused. Efficiency was
needed given the limited amount of time involved for fundraising.
• Opponents were less successful in discouraging financial support for the
1999 ballot measure than for the 1997 measure. In 1997, the lead opponent,
who also was a member of the RTD Board, was successful in his efforts to
have the Board pass a resolution that prevented the district from entering
into any financial relationship with any organization that contributed more
than $100 to the 1997 measure. Even though this resolution was declared
unconstitutional shortly before the 1997 election, it had a chilling effort on
fundraising. This chilling effect was compounded by significant newspaper
coverage of this issue, including publication of names of some contributors
with potential vested interests.
Advertising
Television was the primary medium used for advertising. Radio, direct mail,
and hangers also were used. Each of these four types is discussed below.
Approximately $540,000 was spent on television advertising. The consultants
thought it would be most effective to use an emotional appeal in their
advertising and concluded that television would be more appropriate in
conveying emotions than other media would be.
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Copies of each of the two television ads used were provided by the political
consultants. The two ads had some common elements along with some
differences.
• Both stressed that no new taxes would be needed.
• Both mentioned and showed highway congestion problems and linked
these problems to a poor quality of life. For example, one ad said,
“Congestion takes time away from our businesses and our families.”
• Both ads used positive visual symbols to implicitly link the transit measure
with quality of life. For example, one ad showed a boy riding a bike at the
beginning of the ad and said, “People live here for a better life.” The other
ad showed beautiful flowers in a mountain valley and said, “This is
Denver, but what makes it great is what we do to keep it great.”
• Neither ad stated that the proposed light rail line would significantly lessen
congestion. However, both implied this. For example one ad first presented
the above quote about congestion and then immediately stated,
“Referendum 4A – new light rail along I-25 with no new taxes.”
• Both ads subtlety addressed the issue that the 1999 package was only a
single-corridor package that would not provide benefits to people who used
other corridors. One ad said that the SE Corridor rail line was “The next
step toward better transit service throughout metro Denver.” The second ad
said, “Our traffic problems will only be solved if we work together.”
• One of the ads raised the problem of air pollution and implied that the
transit measure would result in cleaner air.
• One of the ads identified the endorsement by both of the major newspapers.
The television advertising ran multiple times daily for close to four weeks,
starting around October 13 when the mail ballots were sent, up to Election
Day. Heavy advertising, generating approximately 100 gross rating points
(GRPs) per day, was used for the first week or so, followed by a reduction to
about 65 GRPs for the next two weeks, followed by a return to 100 GRPs for
the last four or five days prior to the election. This schedule was used because
of the prevalence of mail voting. To make the concept of GRPs more tangible,
between 30 and 50 ads often were run on a daily basis, using each of the local
NBC, ABC, CBS and FOX network affiliates. The heaviest focus was on the
morning, evening, and late night news programs, along with reruns on the FOX
network at times that news programs were on the other networks.
A second component of advertising involved a distribution piece similar in size
to a door hanger. According to the written field plan, the goal was to distribute
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100,000 copies of this distribution piece. Many of these were distributed at
major places of employment, both downtown and along the SE Corridor, and
at major transit locations. Cooperation was needed from employers in using
this method of distribution and their cooperation is further evidence of the
strong support received from the business community. Some were also
distributed in neighborhoods, although the neighborhood effort was not
targeted. If volunteers were available in a neighborhood, the hangers would be
distributed. The volunteers involved in the distribution tended to be people
from environmental organizations.
The distribution piece was in color and had information on both sides of the
piece. The information on the front stressed a) no new taxes, b) the loss of
federal funding of over $500 million if the measure was defeated (Note that it
did not say that the money was guaranteed if the measure passed.), c) the
endorsements of the two major newspapers, and d) that something needed to be
done about growth and traffic.
The primary message on the back of the piece was that traffic problems would
get better if the measure passed. More specifically, it said that congestion
would get better because 30,000 riders, or 20% of rush hour commuters, would
be riding transit, and because light rail commuters would save 20 minutes. It
also said that light rail would reduce emissions and smog but did not provide
any statistics for this claim. The back also listed some supporters, with the first
supporter being Governor Owens. This prominence of Governor Owens in the
list of supporters demonstrates that proponents viewed his support as being
important.
Direct mail was used as a third component of advertising. The direct mail
campaign had limited reach and frequency. This campaign was not part of the
original plan, but it was added based on results of survey research conducted
during the campaign. This research discovered that support was soft among
Republican and Independent women in the suburbs and that they were looking
for more information than that provided in the television ads. Based on this
research, one mailer was sent to women in Jefferson, Arapahoe, and Douglas
Counties. The mailer was sent around the third week of October. The content
of the direct mail was similar to that of the distribution piece described
previously.
Approximately $30,000 was budgeted for radio advertising. Most of these ads
were run during drive time and on some morning and evening talk shows. The
main themes were similar to those in the other advertising.
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Publicity Efforts
In interviews after the defeat of the 1997 transit measure, representatives from
both the Denver Post and the Rocky Mountain News thought proponents did a
poor job with both the news and editorial departments of the newspapers.
Although proponents did not state that they were running a stealth campaign,
this appeared to be the case, at least with publicity. The political consultants
used with the 1999 campaign realized the importance of trying to a) obtain
favorable publicity, and b) more effectively counter negative publicity. Based
upon both an analysis of the articles written and information from a newspaper
reporter, the proponents accomplished both of these objectives.
The four basic reasons identified below explain the proponents’ comparative
success with publicity in 1999.
• They identified information objectives to be communicated through the
news media and editorials that were not being communicated through
advertising.
• They anticipated arguments that opponents would make, and that news
reporters might address, and had counterarguments prepared in advance.
• They made a concerted effort to keep the RTD Board out of the news. This
was easier to do in 1999 than in 1997 due to Board members’ greater
willingness to cooperate in 1999.
• The coalition with the Governor created the potential for more newsworthy
events, partly because the Governor’s support of transit was surprising.
The Governor’s support was mentioned frequently in the media, including
some articles based on media events planned by the Governor’s office.
Each of the first three of the four reasons identified above is discussed in more
detail below. The fourth reason above needs no additional discussion beyond
mentioning that it provides an additional reason for the conclusion that the
Governor’s support was important to the 1999 transit measure.
Proponents hoped to communicate at least three information objectives
through publicity that were not being communicated through television
advertising. They received some mention in both editorials and news articles of
each of these three objectives. First, they wanted to communicate the
Governor’s support for the transit measure. His support was mentioned
repeatedly in news articles in both major newspapers. Second, they wanted to
give voters, who were more interested in the highway improvements, a reason
to also vote for the transit measure. This was done by saying that the highway
measure would be delayed for up to five years, and would cost at least $40-$60
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million more if the transit measure was defeated. This information was stated
by highway proponents, such as the head of the Colorado Department of
Transportation, which was more credible than having transit advocates make
this point. Third, they wanted to identify the support of conservative
Republican legislators within the RTD but outside the SE Corridor. A news
conference was held by five conservative Republican legislators shortly before
mail ballots were mailed and both major newspapers ran articles about this
news conference. One of these representatives also was frequently used by
proponents as a spokesperson in other news articles.
Proponents realized that the news media would try to be balanced and write
about potential weaknesses of the transit measure. Accordingly, proponents
systematically identified weaknesses and developed contingency responses. A
lengthy lead article on a Sunday when mail balloting was beginning
demonstrates this contingency planning (Denver Post, October 17, pp. 1A,
22A). This balanced article focused on the geographic inequity of the transit
measure, which was a weakness anticipated by proponents. The article
mentioned that voters rejected the 1997 comprehensive measure because it was
too costly. It then mentioned that costs could be reduced through an
incremental approach with success happening only if each region supported
the other regions. These responses had been prepared by proponents during
their contingency planning.
In 1997, a large number of articles were written in both major newspapers
about the RTD Board and its divisions. Given the divisions that existed, it
would have been difficult for proponents to keep the Board out of the news.
Based on this experience in 1997, the political consultants wanted to keep the
Board out of the news during the 1999 campaign and they were largely
successful with this objective once they were hired.
Voter Research Conducted
The political consultants budgeted about $80,000 for voter research, with
about half involving two surveys and the other half involving two series of
focus groups. The initial survey seems to have been used primarily in the
development of the advertising themes and messages, and the focus groups
were used largely to test reactions to four rough-cut ads for television. The
second survey was done for tracking to help determine if any modifications
were required in the communications campaign. The direct mail campaign,
discussed previously, was instituted based on the results of this tracking
survey. In general, with the exception of spending more money on voter
research than in most other cases studied, the research conducted in support of
the 1999 measure is similar to research conducted in other cases.
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THE CAMPAIGN USED BY OPPONENTS
As discussed previously, the proponents in 1999 did a number of things with
the transportation package, coalition building, and their communications
campaign to make it more difficult for opponents to develop an effective plan
than in 1997. At the same time, the opposition and their leadership was not as
effective in 1999 as in 1997, for reasons discussed immediately below.
Nature of the Opposition
The person usually identified as the leader of the opposition in 1997, namely
Jon Caldara, also was in the opposition in 1999. He was quoted quite
frequently in the newspapers and his comments always indicated strong
opposition. However, some people interviewed concluded that Caldara was not
as active and committed in his opposition in 1999 as he was in 1997. For
example, Caldara did not make the effort to contact a news reporter who was
interviewed nearly as often in 1999 as in 1997. People interviewed who
thought that Caldara was not as active in organizing and leading the opposition
in 1999, attributed this to his hesitance in leading the opposition on an issue
that the Governor, who normally is an ally of Caldara’s, supported.
Other than Caldara, effective leadership of the opposition could have come
from prominent elected officials. In 1997, a number of elected Republicans,
including Bill Owens, campaigned against the transit measure. Although some
elected officials at both the state and local level did speak out against the 1999
transit measure, none seemed to play a role in attempting to organize the
opposition. The active support of the Governor for the transit measure
probably had a lot to do with the hesitancy of any prominent elected officials to
lead the opposition since opposition would most likely have come from elected
conservative Republicans. In addition, prominent elected Republicans
probably would have been more inclined to take a leadership role in
energetically opposing the 1999 transit measure if it had involved a tax
increase.
Fundraising Efforts
Based on the case research conducted to date, opponents appear to have more
difficulty raising funds than proponents have, in even the best of
circumstances. In this situation, due partly to the RTD crafting a transit
package that did not involve a tax increase, and partly to the linking of the
transit measure with the highway measure, two of the main sources of funding
for opponents were neutralized, namely anti-tax groups and highway
construction groups. In addition, the fundraising efforts of opponents probably
were hindered by the lack of active opposition from prominent conservative
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Republicans. Opponents, in fact, did not raise sufficient money to do any
media advertising in 1999 while they did raise sufficient funds to do limited
television advertising in 1997. Thus, their ability to get their message out
depended on their plan for obtaining publicity.
Publicity
Unlike 1997, when the Rocky Mountain News took an editorial position that
strongly opposed the transit measure, both of the major newspapers took
editorial positions in support of the 1999 measure. However, neither
newspaper probably would have taken an editorial position in opposition to the
1999 measure even if more prominent and effective opposition leadership had
existed, including opposition from the Governor.
Without editorial support and with no money for media advertising, the
opposition had to rely primarily on news coverage in the newspapers to get
their message across. They were able to get all of the main components of their
message communicated, such as the geographic inequity of the measure, the
uncertainty of federal funding, the limited impact of light rail on congestion
and pollution, and the ineffectiveness and high cost of light rail. They also
argued that the measure was a tax increase in disguise since its passage
prevented the distribution of tax refunds and this argument appeared in some
newspaper articles. However, they had difficulty obtaining intense and
repetitive coverage of these issues, partly because they did not have any
prominent leadership that could stage newsworthy media events and partly
because they did not have a convenient platform, such as a divided RTD
Board, for obtaining publicity favorable to their position.
EVALUATION
Two important and complex issues involving the transit package are raised in
the Denver case. These two issues are 1) the manner in which highway
improvements are packaged with transit improvements, and 2) The use of a
geographically imbalanced incremental package. Each of these two issues is
discussed below, followed by an evaluation of the communications campaign
used by proponents.
Method of Combining Highway and Transit Improvements
Beale, Bishop, and Marley (1996), Middleton (1998), and Haas, Massey, et al.
(2000), have suggested that the probability of success increases when highway
improvements are combined with transit improvements, particularly when
highway improvements have not occurred in the recent past. The Denver case
combined highway and transit improvements, but did so in an atypical manner.
Unlike both the Sonoma County and Santa Clara County cases, examined in
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Haas et al. (2000), which combined highway and transit improvements into a
single measure, Denver had separate highway and transit measures.2
The use of separate measures involves at least two significant risks. One risk is
that distrust and competition can exist between the separate groups and people
who initiate each package. The second risk is that voters who are significantly
more inclined to support highway improvements than transit improvements or
vice-versa might be inclined to vote in favor of one measure but vote to reject a
separate measure. For reasons discussed below, neither of these risks occurred
to a significant extent in Denver.
The potential for conflict certainly did exist in Denver. Neither Governor
Owens, nor the Colorado Department of Transportation, both of whom
initiated the highway measure, are strong supporters of transit. Neither the
RTD nor environmentalists, who enthusiastically supported the transit
measure, are strong supporters of highway improvements. In spite of the
significant potential for conflict, virtually none surfaced in Denver. The factors
below seem to have encouraged cooperation and/or discouraged conflict.
• No tax increase was involved with either measure. Tax increases might
have encouraged some voters to consider the comparative value of the
highway and transit measures. This voter tendency could have encouraged
proponents of the highway measure to argue against the transit measure
and also encouraged proponents of the transit measure to argue against the
highway measure. Since voter approval was required even though no tax
increase was involved, the lack of conflict between proponents of the two
measures in this case might be atypical.
• Leaders in the business community seemed genuinely committed to a
solution that involved both highway and transit improvements and they
worked to raise funds for both campaigns. Thus, competition did not exist
over the potentially divisive issue of fundraising. Although it was not
necessary, the leaders of the business community also could have been
effective mediators of any conflicts between highway and transit
proponents as they had leverage with both groups.
• Voter heterogeneity within the RTD encouraged cooperation between
conservative Republicans who supported the highway improvements and
more liberal Democrats who supported the transit improvements. Denver
and Boulder County tend to be more liberal while the remaining counties
tend to be more conservative. Thus, the highway proponents wanted, at a
2 Since the RTD has responsibility only for transit, it could not have included highway
improvements in their measure even if it wanted to do so.
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minimum, to avoid active opposition from prominent Democrats and
environmentalists and transit proponents wanted, at a minimum, to avoid
active opposition from prominent Republicans.
• The political consultants hired by proponents of the transit measure had
worked previously with conservative Republicans, both within Colorado
and at the national level. For example, one of them had worked with both
Bob Dole and Lee Atwater. This experience gave them credibility in
working with Governor Owens and other conservative Republicans.
• Although two separate campaigns and organizations were involved,
representatives of the two campaigns met frequently and were willing to
compromise, largely because of the above factors. For example, the
Governor was opposed to an advertisement developed by the consultants
for the transit measure that was very popular in the focus groups. This
advertisement was not used because of the Governor’s opposition.
As mentioned previously, a second risk of using separate highway and transit
measures is that it allows voters to split their vote. This risk was anticipated
and countered in Denver by identifying the interdependence between the two
measures. For example, the Governor agreed to have the head of the CDOT
argue that rejection of the transit measure would both increase the costs and
delay completion of the highway improvements on the SE Corridor.
In summary, the Denver case demonstrates the conditions contributing to
success when separate highway and transit measures are placed on the same
ballot.
The Use of Geographically Imbalanced Incremental Transit Package
Beale, Bishop, and Marley (1996), and Middleton (1998) identified
geographical equity as a critical success factor in obtaining voter approval of
transportation funding initiatives. Most of the major cases included both in
Haas, et al. (2000), and in this project have made an attempt to provide at least
a semblance of geographical equity, even though this attempt increases the
costs of the transportation package presented. One of the interesting features of
the 1999 Denver case is the significant amount of geographical inequity. Many
voters would not have experienced any daily benefit from a new light rail line
on the SE Corridor. The success of this single-corridor package by a very large
ratio of 2:1, including a high supporting percentage of 65% in Boulder County,
which received no benefits in spite of high growth and congestion,
demonstrates that geographical equity is not a necessary condition for success.
Of course, passage of the 1999 RTD measure certainly was facilitated by the
absence of any tax increase since voters living in districts receiving no transit
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improvements are less likely to approve a transit package that provides them
little direct benefit when it raises their taxes, than when it does not raise their
taxes. Accordingly, it is difficult to predict the probability of voter approval of
geographically imbalanced transit packages in other communities when a tax
increase is needed to fund the package.
Once a community uses a geographically imbalanced incremental approach, it
must continue to use this approach to fund additional light rail lines in a series
of packages over time. For example, the RTD is considering a future light rail
measure involving a western corridor and/or a northern corridor. Accordingly,
an interesting longer-term issue raised with a geographically imbalanced
incremental approach is whether voter approval becomes more problematic
with later increments. If residents already have a light rail line in their corridor,
they may be less inclined to vote for tax increases to fund lines in other
corridors, particularly if they do not work in a corridor targeted for a light rail
route in a later round.
Evaluation of the Communications Campaign Used
To this point, the evaluation of the 1999 RTD measure has focused on
characteristics of the transit package. It also is relevant to evaluate the
communications campaign used by proponents. Overall, this campaign was
well conceived and comprehensive, even though the consultants were selected
at the end of July, which meant they had a little over two months prior to the
beginning of mail balloting to develop and implement a plan, along with
conducting research. Although some aspects of the communications campaign,
such as the research conducted, are similar to what has been done in most other
cases, a few of the characteristics of the 1999 Denver plan have not existed
frequently. These infrequent characteristics are identified below.
• An integrated communications plan was used with a range of information
objectives identified and different communication media used to
communicate different objectives.
(1) Television advertising was used to convey some basic
themes, such as the severity of the traffic and growth
problems, and appeal to emotions using symbolism.
(2) Targeted direct mail at undecided voters and an
information piece provided more detailed information,
including statistics and endorsements, than provided in the
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television ads.
(3) Additional information objectives, discussed
previously in the section dealing with publicity, were
selected for communication through the news articles and
editorial coverage.
• Proponents were proactive and aggressive in dealing with the news media,
particularly newspapers. Conventional thinking suggests that extensive and
balanced news coverage will allow opponents, who typically can do little
or no advertising, to get their message across. However, proponents in the
1999 campaign learned from the 1997 campaign that news coverage would
tend to be extensive in Denver even with a stealth campaign. If coverage is
likely to be extensive regardless of whether a proactive approach is used,
more favorable coverage is likely to exist with a proactive and aggressive
approach. For example, proponents were able to leverage the Governor’s
prominence and support to stage some news events involving the
Governor.
• As part of the planning process, proponents developed a written document
that listed arguments likely to be used by opponents and the news media
along with responses to these arguments.
Although the communications campaign used by proponents was effective,
proponents also took a significant risk with their advertising campaign. As
mentioned previously in the section on advertising, proponents implied in their
television advertising that the light rail line would have a significant impact on
highway congestion. This implied claim was risky because it essentially was
inconsistent with the assessment in the SE Corridor MIS. The MIS said,
“Generally, implementation of the major investment will result in either no
benefit or only a minor benefit to congestion in the general purpose highway
lanes” (Carter and Burgess, 1997, p. 4-32). As cited previously, the MIS
projected that the highway commute from the end of the light rail line to
downtown would be reduced by only two minutes with the light rail line. Since
it would have been difficult for proponents to question projections and
assessments in the MIS that they commissioned, they were vulnerable with this
implied claim in their advertising. They took this risk because their research
indicated that many voters were much more likely to support the measure if
they thought that the light rail line would reduce highway congestion on the SE
Corridor.
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CONCLUSION
Important lessons can be learned from a comparison of the differences between
a measure that loses by a large margin and a measure in the same community
that wins by a large margin. The differences between the RTD’s successful
campaign in 1999 and the unsuccessful one in 1997 are summarized below.
Table 3-1. Differences Between the 1999 and 1997 Elections
1999 Election 1997 Election
Single SE Corridor package Five or six corridor packages
$779 million of local funds needed $8-16 billion of local funds needed
No increase in sales tax rate, but
voters would not receive a tax refund
Increase in sales tax rate from .006
to .01
Separate measure for highways on
ballot
No highway improvements
included on the ballot
Active support from Bill Owens and
other conservative Republicans
Active opposition from Bill Owens
and other conservative Republicans
RTD Board was united with only one
member opposed to the transit
package
RTD Board was divided; a
significant minority opposed the
package and the lead opponent was
an RTD Board member
Both newspapers supported the
measure in a series of editorials
One newspaper supported, but the
second one opposed the measure
Opponents had no money for
advertising
Opponents had approximately
$45,000 to spend on advertising
Proponents raised and spent
approximately $1 million
Proponents raised and spent
approximately $550,000
Proponents were proactive in dealing
with the media
Proponents were not proactive in
dealing with the media
Emphasis in proponent advertising on
significant federal funding
No emphasis in proponent
advertising on significant federal
funding
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One of the differences identified in Table 3-1 needs to be clarified. First, Bill
Owens was Treasurer of Colorado when he opposed the 1997 measure. Roy
Romer, a Democrat, was Governor during the 1997 campaign and he
supported this measure. In other words, both the 1997 and the 1999 measures
had the support of the standing Governor. However, it probably was more
useful to receive the support of a conservative Republican Governor, as in
1999, than to receive the support of a Democratic Governor, as in 1997.
Some of the above differences are dependent on the very first difference listed.
If a single-corridor package had not been presented in 1999, a tax increase
would have been needed. Both Governor Owens and the Denver Rocky
Mountain News probably would not have actively supported the measure if it
had involved a tax increase. In addition, opponents probably would have been
more successful in their fundraising efforts, and proponents may have been
less successful, without the active support from the Governor and other
conservative Republicans.
Unfortunately, one of the most important characteristics of the 1999 measure,
namely the ability to fund a large light rail line without a tax increase, will be
difficult for other communities to replicate. In addition, as discussed
previously other communities should be cautious about presenting an
incremental and geographically imbalanced light rail package to voters even
though this approach succeeded with the RTD’s 1999 measure.
Other communities also can learn some important lessons from the RTD’s
1999 measure and campaign. First, the case demonstrates a means of
combining highway improvements with light rail construction that can be
effective both with voters and in building a very strong and diverse coalition.
Second, a number of features of the proponents’ integrated communications
campaign can be used in other communities.
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SAN ANTONIO: DEFEAT OF FIRST ATTEMPT
TO FUND A COMPREHENSIVE LIGHT RAIL SYSTEM
INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW
In an election on May 6, 2000, VIA, which is the San Antonio Metropolitan
Transit Authority, proposed a ballot involving a permanent increase in the sales
tax of 1/4-cent to fund a 54-mile light rail system. In a very low turnout
election, with less than 10% of registered voters in San Antonio and Bexar
County turning out to vote, only 30% of the 76,057 voters supported the light
rail measure.
A number of factors typically combine to explain the defeat of a measure that
loses by such a large margin. Such is the case with the defeat of the light rail
measure in San Antonio and Bexar County. Some changes in a) the ballot
measure, b) the communications campaign, and c) coalition building efforts
would have reduced the margin of defeat.
In general, this case demonstrates the difficulty of generating voter enthusiasm
for a comprehensive light rail system, funded by a new tax with no expiration
date, when traffic congestion is not perceived as being a critical problem and
when opponents energetically argue that light rail will be very costly and have
minimal impact on highway congestion.
BACKGROUND: GEOGRAPHY AND POLITICS
According to the United States Census Bureau, the population in Bexar County
was 1,372,867 in 1999, an increase of 15.8% from 1990. Hispanics comprise
approximately 56% of the County’s population. Approximately 79% of the
County’s population live in San Antonio. Assuming that the rate of population
increase in Bexar County is equal to the 35% rate for the entire state, the
population of Bexar County in 2025 will be approximately 1,900,000.3
Although mayoral elections in San Antonio technically are nonpartisan, prior
mayors, such as Henry Cisneros, have been associated with a political party.
3 The significant projected population increase in the County from 2000 to 2025 was used by
proponents to support the need for the proposed light rail system. However, proponents were
not consistent in their projections. One of VIA’s publications distributed to the public said that
the County’s population would increase by over 1 million people between 2000 and 2025. This
figure was retracted when challenged by opponents. VIA then projected a 50% increase in the
population from 2000 to 2025. Based upon the Census Bureau’s projection of a 35% increase
for the State, even this 50% projection seems inflated, particularly since the rate of growth in
the County from 1990 to 1999 was slightly less than the growth rate in the State during the
same time frame.
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Mayoral elections are held every two years and term limits restrict a mayor to
two consecutive terms, or four years. The mayor, Howard Peak, was close to
the end of his second term during the 2000 election.
Mayor Peak, with the support of the city council, had four tax measures on the
same ballot as VIA’s measure. Each measure was positioned as a component of
an economic development plan. The Mayor’s package was unusual in that a
sales tax increase of 1/8-cent was designated for the combination of the
measures rather than for each measure individually. If at least one of these
measures passed but at least one also failed, the tax increase would remain at
1/8-cent. However, the time period for the tax would be shorter than the ten-
year sunset date for the combination of the four measures.
According to people interviewed, Mayor Peak was not happy with VIA’s
decision to place the light rail measure on the same ballot as his four measures.
He perceived that the transit measure was less popular than his measures. This
perception proved to be correct. Although only one of the Mayor’s four
measures passed, by a margin of 56% to 44%, each of the three losing
measures received a higher percentage of support than the 30% support for
VIA’s transit measure. Two of his measures were supported by 44% of voters
while the remaining measure was supported by 36% of voters.
VIA was not happy with the Mayor’s decision to request voter approval of a
sales tax increase for uses other than transit. Texas did not allow any
community to increase the sales tax by more than one cent. VIA initially
requested voter approval of a 1/2-cent sales tax increase to fund a bus transit
system and voters approved this increase in 1977. VIA perceived that they
should be given a chance to obtain voter approval for at least part of the
remaining 1/2- cent for advanced transit improvements before other uses were
proposed for this remaining amount. This perception was based largely on the
fact that Houston, Dallas, and Austin each had the entire one-cent sales tax
dedicated solely to transit.
VIA would have delayed their ballot measure if the Mayor had not presented
his ballot measures to voters in May of 2000. VIA had not completed a major
investment study required for federal funding nor had they done much public
outreach to generate enthusiasm for a comprehensive light rail system prior to
this election. However, since VIA thought voters would be less likely to
support a tax increase for transit at a later date if even one of the Mayor’s
measures passed, it decided to present its measure during the election that the
Mayor presented his measures.
In summary, political factors discouraged cooperation between Mayor Peak,
along with members of the City Council, and VIA. The failure of the Mayor
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and VIA to even coordinate a voter turnout effort demonstrates the lack of
cooperation between them. Given that low voter turnout was projected, both
the Mayor and VIA would have benefited from a coordinated voter turnout
effort.
BACKGROUND: THE TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM AND PUBLIC
ATTITUDES TOWARD IT
The highway and road system in Bexar County seems quite extensive. Two
highway loops exist which encompass San Antonio and approximately 12
major spokes connect with these loops and with inner parts of San Antonio,
including the downtown area. Some areas of congestion currently exist, mostly
around the northern parts of both loops, particularly at interchanges with
some of the spoke highways, as well as along some of the northern spokes.
No HOV lanes currently exist in Bexar County. The Texas Department of
Transportation is proceeding with the design of one HOV lane between an
eastern point on the inner loop and downtown San Antonio.
According to the results in three surveys commissioned by VIA, residents in
Bexar County did not view highway congestion and transportation as being a
critical problem. Two of these surveys were conducted in the last quarter of
1999 and the second survey was conducted in January of 2000. The relevant
survey findings are identified below.
• One question asked respondents to select the first and second most
important issues facing people in Bexar County from a randomized list of
seven factors: a) state and local taxes; b) transportation; c) education; d)
health care; e) crime and drugs; f) water; and g) growth. Transportation
received significantly fewer mentions (9%) than all the listed issues except
growth. Of the five issues above transportation, water received the fewest
mentions (23%).
• When asked whether their current commute trip was “pleasant,”
“acceptable, but could be improved,” or “frustrating, stressful, and
annoying,” 17% said it was frustrating, 54% said it was acceptable and
24% said it was pleasant
• Consistent with the above finding, 81% of respondents indicated that their
current commute time was either “very reasonable” (30%) or “somewhat
reasonable” (51%).
Objective data on commute times seems consistent with the above survey
results on highway congestion perceptions. Approximately 90% of area drivers
have a commute time of less than 30 minutes (San Antonio Express News,
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April 16, 2000). This commute time seems reasonably short for a community
with over one million residents.
Given the above results indicating that transportation and highway congestion
was not perceived as being a high priority problem, it is not surprising that
respondents in the January, 2000 survey did not demonstrate strong support for
a permanent 1/4-cent sales tax increase to fund a comprehensive light rail
system. When asked whether they would vote for or against authorizing a 1/4-
cent increase in the sales tax for a light rail system, 49% indicated they would
support the measure, 41% opposed it and 10% were unsure of whether they
would support it. Respondents also were presented with two 1/8-cent sales tax
measures, one involving a human development fund for services ranging from
early childhood development to adult job training and the second involving the
repair and improvement of local streets and roads. When asked to select which
one of these three measures they would vote against if they had to vote against
just one of them, 49% of the sample selected the light rail measure compared to
22% for the human development fund and 20% for the road improvement
measure.
THE TRANSIT PACKAGE AND THE PROCESS USED TO
DETERMINE IT
Description of the 2000 Transit Package
The package consisted of a 53.5-mile light rail system. This system included
three lines with central transfer points from each of the lines to the other two
lines. Approximately 70% of the system would share streets with automobile
traffic with the remainder operating on exclusive rights-of-way. Both the
proposed routes and stations were identified in materials produced by VIA,
although passage of the measure would not have committed VIA to these
routes.4 Based upon the VIA maps, the routes appeared to provide better
availability to the northern and southern portions of the county and city than to
the eastern and western portions. All three lines appeared to have more miles
running in a northern-southern direction than in an eastern-western direction.
In addition, northern connections existed with both of the highway loops and a
southern connection existed with the inner highway loop. However, no eastern
or western connections existed with either of the two highway loops. Unlike
some other cases studied, which included the authorization of some sort of
4 The language in the ballot measure, which apparently was mandated by the state legislature,
referred only to a 1/4-cent increase in the sales tax to fund an “advanced transportation”
system. The ballot measure made no specific mention of light rail, let alone the magnitude of
the system and its routes.
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oversight process with citizen input, no oversight process was identified in the
ballot language with the San Antonio measure.
The capital costs of the 53.5-mile light rail system were estimated to be $1.428
billion in FY 2000 dollars. VIA decided to use a pay-as-you go system rather
than using debt financing. It thought this would appeal to voters and even
identified this financing method in one of their television ads. At the same
time, this method of financing lengthened the construction process. Slightly
less than half of the 53.5-mile light rail system was scheduled for completion
by 2013, with the remainder scheduled for completion by 2025.
Although most aspects of the plan identified above were specified, one
potentially important aspect was not specified. VIA had not done sufficient
detailed planning to know whether automobile carrying capacity would be
reduced on the roadways with a light rail line. VIA also could not identify the
period of time that normal traffic would be disrupted on these roadways during
construction.
Process Used to Determine the Transit Package
To start with a broad description of the process, VIA commissioned a citizen
task force to propose some public transportation recommendations needed by
2025. One of the recommendations of this task force involved a “fixed
guideway” system, with light rail being one example of such a system. It
proposed a 1/4-cent sales tax increase to fund this system. Since the remaining
recommendations of the task force could be implemented without a sales tax
increase, VIA focused on developing the specifics of a light rail system to be
funded by the proposed sales tax increase. Although the task force
recommended an incremental approach with a 28-mile “starter” fixed
guideway system, VIA decided to proceed with a more comprehensive system
that was almost twice the size of the system recommended by the task force.
This process is described in more detail in the remainder of this section.
The citizen task force, labeled the Transit 2025 Vision Task Force, consisted of
21 citizens. The group’s tasks were to examine the projected county
environment in 2025 and recommend the directions, initiatives and
investments required to produce the public transportation capabilities needed.
The task force began its work in early 1998 and produced a report at the end of
July of the same year.
The importance of task force independence from VIA was stated in the group’s
final report. VIA’s role was to provide administrative support and data when
requested and review proposed budgets. Although the Chair of the task force
was selected by VIA, the remaining members were selected by the Chair.
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These members were strictly unpaid volunteers. A contractor with
transportation planning expertise and experience was selected by the task
force.
The task force held 11 meetings with the public to obtain their input. The first
round of meetings was held toward the beginning of the process. These
meetings were rather unstructured and unfocused in the sense that the task
force did not present transportation solutions being considered.
Recommendations being considered by the task force were presented and
public reaction to these options was elicited during the second round of
meetings held toward the end of the process.
The final report of the Transit 2025 Vision Task Force included the group’s
recommendations. Since VIA’s transit package presented to voters differed
from the task force’s recommendations, it is important to identify the primary
recommendations of the task force.
• VIA should exploit “an opportunity to promote a better image, become
more of a visible, active partner in the community planning structure, and
create a broader awareness of how transportation can often enhance the
outcome of both public and private initiative” (p.1-6). This
recommendation was based on an assessment that, except for times when
VIA receives critical scrutiny, it tends to be invisible in the community.
• VIA should “modernize and expand the capabilities of its current fleet of
buses, growing as much as 10-15% in number and diversifying much more
in bus sizes” (p. 1-7).
• “Investments in fixed guideway systems should be pursued to establish a
rapid, high-capacity movement capability between major activity centers
and/or population concentrations within VIA’s service area” (p. 1-7).
The task force recommended using an incremental approach with this fixed
guideway system. “A ‘starter system’ of sufficient magnitude to demonstrate
benefits as well as costs should be established prior to committing to further
expansion, but should be designed as part of a broader fixed guideway network
that could, over time, meet concentrated needs throughout the service area” (p.
1-8). They suggested that the starter system be approximately 28 miles.
Once the Transit 2025 Vision Task Force completed its report, VIA needed to
develop an implementation plan for the fixed guideway recommendation along
with determining how to modify the plan. The primary modification was to
start with a 53.5-mile system rather than the 28-mile starter system
recommended by the task force. When asked about the reasoning for this
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modification, VIA’s Director of Planning attributed the difference in the two
recommendations to lower estimates of construction costs used by VIA than by
the task force. Apparently, VIA’s decision on the number of miles involved in
the system was based primarily on what they thought they could afford with a
1/4-cent sales tax increase.
Voter reaction, political input, or even business community input, apparently
was not systematically included in VIA’s decision-making process. For
example, survey research was not used to help develop the details of VIA’s
transportation package. As another example, the lead political consultant
indicated that retail institutions located on a street targeted for a light rail line
were not sufficiently involved in the decision making and outreach process.
Even VIA representatives indicated that insufficient time and effort was
devoted to systematic public outreach and coalition building. In addition,
elected officials in other communities studied have played an important role in
developing a transit and funding package likely to be acceptable to voters.
This, also, did not occur in San Antonio.
A former mayor was selected to lead the campaign about three months before
the election. His role consisted primarily of fundraising, hiring a political
consultant, and coordinating the communications campaign. He indicated in an
interview that he made some suggestions to VIA to modify their package to
make it more politically acceptable, such as including a sunset date,
establishing a citizen accountability group, and using the incremental approach
recommended by the vision task force. VIA did accept the citizen
accountability group concept toward the end of April. However, this was done
at a time and in a manner that may have done more harm than good. It was
done only after a good deal of criticism and publicity. Thus, VIA’s belated
response appeared to be politically motivated.
COMMUNICATIONS CAMPAIGN USED BY PROPONENTS
Timing of Start of Campaign
The political consultants were not hired until the end of February, which was
only a little over two months prior to Election Day. Since they had no prior
experience with transit ballot measures, they had an insufficient amount of
time to conduct research and then use the results of this research to develop a
communications approach, while also preparing to effectively respond to
opposition.
The Campaign Budget
The fundraising efforts were led by a former mayor and the ballot measure also
was endorsed by most of the Chambers of Commerce in Bexar County. These
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factors suggest that fundraising was likely to be reasonably successful.
However, the efforts, which raised approximately $300,000, were not
successful by virtually any reasonable standard. For example, proponents of a
measure passed in November 1999 to increase hotel and car rental taxes to pay
for a new arena raised over $1 million.
The lack of fundraising success suggests that most local Chambers of
Commerce, along with the business community, generally were less than
enthusiastic supporters of the measure. This conclusion is supported by
assessments of people interviewed. Apparently, many organizations in the
business community did not perceive developing a comprehensive light rail
system as being a high priority item requiring immediate attention.
Advertising
Approximately $100,000 was spent on advertising. Most of this was spent on
television with the remainder being spent on radio advertising. No direct mail
advertising was used. The consultant wanted to use direct mail advertising to
provide more detailed and descriptive information to complement the strictly
theme-based television advertising. However, the budget was not large enough
to use both direct mail and television advertising.
Two different television ads were used, one in English and the other in
Spanish.
The ad in English had three themes – access, value, and choice. Access meant
that it provided access to work, schools, shopping, and entertainment. Value
meant that it was pay-as-you go with no bond debt and was less expensive than
freeway construction. Choice meant that one would not need to sit in traffic,
which would result in cleaner air. With the exception of a very short visual of
highway congestion, the visuals were of light rail cars moving quickly. The
political consultant was somewhat critical of this ad in his interview.
Television ads in other communities, such as Denver and Phoenix, seemed to
be more effective in their ability to emotionally link light rail to the problem of
highway congestion.
The Spanish language ad involved Henry Cisneros endorsing the measure. He
is a former mayor of San Antonio who is very popular with many Hispanics in
Bexar County. However, since he also had rather high negative ratings with
Anglo survey respondents, this ad was placed only on Spanish-speaking
television stations. With the exception of a very short visual of light rail cars
moving quickly, the visual component consisted of showing Mr. Cisneros
sitting at a desk. Mr. Cisneros stated that the light rail would travel from
downtown to the west side of the city, with no mention of the remaining routes
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and access points. The themes of choice and access also were used in this ad,
although, unlike the English-speaking ad, these themes were not described.
This ad also identified two Hispanic congressmen who supported the measure.
The radio advertising was very similar to the television advertising. Again, two
different ads were used, one in English and the other in Spanish. The television
scripts provided the foundation for the radio ads although additions were
included since the radio ads were 60 seconds in length compared to a time of
30 seconds with the television ads.
Although it technically was not advertising, VIA developed a four-page
information piece, consisting of a lot of text along with maps of each of the tree
light rail lines. This information piece was an insert in the San Antonio Express
News on two different dates prior to the election and it also was distributed at
many public outreach meetings organized by VIA. According to this piece,
highway congestion would get much worse by 2025, and that more highways
are at best, part of the solution that may backfire by encouraging more users. It
also stressed choice and stated that light rail would lessen air pollution and
highway congestion, citing some supportive statistics on the high percentage of
light rail riders in other communities who previously were drivers. Although
no individuals who endorsed the measure were mentioned, this piece did
identify business, labor, and environmental organizations that supported the
measure. No mention was made of the costs of the proposed light rail system,
nor was mention made of the possibility of federal funding.
Publicity Efforts
Given that proponents knew they had insufficient funding to communicate
most aspects of their message through advertising, they might have been
expected to use an aggressive publicity generation campaign. However, this
aggressive campaign was not undertaken. Proponents acknowledged that they
held very few media events. They did issue some press releases and a media
kit. However, two representatives from the Express-News indicated that
proponents did not make concerted efforts to contact them and encourage the
newspaper to provide frequent news coverage.
Proponents did appear to have a few information objectives to communicate
through the news media. First, since insufficient funding existed to provide
details of the plan through direct mail advertising, proponents wanted to
provide the details through the news media. Maps identifying the light rail
routes and the general time frames for the four phases of construction did
appear repeatedly in the Express News. Second, they attempted to attack the
credibility of a lead opponent and his organization, the Texas Public Policy
Foundation, by questioning the validity of their role in the campaign as a
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nonprofit organization. Third, they encouraged the media to disclose the results
of an aforementioned survey, which VIA thought demonstrated a positive voter
reaction. However, this decision may have been counterproductive as a lead
opponent was quoted as correctly saying that the results were not as positive as
those typically found in other communities.
Proponents did receive editorial support from the Express News, although only
a few supportive editorials were written. One columnist also wrote a few
supportive columns. At the same time, two Express News columnists expressed
strong criticism of VIA and the measure in a series of columns.
Voter Research Conducted
Both VIA and the political consultants used by proponents conducted a
significant amount of survey research. VIA had three surveys conducted within
a year of the election. The first one was conducted in July and August of 1999,
the second one in November of 1999, and the last one in January of 2000. They
also commissioned two focus groups in September and October of 1999. The
research conducted by VIA focused on the degree of satisfaction with the
transportation system, attitudes towards different modes of transportation, and
reactions to a large number of positive arguments about light rail and a few
negative arguments. The results with the January 2000 study were discussed in
the previous background section on the transportation system and voter
attitudes towards it. The results of the two 1999 surveys will be discussed in
the outcomes evaluation section.
Three surveys were commissioned by the campaign committee and political
consultants during March and April of 2000. These were largely tracking
studies that measured reaction to both the ballot measure, and to a large
number of supporting arguments and a few opposing ones. The results of the
second of these three studies, along with proponents’ reaction to this study, is
worthy of mention. In this second tracking survey, conducted during the last
week of March, only 37% of respondents who had seen, heard, or read
something about the measure supported it. This study also concluded that low
turnout would reduce the chances of success. Particularly since proponents
either knew, or should have known, they probably did not have the funds to use
an intensive advertising campaign to significantly increase the supporting
percentage, they might have considered an aggressive approach with the
media, along with an aggressive get-out-the-vote effort. These actions were not
taken. In fact, according to one of the leading proponents, these research
results tended to demoralize the proponents.
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COMMUNICATIONS CAMPAIGN USED BY OPPONENTS
Identity of Opposition
Although different organizations were involved in the opposition, the Texas
Public Policy Foundation (TPPF) seemed to lead the opposition. The president
of this organization was the opponent most frequently quoted in the Express
News. This person also appeared at numerous outreach meetings organized by
VIA, and he frequently contacted the Express News in attempts to obtain news
coverage of various issues.
The TPPF is a nonprofit research institution with a free market and limited
government philosophy. The research usually, if not always, advocates
positions on public policy issues including transportation. It has published a
number of articles that are highly critical of proposed and current light rail
systems in Texas.
In addition to the TPPF, a local chapter of the League of United Latin
American Citizens (LULAC), a local taxpayer association, and the North San
Antonio Chamber of Commerce actively opposed the measure.
Opposition Arguments
As is typically the case, opponents argued that light rail is a costly system that
will have little if any impact on highway congestion because very few drivers
will switch to light rail. They also argued that the costs would be significantly
higher than VIA’s estimates. These arguments were presented using numbers
and statistics with light rail systems throughout the country and the sources of
the data usually were identified, often through footnotes.
In addition to the basic arguments identified above, opponents argued that
construction of light rail on city streets would seriously endanger small
businesses located on these streets by disrupting access for a lengthy period of
time and they also stressed that the tax was permanent with no sunset date.
They also argued that the plan was vague, subject to change, and presented
before sufficient studies and thinking had taken place.
To counter charges that they were strictly rejectionists, the opponents did offer
some alternative solutions to light rail. One solution was highway expansion.
In addition, since they seemed to realize that multimodal solutions might be
popular with the public, they also recommended use of a busway/HOV system.
Along with criticizing light rail and offering general alternative solutions,
opponents attacked the credibility and management abilities of VIA. The TPPF
had accused VIA of financial mismanagement in 1997 when VIA increased
bus fares. These criticisms received a significant amount of media attention
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and also may have been a partial basis for the recommendation of the Transit
2025 Vision Task Force that VIA needed to try to improve their public image.
These criticisms were resurrected during the 2000 campaign and two
additional criticisms, discussed below, were added.
A significant criticism of VIA involved the use of public funds for political
purposes. In conjunction with the Texas Justice Foundation, LULAC sued VIA
for the misuse of public funds and this lawsuit received significant coverage in
the news media during the campaign. The lawsuit was based both on an
aforementioned survey financed by VIA in January, and on information
appearing in movie theatres generated and financed by VIA. LULAC claimed
that the survey provided a basis for the proponents’ campaign and should have
been financed from the campaign budget. LULAC claimed that the
information provided by VIA was advertising that should also have been
financed from the campaign budget.
The second major additional criticism suggested that VIA presented biased and
incorrect information. Using VIA documents, they demonstrated that VIA
lowered the capital costs of constructing a light rail system over time.
Opponents made no attempt to explain the basis for the cost reductions, even
though legitimate reasons can exist for these reductions. They also argued that
VIA overestimated population growth to make a stronger case for light rail. In
an interview, a representative from the Express News provided two different
versions of one of VIA’s information pieces with two different population
growth estimates. This discrepancy demonstrates that VIA did initially
overestimate population growth.
Three general characteristics of the arguments used by opponents should be
identified. First, they conducted a time consuming and detailed analysis of
VIA documents to try to discover discrepancies. Second, opponents in San
Antonio adjusted their tactics in response to proponents’ criticisms of
opponents in prior recent campaigns in other communities. For example,
proponents in other communities have criticized opponents as not offering a
viable alternative to the transit package in the ballot measure and this criticism
has been reasonable in other communities. Opponents in San Antonio did
propose alternative solutions, although they were not very specific. Third,
since the lawsuit against VIA for using public funds for political purposes
seemed to be a successful tactic, particularly in generating unfavorable
publicity, this tactic probably will be used by opponents in future campaigns
unless transit agencies are very conservative in their use of public funds.
San Antonio: Defeat of First Attempt to Fund a Comprehensive Light Rail System
Mineta Transportation Institute
63
Means of Communication Used
Since opponents raised approximately $50,000, they were able to do some
advertising, which consisted of five billboards. However, they relied largely on
free media, particularly talk show radio and the Express News, to communicate
their arguments. As discussed in the next section, they were successful in
communicating their message through these media.
Both the talk show radio stations and a couple of newspaper columnists
probably would have opposed the measure even if no organized opposition
existed. However, the opposition was effective in providing these sources with
both their arguments and the information supporting these arguments. One of
the columnists wrote approximately eight columns, appearing on the third page
of the newspaper, which were highly critical of VIA and the transit measure.
One of these columns focused on the ineffectiveness of light rail and the other
ones questioned the credibility of VIA. The lawsuit and the use of public funds
for the survey and the information pieces in the movie theatres were mentioned
in at least three columns. A second columnist wrote about three or four
columns. These focused on the vagueness of the plan and also were critical of
VIA’s management abilities.
NEWS COVERAGE
The coverage of VIA and the ballot measure in newspaper editorials and
columns has been discussed previously. However, the coverage in the news
section of the Express News has not been discussed previously.
The coverage was quite extensive. At least twenty articles were devoted to the
measure and transit, with the majority of these appearing in April. Although
these articles focused on news dimensions of the issue and did not advocate a
position, a number of the articles focused on issues that probably hurt the
measure. The lawsuit against VIA was the most common topic, with six
articles devoted to it. The opposition of the North San Antonio Chamber of
Commerce and suburban mayors, combined with no more than lukewarm
support of the San Antonio City Council and Mayor, was the focus of three or
four articles. Another article focused on VIA revising its estimate of
population growth, another addressed the uncertainty of VIA’s cost estimates,
and still another one focused on the lack of specificity of the plan.
Only four or five articles focused on issues that might have helped VIA’s
measure. One of them questioned whether the TPPF’s role in the campaign was
consistent with its mission as a nonprofit research institution. Four other
articles discussed light rail systems in San Diego, Denver, Phoenix, and Dallas.
Each of these articles tended to emphasize the popularity of these systems.
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EVALUATION
When a ballot measure is defeated by a large margin, no single explanation
usually can be advanced for the defeat. Such is the case with VIA’s measure.
The main reasons for the measure’s defeat are summarized below.
Much of the Public was not Dissatisfied with Traffic Congestion
In a community suspicious of tax increases, obtaining support for a tax
increase, particularly one without an expiration date is difficult unless voters
attach high priority to the problem that the tax will hopefully lessen. As
discussed previously in a background section toward the beginning of this
chapter, highway congestion was not perceived as a significant problem in San
Antonio and Bexar County in 2000.
Limited Political and Voter Input in the Development of the
Transportation Package
Even when the public does view traffic congestion as a significant problem,
many other communities have been unsuccessful in their first attempt to seek
voter approval of a tax increase to fund construction of a light rail system.
Given this difficulty, it is important to integrate public attitudes and political
expertise and involvement into the planning process used to develop the
transportation package. No elected officials were selected to serve on the
Transit 2025 Vision Task Force and VIA made little attempt to obtain input
from elected officials in refining the framework developed by the task force.
The task force held about five or six public meeting to obtain feedback to their
proposals. By itself, this process is unlikely to predict voter reaction to critical
specific issues involved in developing a transportation and funding package to
be placed on a ballot measure. As mentioned previously, VIA commissioned
some systematic voter research in the latter part of 1999. However, this
research did not focus on important and specific issues involved in developing
the transportation package. For example, this research did not compare
respondent reaction to a starter system with a specific sunset date to the
comprehensive system without such a date.
An Apparent Inability to Use the Experience of Other Communities in
Developing a Transportation Package
A systematic comparison of characteristics of transportation packages to the
percentage of votes supporting a package across communities is useful in
developing a package that voters are likely to approve. For example, almost all
of the successful cases studied in our research involved a combination of light
rail with bus and/or highway capacity improvements and also involved a
sunset date. Some unsuccessful ballot measures also have involved a sunset
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date and a multimodal transportation package. Thus, the use of a multimodal
package and a reasonable sunset date is not a sufficient combination for
success. However, this combination may be a necessary combination for
success. VIA’s measure did not fulfill either of these two characteristics.
Lack of a Strong and Enthusiastic Coalition
All successful cases have been enthusiastically supported by important local
elected officials, often from both major political parties, and also by important
segments of the business community. Such a coalition is useful in fundraising,
establishing credibility, and neutralizing opposition. VIA did have the support
of two prior mayors, a couple of city council members, and some of the local
Chambers of Commerce. However, Mayor Peak and most of the city council
members remained neutral. In addition, based on the limited success with
fundraising, the business community did not view passage of VIA’s ballot
measure as a high priority.
The public’s attitude towards the transportation system and traffic congestion
made it difficult for VIA to obtain the enthusiastic support of elected officials
and the business community. Elected officials tend to focus on issues perceived
as being high priority problems by a significant portion of the public. The
research results previously cited indicated that traffic congestion was not
perceived by the majority of the public as a high priority problem. Although no
surveys were conducted within the business community, their attitudes toward
traffic congestion probably were consistent with those of respondents
surveyed.
A significant amount of time often is needed to build a broad and enthusiastic
coalition, particularly with the business community, which is far from a
homogeneous group. According to VIA representatives interviewed, they did
not devote sufficient time to community outreach. In hindsight, they
acknowledged that they should not have presented their ballot measure in an
election less than two years after the Transit 2025 Vision Task Force completed
their report. However, Mayor Peak’s decision to present his sales tax increase
package to the voters in May of 2000 did pressure VIA to act quickly.
Insufficient Time to Develop an Effective Communications Campaign
Particularly since VIA had no prior experience with an advanced transit ballot
measure and since neither the political consultants hired nor the campaign
chairpeople had any experience with transit, it was important for campaign
planning to start well in advance of the actual election. Unfortunately,
campaign planning did not begin until February of 2000, which was about
three months before the election.
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The lack of sufficient planning time manifested itself in a number of ways.
First, the television advertising appeared to be less effective than the
advertising used in other recent successful campaigns, such as in Phoenix and
Denver. Neither the English- nor Spanish-language versions focused on the
problems that light rail would solve, particularly with any visuals, and neither
ad did much to attract attention. Second, proponents did not appear to
understand the need to have an energetic and proactive media approach. This
approach was needed because they did not raise sufficient funds to utilize an
intensive advertising campaign. Third, even though the opposition from the
TPPF should have been expected, since it had been critical of VIA in the past
and also had opposed prior light rail measures in Texas, proponents did not
seem sufficiently prepared to effectively counter many of the TPPF’s
criticisms.
Nature and Effectiveness of Opposition
In some other campaigns, opposition has been led and organized by citizen
groups. This was not the situation in San Antonio. The TPPF had the time and
expertise to provide effective opposition.
As an example of the time commitment, VIA held well over 100 public
meetings during the campaign and they estimated that the President of the
TPPF attended approximately 75% of these meetings. The President of the
TPPF also kept VIA quite busy by bombarding it with what VIA
representatives referred to as “daily public information access requests.”
The TPPF also had people with knowledge of light rail systems in Texas and
throughout the country write position papers based on analysis and research.
For example, the TPPF had one or more people carefully analyze a lengthy
System 2025 Development Plan prepared by consultants for discrepancies and
they were able to find some discrepancies.
CONCLUSION
Since less than 10% of those registered actually voted in the special election,
caution should be used in drawing conclusions from the very large margin of
defeat of VIA’s measure. In fact, the results of one of the surveys
commissioned by the campaign committee suggest that the election results
may have underestimated public support for light rail. This survey concluded
that registered voters likely to support VIA’s measure were less likely to
actually vote in a special election than those likely to oppose the measure. At
the same time, although the margin of defeat probably would have been
reduced in a general election with higher voter turnout, it is unlikely that VIA’s
measure would have passed even in such an election.
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Most of the lessons learned from the defeat of VIA’s measure actually are
lessons that could have been learned from prior cases. Other communities,
which have made no prior attempt to obtain voter approval for a tax increase to
fund light rail, need to appreciate the difficulty in generating voter support for
such a ballot measure on their first attempt. Systematically investigating the
experiences of other communities with these ballot measures can significantly
increase the chances of success in a first attempt. VIA representatives
acknowledged that they could have done more of this investigation.
Some new lessons can be learned from this case. First, it demonstrates that
opponents are adjusting their tactics over time. This seems to be the first
instance in which a lawsuit has been used to discourage a transit agency from
engaging in a public information campaign. Given the success of this tactic in
generating negative publicity in San Antonio, it probably will be employed in
other communities in the future unless transit agencies are very careful about
using these campaigns. In addition, the opposition in San Antonio seemed to
realize the importance of suggesting alternatives to the ballot measure. Second,
this case demonstrates the importance of timing. VIA went forward with a
ballot measure before the public perceived traffic congestion as a high priority
problem.
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APPROVAL OF A COMPREHENSIVE
TRANSIT PACKAGE BY THE CITY OF PHOENIX
INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW
In March of 2000, voters in the city of Phoenix voted by a margin of 65% to
35% to increase the sales tax by .004 for a period of 20 years, with the revenue
dedicated solely to transit improvements. The package included major
expansion of local bus, express bus, and dial-a-ride service, along with
construction of approximately 24 miles of light rail. The total cost of the transit
package was estimated to be approximately $5 billion.
Similar to most other cases studied, in which voters have approved funding for
major increases in transit spending, Phoenix did not succeed on their first
attempt. The city did not succeed until their fourth attempt, having first failed
by a large margin in 1989, then by a narrower loss in 1994, followed by a third
loss of only 122 votes in 1997. Even though the 1997 measure lost by a very
small margin, Phoenix made some important changes in both the 2000
transportation package and the communications campaign used to obtain voter
approval of this package.
Unlike the 1997 ballot measure, the 2000 measure explicitly included light rail
in the package. At the same time, to neutralize opposition, which was expected
to focus on light rail, significantly less than 50% of the funding provided was
devoted to light rail, with the remainder allocated to other transit
improvements. An incremental, rather than a comprehensive, light rail system
was required once the decision was made to have less than 50% of the funds
devoted to light rail. Thus, this case demonstrates that a community with no
existing light rail experience, may be more likely to support a new tax to fund
light rail when it a) is only part of the transportation package, and b) is an
incremental, rather than a comprehensive, system.
Unlike the 1997 communications campaign, the 2000 campaign was very
aggressive and well funded. Its most notable features were a) using a variety of
media to communicate a large number of communication objectives, b)
aggressively criticizing the opposition, largely through attacking the credibility
of the individuals leading the opposition, and c) utilizing a proactive approach
with the newspaper and talk show radio stations to try to influence the issues
discussed in these sources rather than allowing the opposition to influence the
issues covered by these sources.
Approval of a Comprehensive Transit Package by the City of Phoenix
Mineta Transportation Institute
70
BACKGROUND: GEOGRAPHY AND POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT
Phoenix is in Maricopa County, a very large county with an area of 10,000
square miles. The population of both Phoenix and the remainder of the County
has been growing at a rapid rate and this growth rate is projected to continue.
For example, the population in Phoenix increased by 21.3% from 1990 to 1998
and the growth rate in the rest of the County is even higher than in Phoenix.
Phoenix is the largest city in the County, with a population of over 1.2 million
people. Phoenix’s share of the County’s population currently is approximately
45% and this share is decreasing. Mesa, Tempe, Scottsdale, and Glendale are
among the larger remaining cities in the County with Tempe, Scottsdale, and
Glendale all being directly adjacent to Phoenix.
Skip Rimsza, the current mayor of Phoenix, is serving his second term in
office, having been reelected in 1998. He is a Republican, as is the current
Governor, Jane Hull, who replaced Fife Symington when he resigned in 1997.
Mayor Rimsza played important, but different, roles in the 1997 and 2000
transit measures. These roles will be discussed later in the chapter. Fife
Symington also played a critical role in the defeat of the 1997 measure, as he
orchestrated some last minute opposition to the measure that is discussed in
more detail later in the chapter. Given the small margin of defeat of the 1997
measure, it probably would have passed if Fife Symington had not orchestrated
this opposition.
BACKGROUND: A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE TRANSPORTATION
SYSTEM AND PRIOR TRANSPORTATION VOTES
Prior to the 2000 election, Phoenix’s transit system was inferior to systems in
similarly sized cities. Of cities in the United States, Phoenix had the seventh
largest population, while it had fewer buses than 34 other cities. Phoenix had
no Sunday bus service and bus service ended at 8:00 P.M. on the remaining six
days of the week. It also had no dedicated funding source for transit and no
light rail lines had been authorized, let alone started.
In a 1985 countywide election, approximately 70% of voters approved a
highway construction and expansion measure involving a .005 sales tax,
lasting for 20 years. The planned highway improvements were close to
completion, but were ongoing during the 2000 transit campaign. This 1985
measure also dedicated $5 million a year for a regional public transportation
authority (RPTA). The RPTA was charged with developing a long-range transit
plan for Maricopa County.
A plan was developed by the RPTA in conjunction with consulting firms and
with very little public input. The most expensive element in the plan was a
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103-mile light rail system. To fund this plan, a .005 sales tax, with no sunset
date, was presented to county voters for approval in 1989. This measure was
rejected by a margin of 40% to 60%.
A combination of a) a revenue shortfall in an economic downturn, b) increased
land acquisition costs due to real estate speculation on highway routes
announced for construction, and c) increased highway construction costs in the
early 1990s. As a result of these factors, it was estimated that original highway
plans could not be completed with the sales tax approved in 1985. Rather than
scaling back and/or slowing the rate of highway construction, a decision was
made to ask county voters to approve an additional .005 increase in the sales
tax. It also was determined, apparently without any research, that voters would
be more inclined to approve a balanced transportation package, involving
transit as well as highway improvements. Accordingly, half of the tax increase
was devoted to highways and half to transit. This county-level measure was
defeated, with 46% of votes in favor of the measure.
In both the 1989 and 1994 county-level elections, Tempe was the only city in
which a majority of voters supported the tax increases. Accordingly, decision
makers in Tempe abandoned the county-level approach and presented a city-
level transit funding measure to voters involving a .005 sales tax with no sunset
date. This measure, which included funding for light rail, was approved by
voters in 1996.
Encouraged by Tempe’s success, Phoenix presented a transit ballot measure to
city voters in 1997. This measure involved a .005 sales tax increase with no
sunset date. The money was to be used largely for improvements in both local
and express bus services, along with improvements in dial-a-ride service. Light
rail was handled in an unusual manner in this package. Light rail construction
would not begin prior to 2007. After this year, an unspecified amount of the
revenue could have been spent on light rail construction if both a Citizens’
Transit Committee and the City Council approved the authorization of revenue
for this construction. Based upon both survey results, with 70% of respondents
supporting the measure, and the results of early mail-in voting, with 60%
approval, the consultants hired by the proponents decided to use a stealth
campaign. However, votes cast on Election Day ran 60% against the measure
and it was defeated by a total of 122 votes out of 111,000 votes cast. Two
factors happened late in the campaign which may have caused later voters to
be significantly less supportive than early voters. First, opponents spent at least
$30,000 on radio advertising during the last two weeks of the election. Second,
about a week before the election, the Republican Governor, Fife Symington,
directed both the Director of the Arizona Department of Transportation and the
Chief of the Arizona Department of Environmental Quality to hold a well-
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publicized press conference at which they both encouraged a no vote.
Symington resigned from office later that same day after being convicted on
seven charges of bank fraud. Symington’s opposition was somewhat
surprising, as the Mayor of Phoenix, Skip Rimsza, also is a member of the
Republican Party. Additional aspects of the 1997 transit package and campaign
will be integrated into a discussion of the transit package and communications
campaign used in 2000.
THE TRANSIT PACKAGE AND THE PROCESS USED TO
DETERMINE IT
General Description of the 2000 Transit Package, Including Differences
Between it and the 1997 Package
Proponents thought that two characteristics of the 1997 transit package needed
to be more clearly specified to lessen voter distrust and confusion. First, unlike
1997, the amount of money earmarked for light rail was specified in the 2000
measure. Second, since it was difficult for voters to understand how a specific
budget with designated amounts to different components could exist without a
sunset date, such a date was included with the 2000 package.
Including both a sunset date and revenue earmarked for light rail in the 2000
package, along with reducing the sales tax increase from .005 to .004, required
a scaling back of the bus components from the level involved in the 1997
package.
Specific Description of the 2000 Transit Package
The transit package included four basic elements.
• Expansion of basic or local bus service. Expansion would take place
largely through the purchase of 150 additional vehicles, all operating with
natural gas, with 100 vehicles being purchased during the first five years.
New routes were to be added, along with earlier start times in the morning,
later ending times in the evening, Sunday service, and reduced intervals
between buses on routes. A total of $2.515 billion, or 52% of the program
total was presented for this component.
• Construction of approximately 24 miles of light rail lines. This was
described as a surface level system that would be constructed on both
freeways and city streets. Approximately 17 miles were scheduled to be
completed by 2010 along a designated route. The route for the remaining
seven miles was not specified. A total of $1.654 billion, or 34% of the
program total, was presented for this component.
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• Expansion of dial-a-ride service. This expansion also was to be
implemented largely though a fleet increase from 60 to 100 vehicles.
Additional hours were promised and $336 million, or 6% of the program
total, was the cost presented for this component.
• Expansion of express bus service. This expansion also relied on a fleet
increase, although the number of additional vehicles purchased was not
identified in either a press kit or in a description of the plan mailed to all
residents. The description mailed to residents included a map and
mentioned hours of operation and frequency of service. Five different
routes were proposed, each of which either would run directly to
downtown or connect with a downtown express route. Since the routes on
the map were virtually identical to the map for the proposed light rail
system, the express service apparently would have been phased down once
the light rail system was in place. The figure presented for this component
was $160 million, or 4% of the program total.
Approximately 3% was allocated to “support services.” Two other small
components, each involving only 1% of the program total, were identified in
the description sent to residents. One involved a demonstration limited stop
service along two streets, both in the northern part of the city. The other
involved a demonstration neighborhood mini-bus service that would connect
people to local bus routes. The two locations identified for this service were
both in the southeast portion of the city.
Description of People and Institutions Responsible for Developing the
Plan
According to a mailer sent to residents by the city, the plan was developed by a
“26-member citizens’ transit committee with the support of the Mayor and
City Council.” In reality, the Mayor did significantly more than “support” this
committee. He selected the members. This committee, which normally was
termed the Citizens Steering Committee, was chaired by a councilwoman with
a strong interest in transit. The business community had seven representatives
on this committee, one of them the CEO of the Greater Phoenix Chamber of
Commerce. Approximately nine members of the committee were identified as
either citizens or officers of neighborhood associations and they seem to have
been selected to provide both geographic and ethnic heterogeneity. According
to opponents interviewed, people who were opposed to light rail specifically
requested to be on the committee but were not selected. This claim was
disputed by a proponent who said that one or two people on the committee
were opposed to light rail. Regardless of who is correct in this dispute, Mayor
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Rimsza was very enthusiastic about light rail at this point in time and his
enthusiasm was shared by the Phoenix Public Transit Department (PPTD), the
Chamber, and the city manager’s office. He did not try to achieve any
meaningful balance within the committee in terms of attitudes towards light
rail.
To summarize the above, the people and institutions most responsible for the
2000 transit measure were 1) Mayor Rimsza, 2) an associate city manager
heavily involved in transportation planning, 3) representatives from the
business community through the Chamber of Commerce, 4) the city council,
and 5) the PPTD. The package involved political considerations meant to both
build a broad coalition and have a package acceptable to voters, and also
involved input from transit planners. The process used to develop the transit
package by these different people and institutions is described in the following
paragraphs.
Description of the Planning and Decision Making Process
One of the starting points involved establishing a budget parameter for the
package and a compromise was made here. The Chamber and the PPTD
preferred a .005 sales tax rate increase, as in the 1997 election. Given the very
small margin of defeat in 1997, combined with what was perceived as a poor
communications campaign and the last minute opposition orchestrated by a
Governor who no longer was in office, they believed that the sales tax rate did
not need to be reduced as long as a sunset date was introduced. Mayor Rimsza
had wanted an increase of .0025 in 1997 and this also was his starting position
with the 2000 package. Due to a significant increase in the Mayor’s enthusiasm
for light rail, he realized that his preferred tax level of .0025 was not sufficient
to fund both an adequate light rail system and the bus improvements that were
needed.5 Fortunately, a .004 sales tax that was used to finance the baseball
stadium was due to expire at the same time that a transit sales tax would start.
Thus, the mayor apparently agreed to a .004 sales tax because it did not involve
a net increase in the sales tax rate.
Once Mayor Rimsza became enthusiastic about light rail, a consensus existed
to fund both significant improvements in local bus service and construction of
light rail lines in the transit package. The size of the local bus fleet was
inadequate by any standard. In addition, given the comparative costs of
increasing the fleet of buses vs. light rail construction, it was easier to provide
5 To further describe Mayor Rimsza’a changing view towards light rail, he apparently did not
want to have light rail included in the 1997 package while he wanted light rail to be
approximately 75% of the package in 2000.
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geographical equity with the bus component than with the light rail
component. A map sent to residents with the proposed improvements in local
bus service did, in fact, show improvements throughout the entire city. People
on the steering committee became even more enthusiastic about light rail after
traveling to Portland and other cities with modern light rail systems. In
addition, light rail received the highest importance ratings of 11 transit options
presented in residential surveys conducted for the Citizens Steering
Committee.
Another strategic decision involved the percentages to spend on the two major
components of the package, which were light rail and basic bus service.
According to the Chair of the Citizens Steering Committee, general agreement
existed within the committee that the percentage should be significantly higher
for local bus service than for light rail. A consensus existed that the bus system
was weak and needed significant capacity expansion with expanded hours,
expanded routes, increased frequency, and Sunday service. Allocating
significantly more funding to local bus service than to light rail also was
effective in neutralizing opposition. Although the light rail component was not
well defined in the 1997 election, opponents focused their criticism on this
element. This was their focus because they were united in their opposition to
light rail but were not united in their opposition to expansion of local bus
service. In addition, published research, by such people as Richmond (1998,
1999) and Pickrell (1990) has focused on rail systems and provided statistics
that can be used by opponents in arguing that rail is inefficient and ineffective.
Opponents argued that the light rail improvements and the local bus
improvements should have been included in a separate ballot measure. This
position demonstrates that opponents realized the bundling of light rail with
local bus improvements, with considerably more funding allocated to the latter
component, did make it more difficult for them to implement an opposition
strategy.
Once the decisions were made to reduce the sales tax increase from .005 to
.004 with a 20-year sunset date and also have approximately 33% of the funds
allocated to light rail, it was impossible to include a comprehensive light rail
system in the plan. This challenge was resolved in an interesting way. Three
phases were used with only the first two phases being defined. The first phase,
which was scheduled for completion in 2006, consisted of one line
approximately 12 miles in length. Little disagreement existed regarding the
route for this line. It ran in a north-south direction for about five miles,
primarily along a street with a high concentration of employment, both
downtown and uptown. In the middle of downtown, the line then turned east
and ran by both the baseball stadium and the basketball arena. It also went by
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the airport and connected with Tempe’s light rail system. The second phase,
which was scheduled for completion in 2010, involved approximately a five
mile northern extension of the first phase that ran primarily along a major
freeway. The third phase was not defined, largely because it would have been
very difficult to reach agreement on priorities for this phase. It involved an
additional seven to ten miles of light rail, scheduled for completion in 2016,
with the specific route or routes depending on ridership on express bus routes.
The express bus route or routes with the highest ridership will be the route or
routes for the third phase of light rail construction. The ballot measure stated
that a “Citizens Transit Commission” would be established to review all
expenditures.
After funding for expansion of local bus service and light rail construction, the
third ranked component in terms of spending was dial-a-ride service. It was
perceived that this element would appeal to seniors who are a large percentage
of voters in Phoenix. According to two interviewees, approximately 60% of
voters in the 2000 election were seniors.
As mentioned previously, surveys were conducted for the Citizens Steering
Committee while the plan was being developed. These surveys received
prominent mention in the written description of the plan sent to residents.
However, at least with the decision concerning the comparative priority of dial-
a-ride service to mini-bus service, the survey results were ignored. Mini-bus
service was significantly more important than dial-a-ride service to survey
respondents. However, mini-bus service received less money in the transit plan
than dial-a-ride service.
In summary, political considerations appeared to have a significant impact on
the major aspects of the transit package included in the 2000 ballot measure.
These major decisions involved the total magnitude of the package and the
approximate percentages that would be allocated to the major components of
the package. These political considerations included voter acceptability,
diffusing opponents’ likely arguments, and building a broad coalition.
THE COMMUNICATIONS CAMPAIGN USED BY PROPONENTS
The communications campaign used by proponents relied primarily on
advertising since sufficient funds were raised to conduct an advertising
campaign. Accordingly, much of this section discusses the advertising
campaign used by proponents. At the same time, the campaign had some
important objectives that were accomplished through the newspaper and talk
radio stations.
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The Communications Budget
The political consultants hired by Mayor Rimsza approximately one full year
prior to the 2000 election, proposed a budget of approximately $1 million.6
The Mayor, who led the fundraising efforts, exceeded this goal by
approximately $300,000. This $1.3 million budget in 2000 compared with
approximately $700,000 in 1997.
In this case, as in some other cases in which a second election is held shortly
after a failed attempt, more funds were raised in a follow-up election. Donators
do not seem to be discouraged by a lack of recent success, at least if success
appears reasonably likely in a follow-up election.
Advertising Objectives
A large number of themes and information objectives, listed below, were
communicated through advertising. Many of these themes, such as highway
congestion relief, have been used in other cases. A few of the themes, such as
the state of the transit system at the time of the election, have not been used in
a large number of other cases.
• Traffic congestion is bad and will get a lot worse if transit is not improved
because of significant population growth.
• Air pollution is worse in Phoenix than in most places and it will get a lot
worse if transit is not improved because of significant population growth.
• Phoenix has a very bad basic transit system.
• $600 million of matching federal funding will be lost if the measure does
not pass.
• The transit package is balanced and comprehensive, with increased local
bus service, doubling of dial-a-ride service, express bus service, and light
rail.
• Light rail is quiet, pollution free, fast, has reduced congestion in other cities
similar to Phoenix, and it can carry a large number of passengers with
lower per-passenger operating costs than a bus-only system.
6These consultants actually were hired by Mayor Rimsza to work on three different local
funding ballot measures. The March 2000 transit measure was the second measure, with the
first measure occurring in the fall of 1999. Thus, although they were hired one year prior to the
transit election, they began planning for the transit measure approximately three or four
months before the election.
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• Improvements will be made throughout the entire city.
• The plan is specific.
• It is a people’s plan and also has a citizens’ oversight committee.
• The plan will increase the number of choices people could use for
transportation.
The number of advertising objectives identified above is larger than the
number often used in other cases. It is risky to have so many message points as
the main message points can get lost. However, this risk was minimal in this
situation for a couple of reasons. First, the main message themes, such as
highway congestion relief, were communicated at a much higher frequency
level than other themes. More specifically, the major message themes were
communicated through television ads which ran a large number of times on a
daily basis for approximately three weeks, while a number of the other themes
were communicated through direct mail with each household receiving no
more than three direct mail pieces. Of course this heavy use of television,
along with some direct mail and radio advertising, would have been impossible
if fundraising efforts had not been so successful. Second, voters already were
familiar with a number of the message points, having been exposed to them
previously in 1994 and/or 1997.
Television Advertising
Television was the primary advertising medium used with approximately
$700,000 being spent on this medium. The television advertising was
conducted for three weeks, at levels of 500 GRPs per day during the first week,
followed by levels of 700 GRPs per day during the second week and 1000
GRPs per day during the third week.
Three different television advertisements were rotated in Phoenix. Each of
these ads shared some common elements, along with having some differences.
• Each of the three ads began with a visual of highway congestion along with
a close-up of a frustrated driver stuck in traffic. Each of the three ads stated
that the ballot measure would provide traffic relief and two of the three ads
had a visual, linked with passage of the ballot measure, of a freeway with
no congestion.
• Expansion of basic bus service was stated in each of the three ads, along
with some description of the means of expansion in two of the ads. Both of
these ads mentioned more routes, and Sunday service. One also mentioned
greater frequency and extended hours in the morning and evening.
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• Light rail was included in each of the three ads. Express bus service and
dial-a-ride service also were included in each of the three ads.
• Although none of the ads specifically stated that air pollution would be
reduced through passage of the ballot measure, one of the ads linked the
measure with clean air (“time to give Phoenix a clean and efficient valley
wide transit system”), while a second ad featured a close up of an
automobile exhaust pipe stuck on the highway.
Advertising Mailers
Three mailers were sent. One of these was sent and paid for by the city and it
technically was not classified as advertising. The other two were advertising
mailers that were included in the proponents’ budget.
The mailer from the city was sent to all registered voters in the city toward the
beginning of the campaign. This mailer had two important objectives. One
objective involved communicating that the measure involved a specific plan.
This objective was perceived by proponents as being critical because the 1997
plan was criticized by opponents and by two talk radio stations as being either
a vague plan or one with which proponents did not want to disclose the details.
The mailer identified each of the basic components of the plan, along with a
detailed and quantitative description of the nature of the improvements and the
amount of money involved with each component. Complicated maps
identifying the location of services also were included. The second theme
stressed that the plan was developed by a citizens committee with significant
public input, both through a survey and public meetings.
Two advertising mailers were sent to most registered voters. In contrast to the
television ads, these mailers gave greater emphasis to air pollution than to
traffic congestion, although they were careful to avoid explicitly claiming that
air pollution would be reduced with the transit improvements.
One of the mailers reinforced the mailer sent by the city. It identified the basic
components of the plan, along with providing some details and maps. It also
stressed that it was a “people’s plan” and had a “citizens oversight committee.”
The benefits of light rail identified previously in the list of objectives also were
mentioned in this mailer. It also included quotes and endorsements, including
one from the Mayor and three from the Arizona Republic. Different versions of
this mailer were sent to voters in different geographic districts. Each mailer
included an endorsement from the district councilperson and also had some
benefits identified for the district in question.
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The second advertising mailer gave two new reasons for supporting the ballot
measure. First, it indicated that a projected population increase of more than
600 thousand people over 20 years would cause congestion and air pollution to
get worse if “we continue to do nothing to improve what is considered to be the
worst public transit system in the United States.” Second, it indicated that
$600 million in federal matching funds would be lost if the measure failed.
Radio Advertising
Approximately $100,000 was spent on radio advertising and two different
radio ads were used. One focused on highway congestion, using the audio from
one of the television ads. The second radio ad was a message from Mayor
Rimsza.
Proponents leaked information that a third radio ad had been produced. This ad
attacked highway construction organizations that had provided funding for the
opposition in 1997. This threatened ad tried to discourage these organizations
from supporting the opposition.
Publicity and Public Relations Objectives
Proponents began with two major guidelines in their publicity campaign. First,
they wanted to attack the opposition. In addition to attacking the substance of
the arguments used by opponents, they planned to make personal attacks to
lessen the opponents’ credibility. Second, they wanted to neutralize talk show
radio stations, which they thought had done substantial damage in 1997 with
continual criticism of that ballot measure.
Publicity: Attacking the Opposition
The ability of the proponents to try to lessen the credibility of the opponents
was aided by their ability to accurately predict the identities of the lead
opponents before the campaign actually began. The proponents correctly
assumed that the lead opponents in the 2000 campaign would be the same
people who led the opposition in 1997.
As a result of being able to predict the identity of the opponents, proponents
were able to distribute a release at the opening of their campaign in early
January to the press who were invited to the event. These charges were
published in an article on the first page of the Arizona Republic, which is the
main newspaper in Phoenix and Maricopa County.
One of the supporting arguments in the voting pamphlet, written by a
representative of the official organization supporting the measure, also
demonstrates the personal attacks on opposition. This argument was entitled
“Who is De-Rail the Tax?” and it identified four opponents by name followed
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by negative statements about each person. Two of the four negative statements
are quoted below, omitting the person’s identify.
It’s ___________, whose Cadillac sports the vanity license
plate “FREON” because she believes Freon doesn’t hurt
the environment. Next to the license is a bumper sticker
“Stop Global Whining.”
It’s ___________, an ADOT employee, who works for
government and collects his government check as he rails
against government. He says he’s an “economist” from the
Laissez-Faire Institute. The institute is his home.
Proponents also used a press event held by opponents to attack them and this
also was mentioned in an article in the Arizona Republic. In discussing the
demonstration, the article mentioned that a supporter carried a sign calling the
opponents “CAVE” people with the acronym meaning “Citizens Against
Virtually Everything” (Arizona Republic, March 10, 2000, p. B1).
Proponents assumed opponents would use many of the same arguments in the
2000 campaign as they used in 1997. Accordingly, they were well prepared for
these arguments. A report commissioned by the Chamber of Commerce
demonstrates both this anticipation of arguments and preparation of responses.
Proponents in Phoenix, as elsewhere, have tried to persuade voters that the
transportation problems need some solution now and that opponents either
have no solution or they have an inferior solution. The use of the previously
mentioned CAVE sign was meant to convey this message. Some of the other
solutions identified by opponents on a website also were criticized and may
have been rather susceptible to criticism. For example, opponents suggested
that SkyTran was a better solution because it was a high technology private
sector solution involving no new taxes. As the Arizona Republic discussed in
an article that focused exclusively on SkyTran, this transit system was an
untested concept that existed only on a web page (Arizona Republic, March 7,
2000, p. B1).
Publicity: Neutralizing the Talk Show Radio Stations
Two popular talk show radio stations, and one talk show personality in
particular, frequently were critical of the 1997 ballot measure. Proponents
made a concerted effort to neutralize this source, realizing it was one of the few
possible sources that the financially strapped opponents could use to convey
their message. Proponents, including Mayor Rimsza and their media
consultant, met with the talk show personality. Apparently, the personality
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agreed to remain neutral if proponents agreed to three one-hour debates aired
on his talk show. Although the media consultant did not discuss the tactics used
to encourage a second talk show radio station to take a neutral position on the
2000 ballot measure, her efforts apparently were successful with this second
station.
Publicity: Editorial Support by the Arizona Republic
According to the person who wrote virtually all of the editorials supporting
both the 1997 and 2000 measures, no persuasion was needed by proponents to
obtain the editorial support of the newspaper. He also indicated that opponents
were powerless to change this editorial position.
Six editorials appeared in the Republic between the middle of February and the
election. The arguments presented in these editorials covered all of the major
points proponents were making in their advertising and one of the editorials
attacked the credibility of the opposition.
Voter Research Conducted
As discussed previously in the section on the development of the transportation
package, the steering committee had two surveys conducted while it was
developing the transportation package. Both surveys, one telephone and one
mail, asked residents to rate the importance of various components being
considered for inclusion in the package.
Although the political consultants did no focus group research, some survey
research was conducted to help formulate the advertising. According to a lead
political consultant, these results confirmed their decision to focus on air
pollution as well as on traffic congestion relief. Voters surveyed expressed high
concern over air pollution and they tended to accept the argument that transit
would reduce air pollution, even with no statistics being presented to support
this claim.
THE CAMPAIGN USED BY OPPONENTS
The composition of the opposition, their arguments, their fundraising efforts,
and the means used to communicate their arguments are discussed below.
Nature of the Opposition
One of the lead opponents described the opposition as a “grass roots” group.
This appears to be an accurate description. Only three elected officials, all state
legislators, presented signed ballot arguments against the measure in the voting
pamphlet. Since Republicans are more likely than Democrats to oppose new
taxes and increased government spending, it is difficult to obtain the support
and involvement of prominent politicians when the mayor is a Republican who
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strongly supports a measure. This was the challenge faced by the opposition in
2000 with Mayor Rimsza. One of the lead opponents confirmed this difficulty.
He stated that some elected officials expressed private opposition to the ballot
measure but were unwilling to risk alienating one of their leaders by actively
opposing the measure.
The opposition also was largely unsuccessful in obtaining the support of many
organizations. This is demonstrated by the identity of people who presented
opposing arguments in the voting pamphlet. Excluding the three ballot
arguments signed by state elected officials mentioned in the preceding
paragraph, 14 opposing arguments existed. Only one of these arguments was
signed by a person representing an ongoing organization, with this
organization being the “Taxpayer Protection Alliance.”
Opposition Arguments
Both the names usually used by opponents, “De-Rail the Tax,” and one of their
labels for the measure, “Trolley Folly,” suggest that they focused more on the
light rail component of the package than on the bus component. This was, in
fact, the case. According to one of the lead opponents, they focused more on
light rail because all of their members were opposed to light rail but some were
in favor of improving the bus system. The basic arguments used against light
rail were the common ones of it costing more than buses, being slower than
express buses, having minimal impact on congestion and air pollution, and
disrupting business and traffic during a lengthy construction period.
Realizing that they were somewhat vulnerable in attacking the light rail
component when it was supposed to be a relatively small percentage of the
total package, they argued that significantly more money would actually be
spent on light rail than the 34% stated in the mailer sent by the city. More
specifically, they argued that the Citizens Transit Commission had the
authority to change the package and also noted that the ballot measure
language did not identify the percentages to be spent on light rail vs. the other
components.
Although opponents focused more on the light rail component than on the bus
component of the package, some criticisms were made of the bus expansion
component. They indicated that this money would have little impact on air
pollution and congestion, and provided statistics to support this argument,
including statistics demonstrating that significant reductions in air pollution
had already occurred. They also argued that higher priority uses existed, such
as spending more for libraries, and the police and fire departments. In addition,
opponents argued that the $600 million of matching federal funds identified by
proponents was far from a certainty.
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Since proponents relied more heavily on personally attacking opponents in the
2000 campaign than in the 1997 campaign, opponents probably were surprised
by these attacks. If proponents were attempting to sidetrack opponents through
their personal attacks, they may have partly succeeded in accomplishing this
objective. According to a news reporter from the Arizona Republic, opponents
focused their criticism of the news coverage toward the end of the campaign on
the failure to adequately cover these personal attacks.
Opponents thought their case would be strengthened by proposing some
alternatives to the transit package. In addition to the previously mentioned
SkyTran, they proposed privatizing the bus system, giving vouchers to the
transit dependent, telecommuting and flexible work schedules, and state-of-
the-art traffic-activated traffic lights.
One solution suggested by opponents in other communities in which a transit-
only package exists, is conspicuous in its absence. This solution is highway
capacity increase. It was difficult for opponents in Phoenix to use this
argument because major highway improvements had taken place during the
1990s and were still taking place at the time of the 2000 election.
Fundraising
Opponents only raised about $10,000 in the 2000 campaign, compared to more
than $30,000 in 1997. As mentioned in the section discussing the
communications campaign used by proponents, proponents used the threat of
radio advertising to discourage a significant funding source for the opposition
in 1997 from contributing to their efforts in 2000. This source, which had
contributed over $30,000 to the opposition for a radio advertising campaign in
1997, did not contribute any funds to the opposition in 2000.
Means of Communication Used
Unlike 1997, when the opposition did some radio advertising in the last few
weeks prior to the election, the opposition did not do any advertising during the
2000 campaign. They also knew, as in 1997, that the Arizona Republic would
strongly and repeatedly endorse the ballot measure in their editorials.
Accordingly, opponents hoped to communicate their message largely through
the news media, particularly the Arizona Republic, and through talk radio
stations, which had been a very good source for them in 1997.
As discussed previously, the talk show radio stations did not oppose the 2000
measure even though they had opposed the 1997 measure. At the same time,
one of the radio stations sponsored three one-hour debates and the ballot
measure was frequently discussed in call-ins.
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According to the opposition, the Republic did not cover the 2000 campaign as
extensively as it covered the 1997 campaign. This view was confirmed by the
reporter who was responsible for covering both campaigns. She did not want to
rehash the same issues she wrote about during the 1997 campaign. Although
the amount of coverage in the newspaper in 2000 was not as extensive as in
1997, the coverage was far from light. Coverage started in early January and
involved only five articles prior to the end of February. However, 12 articles
appeared from the end of February until the election, with about half of them
front-page articles. Opponents were quoted in most of these articles and most
of their communications objectives were repeatedly mentioned, particularly
objectives pertaining to light rail. Frequent mention also was made of the
opponents’ solutions. At the same time, two or three correct mentions were
made that some opponents supported expansion of the bus system, including a
direct quote from one of the leaders of De-Rail the Tax.
EVALUATION
One characteristic of the ballot measure in the Phoenix case is unique among
the cases studied to date. Phoenix is the only case that used a city-only ballot
measure.
The use of a city-level approach seems plausible only when support is likely to
be significantly higher in one or two communities within an MPO than within
other communities within the same MPO. Based on the results for the
Maricopa County transit elections in 1989 and 1994, Tempe’s success in 1996,
and the defeat of 2000 ballot transit measure in Scottsdale while Phoenix
passed their measure in the same year by a large margin, support for transit is
significantly stronger in Phoenix and Tempe than in the remaining
communities within Maricopa County. In addition, the use of a city-only
approach may simplify the task of providing geographical equity. It may be
easier to achieve this equity in a smaller geographical area than in a larger area,
particularly when the need for transit is not equal throughout the larger
geographical area. For example, the need and demand for bus transit is greater
in Phoenix than in largely suburban residential communities, such as
Scottsdale.
Although the use of a city-only approach increases the likelihood of success in
one or two communities within an MPO, such as in Phoenix and Tempe, the
same approach probably reduces the likelihood of success in other
communities with less support for transit within the same MPO, such as in
Scottsdale. Thus, the use of a city-level approach could lessen the probability
that a system-wide transit system will be adopted. Since most freeway traffic in
Maricopa County, particularly during commute hours, is suburb-to-city, a rail
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system existing only in Tempe and Phoenix will have less impact on
congestion than a system-wide rail system would have.
In summary, the use of a city-only approach seems to involve a tradeoff. Such
an approach increases the chances of success within some communities while,
at the same time, probably lessening the chances of success in other
communities within the MPO.
The Phoenix case provides some understanding relevant to an issue discussed
in a number of other cases. This issue is whether highway funding should be
paired with transit funding, either in a single measure or in separate but
concurrent measures.
The success of the 2000 transit-only measure in Phoenix, combined with voter
rejection in Phoenix of a combined highway and transit county measure in
1994, suggests that transit-only measures can be more successful than
combined highway and transit measures in at least one set of conditions. The
conditions existing in Phoenix were a) a significant amount of highway
construction had taken place shortly before the 2000 transit-only measure was
presented to voters, and b) the transit-only package included a significant
percentage of funding allocated to improving an inadequate basic bus service.
CONCLUSION
Differences between the successful 2000 ballot measure and the unsuccessful
1999 one have been discussed throughout this chapter. The differences are
summarized in Table 5-1.
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Table 5-1. Differences Between 2000 and 1997 Ballot Measures
A brief explanation of one entry in Table 5-1 is needed. Although the 2000
measure added 300 fewer buses than the 1997 measure, this difference was not
mentioned by either proponents or by opponents.
Now that the differences between the successful 2000 ballot measure and
campaign and the unsuccessful one in 1997 have been identified, they are
briefly evaluated.
2000 Ballot Measure 1997 Ballot Measure
.004 increase in sales tax .005 increase in sales tax
20-year sunset date No sunset date
100 buses added in first five years 400 buses added in first five years
An explicit light rail component No explicit light rail component
Specifics of plan communicated Specifics of plan not communicated
as part of stealth campaign
Proponents had $1.3 million budget Proponents had $700,000 budget
The Mayor led the fundraising
efforts and selected the political
consultants
The business community led the
fundraising efforts and also selected
the political consultants
Proponents used extensive television
advertising
Proponents did not use extensive
television advertising
Proponents attacked opponents Proponents did not attack opponents
Opponents had no money available
for advertising
Opponents spent at least $30,000 on
advertising
Talk show radio stations not
opposed
Talk show radio stations opposed
No opposition from prominent
politicians or appointed officials
Opposition from the state Director of
the Department of Transportation
and the Chief of the state
Department of Environmental
Quality
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• Phoenix both added a sunset date and reduced the magnitude of the sales
tax increase with their successful ballot measure. Even with these
modifications, the sunset date of 20 years is a lengthy one and the .004
increase in the sales tax rate is rather large in comparison with other cases
studied. In addition, as mentioned previously, the rate was lowered
primarily at Mayor Rimsza’s insistence based upon future political
aspirations rather than lowered to gain more voter acceptance for the ballot
measure. Voters’ positive reaction to this long sunset date and significant
tax increase, in a fiscally conservative community is somewhat
inconsistent with conventional wisdom that measures are unlikely to pass
with a sales tax increase greater than 1/4-cent, particularly if the sunset date
is longer than ten years.
• Having some unspecified components of a plan and/or not presenting the
specific components to the voting public, fearing that voters will reject the
plan if they disagree with some of its specific aspects, is risky.
As discussed previously, the amount of funding devoted to light rail was not
specified in the 1997 package and this lack of specification was used by
opponents and talk show radio stations to generate voter suspicion and distrust.
These suspicions were reinforced by the political consultant’s decision in 1997
to run a stealth campaign which did not disclose the details of the parts of the
plan that were specified and by the lack of a sunset date. These problems were
largely corrected with the 2000 measure and the campaign in support of the
measure.
To qualify this discussion of specificity, voter distrust may not be triggered
with some unspecified components as long as the basic aspects are specified.
For example, the failure to specify the seven to ten miles of light rail routing in
the third phase of construction apparently was not viewed negatively by voters
in the 2000 campaign. The combination of specifying the total funding
allocated to light rail and also specifying the routing of the first 17 miles of
light rail construction appears to have alleviated potential voter distrust
regarding the lack of specificity of the routing during the third phase of light
rail construction.
• A high frequency television advertising campaign, focusing on the
congestion problems can be effective, even without strong statistical
support, demonstrating that the transit improvements will significantly
lessen congestion. To qualify this discussion of television advertising
frequency, higher frequency levels probably are needed when voting is
done over an extended period of time through mail balloting. Such was the
case in Phoenix.
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• Proponents were much more aggressive in attacking opponents in 2000
than in 1997, as well as being more aggressive than in any other
community studied to date. However, it is difficult to ascertain the impact,
if any, of these attacks, given the large number of other differences
identified in Table 5-1. In addition, these attacks could have backfired if
some prominent and respected people had been involved in the opposition.
The attacks, particularly the use of the CAVE acronym (Citizens Against
Virtually Everything), also would have been less effective if the opponents
had presented alternatives that the public perceived positively, rather than
presenting alternatives such as SkyTran and telecommuting.
The successful passage of the 2000 ballot measure by a 2:1 margin, only
slightly more than two years after a rather similar measure was defeated by a
small margin, suggests that voting patterns with transit measures can be
unstable. The Phoenix case also demonstrates that a transit-only measure with
a significant increase in the sales tax and a lengthy sunset date can be passed
by a large margin when a) light rail is only one component in the package and
this component initially involves an incremental, rather than a comprehensive
light rail system to be funded, and b) proponents use an aggressive
communications campaign supported by very successful fundraising.
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IS HALF A LOAF BETTER THAN NONE?
COLUMBUS SPLITS TRANSIT TAX VOTES
In November of 1999, the Central Ohio Transit Authority (COTA) had two
issues on the ballot in Franklin County. One, Issue 20, represented a permanent
renewal of COTA’s existing 1/4-cent sales tax funding; the other, Issue 21,
would have provided an additional 1/4-cent tax for a ten-year period in order to
provide for significant transit enhancements, including new commuter trains.
Voters in Franklin County, which includes the city of Columbus, opted to
approve the first measure by a significant margin, yet rejected the second
measure by an almost equally large margin. Thus, voters apparently sent a
mixed message, and this case therefore represents a somewhat complicated
lesson for transportation advocates. The case seems to illustrate the difficulty
of getting voters to approve a transit-only package with a substantial rail
component in an area with less than crisis-level congestion and a controversial
bus system.
BACKGROUND: TRANSPORTATION AND TRAFFIC
Columbus, the state capital of Ohio, is a city of over 500,000 and greater
Columbus, including surrounding Franklin County has a population of just
over one million. A number of Fortune 500 companies are located in
Columbus, which has become a financial and service sector center of the
Midwest. Additionally, the city is home to many state government agencies as
well as Ohio State University, which has over 30,000 students. Population
forecasts suggest that the area will face an increase in population of 400,000,
including 225,000 new jobs by the year 2020. With the growth of population
and commerce have come increases in traffic and congestion. Although
Franklin County’s population increased by only 6% in the past nine years, the
number of cars on the road increased by 29% during the same period.
Commute times are expected to double by the year 2020 (Columbus Dispatch,
May 16, 1999).
However, traffic congestion in the Columbus area does not yet appear to be at a
crisis point in the eye of the public. The worst traffic appears to be located in
specific areas, and some parts of the city are relatively unaffected by
congestion. A survey taken shortly before the campaign for Issues 20 and 21
began found that 24% of Columbus citizens were “concerned about traffic
congestion.” Although that is a substantial increase since 1994, when only 4%
were so concerned, it suggests that many residents of the area do not yet see
congestion relief as an urgent and immediate priority for public policy. Unlike
many communities with traffic and congestion problems, air quality did not
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appear to be a pressing issue in Columbus. One transit supporter said,
“Columbus is one of the last major cities to experience real congestion; we
have had a great ride for about 40 years” (Dispatch, Oct. 24, 1999). Traffic is
clearly a problem in Columbus that many citizens are concerned about, but is
perhaps not yet at the point at which the public is prepared to pay much for
transit improvements.
The Columbus area receives transit services from COTA in the form of a bus
system, which COTA has operated since 1974. Currently, COTA has 66 bus
routes with 334 buses that provide 18 million rides a year. Project Mainstream,
a van service for the disabled, carries 121,000 people annually. The bus
system, although extensive, has been the focus of some dissatisfaction in
Columbus. The dependability of the system at nonpeak hours has been
questioned, while some critics focused on the inefficiency of the system: so-
called “empty buses” became a focal point of the campaign for Issues 20 and
21. The existing bus system was financed in large part by a nonpermanent 1/4-
cent sales tax levy whose renewal and transition to permanency was at issue
with Issue 20 (Dispatch, Jan. 10, 1999).
However, the area did not have any rail transit of any kind. Supporters of
Issues 20 and 21 argued that the area was losing out on federal assistance for
transit because of its failure to embrace rail transit. For example, the Ohio
cities of Cleveland and Cincinnati had recently been awarded $220 and $127
million respectively for rail related activities, whereas Columbus received only
$66 million for capital improvements to its bus system (Dispatch, Jan. 10,
1999).
BACKGROUND: POLITICAL HISTORY
In Columbus, decision making about transit is largely the responsibility of
COTA. A Board of Directors governs COTA, but COTA President and CEO
Ronald Barnes is the most influential individual. Barnes was formerly the chief
manager with the Greater Cleveland Regional Transit Authority. A high
profile, active chief administrator, Barnes was the key architect and proponent
of Issues 20 and 21, although he was by no means the sole force behind the
measures. Other key decision makers who figure in local transportation policy
include Columbus Mayor Greg Lashutka, the Greater Columbus Chamber of
Commerce – which frequently speaks for the local business community, and
the Mid-Ohio Regional Planning Commission, a voluntary association of
governments serving the area.
The 1999 election was not the first time that the area had considered
substantial improvements in its mass transit system. As the executive director
of the planning commission noted, local efforts to introduce passenger rail
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have been characterized by “misadventure and disappointment” (Dispatch,
January 10, 1999). Over the prior 15 years, no fewer than nine long-range
plans that included a rail transit component (including subways, light rail and
commuter rail) had been proposed, but none had actually made a ballot. Each
was rejected on the basis of excessive cost.
Most recently, in 1995 COTA had proposed an 11.2-mile light rail line that
would have connected downtown Columbus to suburban Crosswoods center.
Due to the cost ($276 million) and opposition from the local newspaper, the
COTA board withheld the measure from the ballot. Instead, a less costly
measure that included only enhanced bus service was placed on the 1995
ballot, which was soundly defeated. Transit advocates felt that the rail measure
might have fared better, and with metropolitan congestion a much more
tangible reality, transit supporters were optimistic about the prospects for
increased support for a rail measure in 1999.
Additionally, the Columbus Dispatch had figured prominently in past decisions
about transportation improvements. The former publisher of the local daily
newspaper, John Wolfe, had reportedly helped to eliminate light rail from the
1995 measure, which may have helped to hasten its lopsided defeat. Its
coverage of the campaign for Issues 20 and 21 figured to have a significant
impact on the outcomes.
DEVELOPING A TRANSPORTATION COALITION
Community leaders are generally supportive of COTA. Once COTA
announced the details of the transit plan (see below), the mayor of Columbus,
both of the candidates who were running to replace him, nearly every suburban
mayor, the Columbus and Westerville Chambers of Commerce, the Franklin
County AFL-CIO, environmental groups (including the Sierra Club), and
many other community organizations endorsed it. A political action
committee, the Transit Tomorrow Coalition was formed early in 1999 (the year
of the election), giving the transportation initiatives’ supporters a timely focal
point for their efforts. Support for the measures was bipartisan, but this election
was the first in which congestion was a major issue. This meant that the depth
of support for congestion relief was a major unknown.
The business community was generally supportive of the idea of enhanced
mass transit because of the perception that the existing transportation system
was inadequate for business. The continuing mobility of the workforce,
therefore, was a motivating factor for the support of the business community.
Nevertheless, some within the business community were less than enthusiastic
about COTA; and the perception existed that the authority lacked public
support due to its mismanagement of the bus service (interview with a
Is Half A Loaf Better Than None? Columbus Splits Transit Tax Votes
Mineta Transportation Institute
94
Chamber of Commerce representative). Moreover, Columbus is a generally
conservative community that has traditionally resisted public indebtedness.
Although Issues 20 and 21 did not represent debt, they represented a long-term
financial obligation with which some within the business community may have
felt unease.
Organized opposition was scant in terms of organizational resources, yet
highly effective. First, Richard Sheir, a citizen-activist, was opposed to the
plans. He based opposition primarily on dissatisfaction with the existing bus
service offered by COTA. Second, the Buckeye Institute, a research
organization based in Dayton that typically opposes public expenditures for
passenger rail systems, was poised to oppose the measures. Although neither
opposition force could marshal much in the way of financial or other
organizational resources, both were to be highly effective in publicizing their
opposition to the plans.
CREATING A TRANSPORTATION INITIATIVE
Plans for the 1999 measures began in 1996, when COTA officials began to
discuss how they were going to deal with the impending expiration of a 10-
year, 1/4-cent sales tax levy that provided much of their operating funds, in
light of the fact that the 1995 increase had failed at the polls. To help build
stronger grass roots support for its next attempt, the COTA Board of Directors
created a committee of members of the community who would help construct a
more successful measure. Additionally, the Board attempted to consult with
community stakeholders and leaders, trying to both seek a consensus and to
rectify its less than positive community image. In 1998, the agency began an
outreach program, which sought feedback on its emerging regional
transportation plan known as “Vision 2020,” which is described below in
greater detail. However, the plan that emerged was essentially designed by
COTA.
The COTA board itself was solidly behind Barnes, although several members
left shortly before the election (Dispatch, March 7, 1999).
Vision 2020 consisted of the enhancement of the existing bus service, creation
of a commuter rail system, plus a downtown light rail line (Dispatch, Oct. 12,
1999). The plan also called for various improvements that would help increase
the “intelligence” of the entire transit system. At a projected cost of $421.7
million, the enhanced bus service would include:
• 24-hour bus service on major routes;
• 15 transit centers with small-bus circulators in suburbs and urban
neighborhoods;
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• Expanded downtown circulator bus service;
• Construction of a downtown multimodal transportation terminal; and
• An increase of the bus fleet from 265 to 508 coaches, including more small
buses.
At an estimated cost of $498.8 million, the commuter rail would include:
• Construction of eight commuter rail lines on existing freight lines between
downtown Columbus and its suburbs;
• 83.6 miles of right-of-way would be obtained from freight railroads;
• Purchase of 29 diesel-powered rail cars; and
• Trains that would run on average every 30 minutes from 5:00 A.M. to
Midnight, Monday through Saturday, plus more limited Sunday service.
The downtown “circulation” system would consist of:
• A 1.2-mile street-level rail line opening in 2005 connecting two
neighborhoods that circumscribe the north and south of downtown
Columbus, and
• Two circulator bus loops running north and south along Broad Street, a
major downtown artery.
The plan represented a sweeping upgrade of the Franklin County transit
system. The creation of eight commuter rail lines, and a light rail in central
Columbus represented benefits potentially attractive to a geographically
diverse portion of the area.
All told, the projects outlined in the Vision 2020 plan required approximately
$1 billion in new revenues. Initially, transit supporters planned a permanent,
1/2-cent sales tax increase that would have provided the bulk of the required
revenues (although even with that amount, some additional bond funding
would have been necessary) (Dispatch, May, 20, 1999). However, opposition
surfaced with respect to the permanency of this approach. More specifically,
elements of the business community lobbied for a temporary measure, on the
grounds that it would enhance the accountability of COTA. A number of
alternatives were then floated as possible compromises, and eventually the idea
of two tax measures, one permanent and one temporary surfaced. However,
even if both measures were to pass, the temporary measure would need to be
renewed by voters in 10 years for the project to be adequately funded.
Supporters of the measures expressed hope that the taxes would help attract
federal funds that would help make up some or all of the shortfall.
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In retrospect, the bifurcation of the tax measure – although it helped increase
the purchase on the local business community – may have helped to doom the
overall success of the transportation measures. Pre-election survey data
suggested support for rail transportation. But rail transportation was only a
possibility if both measures were to pass, because the operation of the existing
bus transit system rested in part on passage of at least one tax increase.
Ballot language for the two measures was nearly identical. Issue 20 (the
permanent 1/4-cent increase) read: “Shall the continuation of an existing sales
and use tax be levied for all transit purposes of the Central Ohio Transit
Authority at a rate not exceeding one-fourth of one percent for a continuing
period of time?” Issue 21 (the temporary 1/4-cent increase) was nearly
identical, ending with the “for a period of ten years.” (State law presently
prohibits direct linkages between tax increases and specific expenditures.)
Thus neither measure was legally specific with respect to its purpose, thereby
potentially confusing voters and opening a line of criticism from opponents
about the vagueness of the plan. Had both measures passed, they would have
raised approximately $1.5 billion over a 20-year period (Dispatch, Oct. 24,
1999).
USE OF RESEARCH TECHNIQUES
Extensive survey research was employed to test the waters for the passage of
Issues 20 and 21. Tracking surveys were conducted in April, July, and
September in 1999. Results from the initial April survey, although indicating
widespread support for the issues (which at that time weren’t well known)
suggested that transportation was not an issue of preeminent importance
among most respondents. When asked what was “the most important problem
facing Franklin County,” respondents were as likely to mention crime (21%) or
education (21%) as transportation-related issues (20%). Compared with
previous data, the survey found that transportation had actually receded
somewhat as a salient issue; a 1998 survey found that 28% of respondents
found it to be the most important problem.
Nevertheless, as early as April, support for the language that would later
appear in both Issues 20 and 12 seemed fairly strong. With respect to Issue 20,
69.5% of respondents said they would “probably” or “definitely” vote yes for
such measures. For Issue 21, a total of 62% were in favor. Thus, support for the
second, temporary measure was apparently less than that for its companion
from the onset. Interestingly, the percentage of respondents who said they
would vote for the two measures combined into a single, permanent 1/2-cent
increase was 57% (37% definitely, 30% probably).
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By July, however, before any considerable amount of publicity about the
measures had emerged, support for the measures had changed noticeably.
Whereas support for Issue 20 remained more or less constant (at 66%), support
for the 1/4-cent increase (Issue 21) had already dipped to 55%, a loss of seven
percentage points.
The July survey instrument also contained interesting items that may shed light
on the outcome of Issues 20 and 21. When asked, “If COTA receives additional
funding, do you believe it is more important for COTA to spend those
additional funds on improving the county’s bus system OR on developing a
passenger rail system in the county,” respondents were fairly closely divided.
Forty percent chose improving the bus system, and 48% opted for developing a
rail system. This suggests that the priorities underlying support for the two
measures were significantly divided. Nevertheless, although more respondents
wanted to develop a rail system (if additional funds were available), support
was greater for the measure that was dedicated to the (existing) bus system.
The discrepancy is explained in part by the fact that all respondents – including
those who expressed opposition to the tax measures – were asked about their
priorities for additional funds.
Respondents were also asked whether various arguments would affect their
support for the ballot measures. The argument that had – by far – the biggest
positive impact was: “In order to move people more efficiently, COTA plans
on using a portion of the funds from these issues to purchase smaller buses to
service areas with fewer average riders and put larger buses into areas where
the bus system has a heavier load. This will eliminate the problem of running
buses with few or no passengers.” Ninety-three percent of respondents
indicated that this argument would make them “much more” or “somewhat
more” likely to support the measures. This fact illustrates the salience of the
management of the bus system – and dissatisfaction with it – to voter attitudes
about transportation in Franklin County, which seemed to have some impact
for the outcome of these measures.
By late September, support for both issues had eroded considerably. Support
for Issue 20 was at 53%, while Issue 21 was receiving only 38%. Although the
campaign for the Measures had barely begun, they were already in serious
jeopardy of failing. To understand this development, and to interpret the
ultimate failure of Issue 21 (and passage of Issue 20), it is necessary to more
closely examine the events that unfolded during the campaign (see following
section).
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DEVISING AND IMPLEMENTING A CAMPAIGN STRATEGY
A Columbus based consulting and public relations firm, coordinated the
campaign for the issues. The firm subsequently hired a campaign manager,
field coordinator, and a fundraiser. The business community, rallied in part by
the Chamber of Commerce, also took a reasonably active part in the campaign
for Issues 20 and 21. The Chamber’s Board of Directors passed formal
resolutions in favor of both measures. Most, if not all of the bigger local
financial concerns donated to the campaign, including the Columbus Dispatch,
Nationwide Bank, BancOne, and The Limited. Ultimately, however, the
Chamber raised less than $500,000. There is no simple explanation for the
relative shortfall of donations from the local business community; it may have
been the result of distrust of COTA management, the lack of a history of
successful transit projects, the perception that congestion was not at a crisis
level, or some combination of these or other factors. The campaign wound up
with a war chest of less than $550,000, an amount less than that typically
associated with such campaigns and an insufficient one in the view of some
campaign consultants. Most of the money was dedicated to television
advertising, which ran the last two weeks of the campaign.
As is the case with many political campaigns, the supporters’ strategy was to
focus on convincing marginal or “swing” voters to support the measures, while
maintaining the support of those predisposed to do so. Survey research had
suggested that the “base” support for the measure was coming from women,
Democrats, infrequent COTA users, and residents of downtown Columbus and
its northern suburbs. Swing voters were believed to consist of female
homemakers, African Americans, independents, and residents of the
southwestern, blue-collar areas of Columbus. Interestingly, frequent COTA
users were not considered to be part of the base support demographic; rather
they were found to be at best part of the “swing” contingent. This fact alone
should have perhaps raised concerns about the underlying vitality of support
for the measures. Despite the fact that the campaign never became particularly
partisan in flavor, the key opposition demographic consisted primarily of
Republicans; the campaign strategy was essentially to ignore the more
entrenched opposition.
The overall campaign strategy was to focus on mass media, particularly
television spots. Second, the campaign would seek to sell the two measures as
a package, and not emphasize the differences between the two on the theory
that to do so would only complicate the issue and confuse voters. One fact that
had emerged from the precampaign polling was that rail was a popular issue
among voters in the County. For example, when asked in April of 1999,
“Which one of the following do you believe will do the MOST to relieve traffic
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congestion in the county?” a plurality (44%) of respondents had opted for
“building a passenger rail system in the county.” Although management of the
bus system was clearly also a concern among voters, adding new rail service
seemed to be a more positive message to emphasize than addressing bus
management issues. In any event, the campaign’s relative lack of emphasis on
grass roots and direct mail campaigning were, in retrospect, questionable.
The message from the television campaign was to emphasize the congestion-
reducing effects that a rail commuting system could confer on the community.
It would focus on the “three Cs:” Connecting people to higher-paying jobs;
providing Congestion relief, and helping riders Conveniently reach important
destinations. The bus system was mentioned in some spots, but received much
less overall emphasis. However, the television campaign was apparently
overshadowed by other developments in the campaign.
First, despite the lack of organized opposition, contestants in other races
largely overlooked the issue of transportation raised by Issues 20 and 21. Most
important, the two candidates for Mayor of Columbus avoided the issue,
although both were on record in support of both measures. This left the issue
without a major elected official or candidate to act as spokesperson for the
measures. Second, the Columbus Dispatch focused heavily on the issue. It was
through this avenue that the essentially unfunded and unorganized opposition
to the measures was apparently extremely effective.
Perhaps the most effective opponent was Richard Sheir, a self-styled “rabble-
rouser” who was also associated with a successful effort to deny public funding
to a downtown sports arena. Sheir is a management analyst for the Ohio
Department of Human Services with a master's degree in public policy and
labor economics from the University of California-Berkeley. His opposition to
both Issues 20 and 21 was based almost exclusively on his charge that COTA
was an inefficient manager of the bus system. Beginning in approximately
September, Sheir began publicizing the fact that some if not many, COTA
buses frequently ran with few and sometimes no passengers.
A Dispatch columnist picked up on Sheir’s opposition, running a column that
supported Sheir’s view of COTA and the bus system:
Richard Sheir—a rabble-rouser who has saved taxpayers
untold millions of dollars fighting arenas, convention
centers and other titan-favored toys—says 17 COTA
routes average fewer than seven people—total—per run.
Thirty other routes average fewer than 10, he said. On
some trips, a lone rider, rattling around a huge, diesel-
gulping bus built for 40 or more gets what amounts to a
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$69 subsidy from taxpayers, Sheir said. “They’re like very,
very expensive taxi rides.” And Sheir, a Democrat and
regular COTA rider, likes public transportation. He just
thinks it'd be crazy to fork over billions of additional
dollars in light of COTA's record. “They want to take an
already-inefficient system and double capacity,” he said.
“Any troubled business cuts out the inefficiency first
before talking about expanding” (Dispatch, Oct. 11, 1999).
Shortly after the above article appeared, Sheir debated his views with a
representative of the supporters of Issues 20 and 21. (The two were actually
interviewed separately, but their views were pieced together to give the
appearance of an actual debate.) In the article, Sheir expanded upon his view
of COTA as a mismanaged public entity. He disputed the notion that Columbus
was really experiencing enough congestion to warrant creation of a rail
commuting system, criticized plans to link employers with bus service as
“corporate welfare,” and continued to press his criticism of “empty buses” run
by COTA. Sheir was effective in portraying himself as a mainstream critic who
represented dissatisfied COTA customers, and not a “lone voice” (Dispatch,
Oct. 24, 1999).
A few days later, COTA general manager Ronald Barnes – the de facto leader
of the pro-transit campaign – engaged in a public debate at a luncheon at the
Columbus Metropolitan Club. Barnes responded –somewhat testily, according
to news reports – to Sheir’s charges about the so-called “empty buses.”
“It’s very easy to go out and cut down on every route that
is not productive in someone’s mind,” Barnes said. “But
we as a public agency should be looking at guaranteeing
mobility for every person who needs it.” The comment
generated applause from the audience. “In a government
city, you are not going to get much applause by saying that
there are limits to government,” Sheir responded.
“Guaranteed taxi services should be one of those limits”
(Dispatch, Oct. 28, 1999).
Whether either individual “won” the debate is less important than the fact that
the event apparently continued to elevate Sheir as an opponent with a credible
point of view. The “empty buses” argument seemed to resonate with an
electorate that surveys (taken before the debate) had shown to have concerns
with the COTA bus service. Additionally, the focus on Sheir and his arguments
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effectively moved the campaign from a discussion of the merits of Vision 2020
to a debate over the management of the bus system by COTA.
More or less concomitantly, a second phalanx of opposition arose from a
conservative think tank known as the “Buckeye Institute for Public Policy
Solutions.” In October, the Institute released a report with the claim that it
would be cheaper to lease projected rail passengers new sport utility vehicles
than to build light rail or commuter rail in Ohio’s major cities. A second
Buckeye Institute theme disputed the major COTA claim of cutting congestion,
concluding that traffic congestion would be reduced by less than one-percent
by building the proposed passenger rail in Ohio’s largest cities. The report
supported the idea of building additional roads as the most efficient and
effective response to congestion problems in the Columbus area (Dispatch,
October 19, 1999).
Transit supporters countered the report with the results from one
commissioned by the Columbus Chamber of Commerce. That report found
that Franklin County would receive $3.30 in benefits for every $1.00 paid
toward the $1.5 billion COTA expansion and generally contradicted the
conclusions from the Buckeye Institute. Following the release of the Buckeye
Institute report, a Dispatch columnist lampooned its findings: “The institute
says that because so many people drive cars, the answer to road congestion is
to keep driving cars and building more roads.” The Institute soon offered a
rejoinder in the Dispatch’s letters to the editor section. However, once again,
the question was not “who won?” but rather to what extent did the debate shift
the focus of the campaign from the supporters’ positive message to a sound
byte about buying sports utility vehicles in lieu of transit.
Ultimately, the Dispatch editorial section did endorse both Issues 20 and 21,
with the following language:
For metropolitan Columbus to remain a place where
people enjoy living, working, and raising a family, the city
must have a convenient, well-used and efficient mass-
transit system. Voting yes on both Issues 20 and 21 puts a
plan for such a system into action. Issue 20 would turn the
Central Ohio Transit Authority's existing 1/4-cent sales-tax
levy, which expires on Jan. 31, into an equal-sized levy
that would not expire, thus ensuring the continuous source
of revenues necessary to attract federal funding. Issue 21
would establish, for 10 years only, an additional 1/4-cent
sales-tax levy for COTA, allowing a much-needed
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expansion of the system (Dispatch, Oct. 31, 1999).
Whereas this was indeed an endorsement, it was probably too little and too late
to offset all of the negative publicity that the opponents of the measures had
successfully engendered.
Of course, the supporters’ campaign extended beyond the war of words in the
Dispatch. The campaign sought to create a grass roots presence, with the
creation of a speaker’s bureau, securing endorsements from community
leaders, and outreach messages targeted for constituent groups such as African
Americans, seniors, and the disabled. However, in retrospect, some observers
interviewed for this report were skeptical about the campaign’s effectiveness in
implementing this aspect of the campaign.
EVALUATION
On the general election held November 2, 1999, in Franklin County, Issue 20 –
a permanent 1/4-cent sales tax increase – passed with 57% of the vote (124,343
yes to 91,733 no). Issue 20 – a ten-year 1/4-cent sales tax increase – failed
with just 44.7% of the vote (96,614 yes to 119,350 no). Interpretation of such a
mixed result is precarious, and insomuch as no exit polling was done, the true
reasons behind this outcome cannot be definitively known. The mixed result
was, in a fashion, a major victory for COTA because it meant that for the first
time the agency would receive guaranteed funding without the need to ask for
renewal. On the other hand, of course, the defeat of Issue 21 signified the
decimation of COTA’s plans for the comprehensive transit system outlined in
Vision 2020 – at least for the time being.
Perhaps the most obvious interpretation of the outcome would be to credit the
opposition and its remarkable domination of the campaign agenda during the
key weeks of October. However, that interpretation is problematic for several
reasons. First, the surveys conducted by the supporters showed that support for
both measures had decreased significantly as early as September, far earlier
than the publicity surrounding the opposition. The September poll results
showed Issue 20 passing (barely) and Issue 21 losing. The actual result was
quite similar to the results of this poll. Such a pattern of early support followed
by deterioration is not unusual in this type of election.
Second, the fact that Issue 20 – which was essentially dedicated to the bus
system – passed, suggests that the opposition’s message about “empty buses”
was perhaps not as trenchant as it appeared to be. Issue 21 did fail, of course,
but again the polls suggested it would fail before the Buckeye Institute attacks
on rail systems. Nevertheless, the fact that the $550,000 pro-transit campaign
was unable to realize any gains in public support in the face of an underfunded
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opposition that included few, if any, prominent officials or widely respected
organizations, was a major disappointment to transit supporters in the area.
In all likelihood, a number of factors were at play to create the outcome of
November 2, including the following:
• Paired initiative on the ballot;
• Inexplicit ballot language;
• Lack of a lead campaign spokesperson;
• Failure of campaign to link plan to benefits for voters;
• Failure to convince suburban voters about the benefits of transit;
• Lack of congestion crisis;
• Inadequate campaign funding;
• Inadequate grassroots organization;
• Over-reliance on mass media; and
• Excessive attention paid to opposition arguments.
Paired initiative on the ballot
Considerable hand wringing occurred among transit supporters before and
after the November election concerning the wisdom and impact of going with
two separate ballot measures. The existence of two measures meant that
limited campaign resources had to be stretched even further – despite the
avowed strategy of treating the two as a package. Although it is uncertain
whether one ballot would have passed, it is fairly clear that voters were quite
confused by the two measures. Only half of the voting respondents to a post
election survey reported knowing the difference between the two issues, as did
only 31% of all respondents.
Individuals interviewed for this report were evenly divided with respect to
their opinion on how a single initiative would have fared. As one consultant
stated, “placing one initiative on the ballot for a permanent tax would have
been a huge gamble, and probably would not have paid off.” Splitting the
measures enabled supporters to treat one as a “renewal” and the other as an
“increase.” Clearly, the renewal was more popular with voters, although it is
possible that the increase (Issue 21) helped to detract attention from the
permanency of the renewal (Issue 20).
Ultimately, given the political realities of the Columbus area, the question of
the wisdom may be a moot point. The fact is that the business community,
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whose buy-in to the plan was critical, would not have supported a single,
permanent measure, and thus supporters had to work with the hand with which
they were dealt.
Inexplicit ballot language
An associated problem with Issues 20 and 21 was their vague language, which
mentions only the tax increases and not – even impressionistically – their
purposes. Voters who were not familiar with the details behind the issues – and
post election survey data suggests many voters were not – were confronted
only with a pair of what appeared to be tax increases. However, the supporters’
hands were tied in this respect by state law. Supporters have since raised the
idea of amending the law such that the purposes of a tax increase can be
included in the ballot language.
Lack of a lead campaign spokesperson
Although the outgoing Mayor and both of the candidates running to succeed
him all endorsed the measures, none took great initiative to sponsor them.
Given the traditionally fiscal conservative mindset of the Columbus electorate,
their reticence is understandable, but the burden of spearheading the campaign
fell largely instead to the managing director of COTA, Ronald Barnes. Besides
being limited as an appointed official in terms of campaign activities, Barnes
would have the appearance of feathering his own nest by being too closely
associated with the campaign. In any event, his debate with opponent Richard
Sheir apparently did little to help the measures succeed.
Failure of campaign to link plan to benefits for individual voters.
The message of the campaign – the “three Cs” of Connecting, Congestion
relief, and Convenience, was perhaps too broad. It failed to demonstrate to
individual voters the specific benefits they could expect to realize were the
measures to pass. This problem is related to the reliance on televised media
(see next item).
Over-reliance on mass media
The campaign devoted most of its limited resources to television spots that
aired the final two weeks before the election. Although these spots may have
had some positive impact, televised media are inherently poor at linking
specific benefits to specific portions of the electorate. Additionally, brief
television spots are a poor forum for explaining the complexities of a two-issue
campaign. An enhanced direct mail approach might have helped voters
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understand what was at stake with the two issues, as well as letting them see
how they personally might have benefited from a positive outcome.
Lack of a traffic congestion crisis
Compared to many other major metropolitan areas, Columbus does not yet
seem to be facing a crisis with respect to traffic, congestion, and associated
problems like air pollution. Even some of the measures’ supporters would
concede this, and polling data tend to support the finding that many voters do
not yet regard transportation as a front-burner issue. This fact put additional
burden on the already overextended campaign to help sell the message that
something needed to be done, and quickly, to address the problem. It may be
that a necessary condition for a successful transit tax measure is a clear
consensus that something must be done about a pressing traffic problem.
Columbus does not yet fill that bill.
Inadequate campaign funding
Consultants for the Columbus campaign indicated that their odds of success
would have been much greater with a $1 million campaign fund. With more
resources, the campaign might have been able to afford more voter education
about the two issues, and a much more extensive direct mail campaign.
Inadequate grass roots organization
The campaign occurred in a six to eight week time frame, insufficient to build
an effective grass roots presence. As a result, logical constituencies such as
frequent COTA users were apparently not mobilized.
Excessive attention paid to opposition arguments
The supporters’ campaign opted to respond in great detail to the opposition’s
somewhat outrageous claims about public transportation. The director of
COTA even engaged one outspoken opponent in a public debate that was
covered by the local media. In the context of the campaign, it is possible that
this seemed necessary because the newspaper was publishing the opponents’
arguments. But it may have been counterproductive in that it served to further
publicize these arguments, and perhaps legitimized them for an even wider
audience.
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CHARLOTTE: A RESOUNDING VICTORY
FOR TRANSIT IN THE “NEW SOUTH”
On November 3,1998, voters in the City of Charlotte and Mecklenburg
County, North Carolina, approved a 1/2-cent sales tax increase to fund an
improved public transportation system, including rapid transit. The tax
increase, which was projected to raise $1 billion over a 25-year period,
received 58% of the vote countywide. The victory was a stunning political
success in an area with a scant history of support for or experience with transit.
Revenues from the tax will be used to create a new light rail system, improve
and expand bus service, as well as fund commuter rail from outlying areas.
The success of the measure provides an example of how sufficient support can
be marshaled for transportation improvements even in areas that are
traditionally wary of tax increases, as well as transit. To achieve this in
Charlotte, supporters of the tax initiative created a credible, detailed plan, used
extensive public education to publicize it, and ultimately built a broad coalition
that supported it at the polls. They were also effective in neutralizing the
opposition to the measure by addressing opponent’s arguments directly and
with immediacy.
BACKGROUND: TRANSPORTATION AND TRAFFIC
Charlotte (and surrounding Mecklenburg County) is one of the Southeast’s
fastest growing metropolitan areas. More than 500,000 people reside within
the city’s borders, and approximately 1.3 million live within the metropolitan
area; six million residents are within a 100-mile radius. Moreover, the
County’s population is expected to continue climbing by as many as 345,000
residents over the next 25 years, a 57% increase; employment is projected to
grow by approximately 250,000 jobs during the same period (2025 Transit/
Land-use Plan). The metropolitan region’s population is forecast to double
over the next 30 years (Observer, Nov. 1, 1998).
Charlotte is home to 292 of the top Fortune 500 companies and more than 340
foreign firms. The banking and financial industries are particularly important
and the city is known as the nation's second largest banking center (next to
New York City), with more than $362 billion in banking assets. The city now
ranks as the nation's fifth largest urban region, as Charlotte and its environs
have attracted more and more workers and their families to the “New South.”
With the expanding population and explosive economic development of the
past decades, Charlotte is experiencing concomitant increases in traffic,
congestion, and related problems. According to a 1997 study by the Texas
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Transportation Institute, Charlotte ranked fourth in its rate of congestion
growth among the largest 50 metropolitan areas in the United States. Mobility
within the region’s five major transportation corridors is rated from “fair” to
“poor,” while vehicle miles traveled (VMT) are projected to increase even
faster than the population. At the same time, the area has developed in a
dispersed manner, such that relatively few commercial and residential
developments are situated within major transportation corridors. Additionally,
air quality in Charlotte has deteriorated to the point that the region is
considered a “maintenance area.” In 1997, for example, the Charlotte area was
out of compliance with federal ozone regulations eleven times (Observer, Nov.
1, 1998).
Traffic and congestion have become significant concerns to the residents and
economic leaders of Charlotte. Residents are increasingly wary of long
commute times, and the business community has expressed concerns about the
continuing competitiveness of the region should congestion continue to
worsen. However, Charlotte is a community that has traditionally eschewed
both transit and tax increases. A bastion of moderate conservatism with
comparably low tax rates, prior to the 1998 election, Charlotte boasted only a
very basic bus and paratransit system.
However, an influx of new residents from the North and East has potentially
increased the proportion of residents who have some familiarity with transit.
That the business community was demonstrating concern about the region’s
transportation problem was also a potential ground for optimism. Nevertheless,
to even consider a significant sales tax increase for a major transit project
represented a major departure from local custom.
BACKGROUND: POLITICAL HISTORY
The City of Charlotte is governed by a council-manager system. There are 11
members of the City Council; seven are elected by district, the remaining four
are elected on an at-large basis. Although the Mayor is elected directly by the
voters, most of the day-to-day administration of the city is left to the city
manager. However, as the only citywide elected executive official, the mayor
can be an important source of policy direction and political leadership, if not an
always legally empowered one. Mecklenburg County is governed by a nine-
member County Commission; six commissioners represent county districts,
and the remainder are elected at large.
The current mayor, who was also in office at the time of the transportation tax
campaign, is Pat McCrory, considered by most observers to be a moderate to
conservative Republican. Politically, the Charlotte area is generally regarded as
conservative and Republican, although partly because the significant African-
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American population tends to vote Democratic, some Democrats have been
elected as Mayor.
In a city like Charlotte, which is dominated economically by a single industry,
it is not unusual to find extraordinary political influence wielded by that
industry. Thus in Charlotte, it is the banking and finance industry that is an
extremely important member of the influential elite when it comes to civic
affairs. Particularly, the First Union Bank and the Bank of America are
regarded as critical voices in the local business community.
Prior to the 1998 election, transit in Charlotte was the responsibility of the City
of Charlotte. The system consisted of only about 180 buses that rode primarily
in and out of downtown Charlotte. According to interviewees, the bus system
was not highly regarded by many citizens and was often viewed as a
transportation option of last resort for the poor.
CREATING A TRANSPORTATION INITIATIVE
The decision to place a public transportation sales tax increase on the
November 1998 ballot had its origins in discussions generated early in the
decade when the City’s Planning Commission convened a group of civic
leaders. Known as the “Committee of 100,” the group proposed that the area
needed to begin planning a comprehensive transportation plan to respond to its
worsening traffic problems. At that time, the idea of a one-cent sales tax
increase was initiated. However, these proposals died without any definitive
action being taken on their behalf.
Late in 1997, the idea that a public response to traffic and congestion problems
was necessary was resurrected when the region’s state government delegation,
working in concert with local leaders, sought and received state permission to
ask voters for a 1/2-cent sales tax increase for public transportation. Although
some general concepts about the corridors that would receive improvements
had already been discussed, there was recognition that a more detailed plan
would be necessary to win voter support.
To this end, the City’s planning, transportation, and corporate communications
departments collaborated to produce a combined transit and land-use plan
titled the “2025 Transit/Land-Use Plan.” Although the plan was not formally
linked to the transportation tax initiative, it was the cornerstone of the approach
communicated to the public. It established a strong conceptual link between
proposed transportation improvements and future land-use policies that would
strengthen them. In the minds of its creators, public approval for the tax would
mean more than support for transit – it would mean support for “smart
growth.”
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The plan provides for a development pattern that is “transit-friendly,” by
concentrating new development along five major corridors that connect the
city’s major economic centers. This land use strategy plays a critical role in
helping to make transit a more realistic alternative for the sprawling Charlotte
area. Among the land-use patterns espoused by the plan are:
• denser, more pedestrian friendly developments,
• a mix of single and multifamily residences, and
• areas with a mix of residential, shopping and employers in close proximity.
These land-use approaches are markedly different than most of the existing
developments in the Charlotte area. Linkage of land-use to the plan implied
that a vote for the tax increase meant support for a different approach to land
use, although the two were not linked by law. With respect to transit, the plan
specifies the development of a transit system consisting of the following
options:
• Commuter (“heavy”) rail, to run on commuter lines on existing tracks
• Light rail, to be run on new lines created along major corridors.
• Bus Rapid Transit, to run on newly created busways
• Improvement of existing bus service.
The plan is noteworthy for its specificity. The 2025 report provides a detailed
breakdown of the improvements envisioned for each of the five transportation
corridors, including the mix of commuter and light rail and bus rapid transit
planned for each, and a timetable for implementing the improvements over the
coming 25 years. The document also covers planned improvements for area
roads, but these receive considerably less emphasis than the rail and other
transit strategies. (HOV lanes are rejected as alternative because they “have
little or no potential to stimulate or support land use intensification.”)
Despite the comprehensiveness of the plan, its developers avoided
overpromising its benefits. They specifically did not contend that adoption of
the plan would reduce existing congestion. Rather, the plan was touted as a
means of addressing future, inevitable growth and development more
rationally.
The plan also called for the creation of a “Metropolitan Transit Commission”
(MTC) that would be established to manage the sales tax revenue and oversee
the transit operations. The MTC would consist of eight members, one from
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each municipality in the County and one at-large member. The MTC would
have the following responsibilities:
• Develop and periodically update a long-range transit plan for the County.
• Prepare biennial transit operating programs and five-year capital programs
for all County transit services.
• Conduct a public involvement program to help guide the transit planning
processes.
In order to build public awareness and support for the transportation tax
measure, city officials developed a concentrated effort to publicize and solicit
feedback about the plan. Among the key components of this communication
effort were the following:
• Community meetings. Multiple public meetings at each of the five
transportation corridors identified in the land-use plan were conducted.
• Citywide meetings. Three higher profile, citywide meetings were
conducted. These meetings, which were publicized with paid newspaper
ads, included a panel of outside consultants who discussed the pros and
cons of the plan.
• Citizen’s Committee. A committee of 21 influential citizens was created to
help promote public discussion of the plan.
Enacting a tax increase for transportation improvements is a complicated
process in the Charlotte area, requiring permission from the state legislature,
the Mecklenburg County Commission, and the City Council. Mayor McCrory
and the local legislative delegation were instrumental in obtaining this
permission. The North Carolina State Legislature enabled the ballot initiative
with support from the Charlotte-area delegation in the fall of 1997. In August
of 1998, the Charlotte City Council and Mecklenburg County Commission
also approved of putting the measure on the ballot. This left approximately 10
weeks for the campaign to win majority approval from the Charlotte
community.
The measure called for an open ended 1/2-cent sales tax increase, projected to
raise approximately $50 million annually and over $1 billion dollars during the
25 years projected to complete the transportation plan described earlier. The
actual amount raised by the tax will depend on sales tax revenues; one observer
believes the actual amount could be as much as $2 billion (Charlotte Observer,
September 6, 1998). Although the measure did not specify how the funds
raised by the tax would be spent, the 2025 plan contemplated a system that
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could include: a single light rail line from suburban Pineville to “uptown”
Charlotte; a busway from the city of Davidson on the shoulder over a major
commuting artery, Interstate 77; a heavy rail line on existing track; and several
other busways. Nevertheless, passage of the tax increase did not necessarily
commit funds to these specific projects, a fact that opponents of the measure
seized upon.
Coincidentally, voters were also given an opportunity to vote for a bond
package that would provide $98.3 million to widen and improve existing roads
and expand sidewalks within the Charlotte city limits. This provided the tax
measure’s supporters with the appearance, if not the reality of a balanced
approach to the community’s transportation challenges.
Creation of a pro-transit coalition
The Mayor and the Charlotte business community provided the leadership for
the initiative campaign. The Chamber of Commerce viewed the transit
improvements to be created by the tax to be “part of the [city’s] business
infrastructure” and was therefore an enthusiastic supporter of the campaign
(interview with Bob Morgan, Chamber CC). The group selected a well-known
former Republican mayor, Jerry Blackmon, to chair the campaign although this
was a largely symbolic position. Blackmon’s participation helped to signal that
the tax increase had the blessing of the more conservative business
establishment in Charlotte, an important consideration in the conservative-
leaning community. The mayor’s commitment to the campaign was also
critical. Besides helping to convince the state legislature that the tax should be
allowed on the ballot, he marshaled political support around the community
and appeared in television ads. However, on a more day-to-day basis, a few
key business leaders, including executives from major Charlotte financial
institutions, directed the campaign.
Under the auspices of the Committee for Our Transportation Future,
approximately $250,000 was raised. Of that sum, $150,000 came from three
key corporate entities: First Union Bank, the Bank of America, and Duke
Energy. The remainder came in much smaller amounts from a wide spectrum
of local industries, businesses, and construction firms (Charlotte Observer,
October 28, 1998). Although $250,000 is not a large sum by national
standards, the campaign was very brief – about ten weeks – and the measure’s
opponents did not have a funded campaign. Additionally, the public education
program conducted cooperatively by various city agencies helped to raise
positive public consciousness about the measure. Although city employees
could not actually campaign for the measure, the series of public meetings and
informational sessions probably helped to achieve the same purpose.
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Organized opposition to the plan was scant. Although two Charlotte City
Council members were outspoken opponents, they did not raise money to fund
an opposition campaign. Perhaps the most effective step taken by the
opposition was to gather opposition-related talking points from Wendell Cox, a
nationally active opponent of many transit developments, particularly those
with a rail component, and related tax measures whose “Public Purpose”
provides a host of generally anti-transit materials. The pro-transit coalition
responded by retaining the services of UC-Berkeley professor and transit
consultant Robert Cervero, who addressed Cox’s many specific arguments
against public transit with great diligence. The automobile club, AAA
Carolinas, issued a statement in opposition to the plan, stating that the open-
ended tax and proposed plans were a “poor way to address the (transportation)
problem” (Charlotte Observer, Oct. 30, 1998).
In many communities, pro-transit coalitions begin with the more liberal and/or
Democratic elements of the community and seek to expand to include the more
conservative constituency. In Charlotte, by contrast, supporters had a solid
base in the business community but needed to reach out to other community
groups to create a more viable coalition. The measure’s supporters, therefore,
took steps to target public hearings in areas with relatively heavy
concentrations of Democrats and/or African Americans. Additionally, they
successfully enlisted the support of local environmental organizations,
including the Sierra Club, which was reportedly supportive during the
campaign (interview with Jerry Blackmon).
The result was a truly bipartisan coalition in support of the measure and an
almost complete absence of organized opposition. The ineffectiveness of the
opposition is perhaps underscored by the defeat of both outspoken opponents
in the concurrent city council election.
MEDIA COVERAGE
Moreover, newspaper coverage of the issue was quite extensive. The Charlotte
Observer, the major daily in the area, endorsed the measure without
reservation. Perhaps more important, the newspaper ran a series of in-depth
analytic pieces about the need for solutions to the area’s transportation-related
woes. The pieces included features – including both pros and cons – about the
transit systems in other large Sun Belt communities, such as Houston, San
Diego, Atlanta, and St. Louis. Several of these cities have fairly extensive rail
transit systems. Although the pieces stopped short of endorsing any particular
type of system, they perhaps had the net effect of making mass transit seem
like a viable alternative for a modern Sun Belt metropolis. Given the lack of a
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history of a comprehensive transit system, that was a significant step for the
Charlotte area.
The Charlotte Observer endorsed the measure wholeheartedly, stating: “No
large city can function without good mass transit, and Charlotte’s growth
requires it here. That can’t be done without funding. We recommend a yes vote
on the transit tax.” The editorial, like the campaign generally, did not
overpromise on the benefits to be realized from passage of the tax: “Will
building a transit system reduce traffic congestion? No. Transit will, instead
offer the option of a reliable, efficient trip, versus the unpredictability and
annoyance of traffic congestion” (Charlotte Observer, October 21, 1998).
The newspaper also printed guest editorials in support of, and opposition to,
the tax measure. Jerry Blackmon, the former mayor and a Republican, from the
supporters, wrote the centerpiece editorial. He emphasized that raising the
sales tax was the fiscally responsible way of providing for transit – and that
30% of sales tax was paid by people who resided outside of the area. He also
mentioned that the tax would help to attract state and federal matching funds
and that the system would help bring the county into compliance with federal
air pollution regulations. In a fiscally conservative area like Charlotte, his
approach has apparent advantages (Charlotte Observer, Nov. 1, 1998).
For the opposition, City Council member Mike Jackson wrote the most visible
editorial. Jackson quoted the Observer’s own editorial which had conceded
that the new transit system funded by the tax would not improve traffic
conditions in the area. Beyond that, he claimed that (unspecified) supporters of
the tax were lying by making various promises about the effectiveness of
transit. Jackson provided various examples of communities that had
experienced less than favorable outcomes with transit (Most of these
arguments were apparently based on those supplied by “The Public Purpose.”).
The strategic problem with Jackson’s argument – and perhaps that of the
opposition generally – is that it did not for the most part address the specifics
of the Charlotte proposal, as did the supporter’s. Instead, it relies on somewhat
sketchy critiques of other cities’ transit systems. For example, Jackson goes so
far as to say that “Los Angeles is an argument for continued aggressive road
improvements” (Observer, October 29). Even if true, this line of argument may
have proven difficult for the average reader to relate to the specifics of the
Charlotte tax proposal. Beyond providing opponents with editorial space, the
newspaper apparently did little to promote public awareness of the opposition.
Local television was apparently not a significant factor in the campaign,
although in October a local network affiliate did air a special titled “Crossroads
of Change,” which explored the issues involved in the transportation tax
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measure. The show was one of a series about changes faced by the Charlotte-
Mecklenburg community. Given the market share of public television
generally and news programs specifically, it is doubtful whether this program
influenced many voters.
DEVISING AND IMPLEMENTING COMMUNICATIONS
CAMPAIGN STRATEGY
Use of research techniques
Market research was used to extensively to help plan the transportation tax
measure and inform the subsequent campaign. First, in the month of March
preceding the election, the City of Charlotte commissioned MarketWise, Inc., a
survey research firm, to conduct a survey of Mecklenburg County residents.
The telephone survey of 400 residents established the following findings:
• Most (76%) respondents identified the term “mass transit” with the City’s
bus system.
• A majority (53%) had a negative view of the bus system.
• Traffic was viewed as a problem for Charlotte, with nearly half agreeing
that the traffic situation was a “very serious problem” and an additional
30% finding it “somewhat serious.”
• More than half (55%) liked the idea of a light rail system.
• Nevertheless, most respondents were described as “car oriented.” For
example, half thought that widening the roads would be an “excellent”
alternative to mass transit, and almost half (47%) were in favor of HOV
lanes.
• Although most respondents were not aware the tax increase measure was
being proposed for the ballot at the time, 60% did indicate that they
supported the idea of a 1/2-cent sales tax increase for funding an expanded
mass transit system.
These results convinced transit supporters that a sales tax initiative was a
viable prospect, but it also demonstrated the need for public education about
the potential benefits of transit. The data helped city officials create the public
education program described earlier. A poll conducted by the Observer
similarly indicated broad support for a transit-dedicated tax increase. However,
a poll conducted by the consultant hired by the pro-tax campaign found the
public split nearly 50-50 only seven weeks before the vote.
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The Campaign Message
As required by law, the campaign for the sales tax initiative was conducted
separately from the city’s public education program concerning the broader
“2025” land-use plan. The campaign was organized under the title of
“Committee for the Transportation Future.” It is difficult to ascertain how
effective the public education effort was alone in helping to increase public
awareness and acceptance of mass transit. However, interviewees from the
campaign suggest that their campaign kept the potentially divisive land use
proposal at a safe distance in designing and implementing their campaign
strategy. This approach is understandable, given that the land use plan calls for
higher density development than that traditionally allowed in the Charlotte
area. Had the campaign embraced this concept, it would have exposed the
measure to opposition from neighborhoods fearful of higher density
developments.
The central message, therefore, was somewhat different than that implied by
the “2025” plan. First, it focused on coupling the transit tax measure with the
roads bond package: “Vote yes for transit and roads” was one of the phrases
frequently invoked by the campaign. Second, the campaign was intentionally
vague about what “transit” comprised. In light of the survey results that
suggested many residents were unfamiliar with exactly what is meant by
“transit,” it made sense to let individuals interpret the concept in their own
way. This approach also avoided the potentially divisive effect of committing
to specific routes and locales. Third, as exemplified by the pro-tax editorial
mentioned earlier, the campaign focused on the fiscal soundness of investing in
transit by linking the success of the measure to increased state and federal
funding and the role of nonresidents in paying the sales tax.
An additional appeal was directed toward the area’s civic pride: “For Charlotte
to be a world class city, it needs a world class transit system.” This message
capitalized on the fact that many residents of Charlotte are recent implants
from larger East Coast cities. Another message exploited the survey results that
indicated significant citizen concern over a clean environment: “Congestion
and air quality problems are not going to go away.”
What these campaign messages, for the most part, did not do is overpromise on
the ability of transit to instantly solve the area’s traffic congestion woes. None
of them, it would seem, provided the measure’s opponents with an easy factual
or logical weakness to exploit. To the contrary, these messages tended to put
the onus on the opposition to articulate a reasonable alternative to the
supporter’s plan. Most important, they implied that doing nothing was not a
reasonable alternative.
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Use of campaign media
The campaign had very little lead-time to plan a grass roots campaign, so most
of the activities were mass distributed. The media campaign for the tax
measure was based primarily on direct mail rather than broadcast media. With
a total budget of only approximately $250,000, television was considered too
expensive to be the centerpiece of the campaign. The supporters’ campaign
assembled a list of 90,000 voters who were considered most likely to vote in
the election. They contacted each with either direct mail, a phone call, or both.
Additionally, a group of speakers was assembled that enabled targeting
individual speakers to specific audiences.
Some television spots were purchased. Most notably, one featured Mayor
McCrory standing on a busy overpass during rush hour. The idea was to
implant a positive message – about the need to address the traffic problem – in
a negative context that reminded potential voters about the seriousness of the
problem.
EVALUATION
On November 3, 1998 Charlotte and Mecklenburg County voters passed the
1/2-cent sales tax increase by a margin of 58% to 42%, thereby authorizing the
largest public-works project ever approved by County voters. The Charlotte
Observer interpreted the vote as “as a strong message to the rest of the nation –
and especially the rest of the state – that there is a serious concern about
transportation, congestion, and the environment” (Charlotte Observer,
November 4, 1998).
How did a Southern, traditionally fiscally-conservative city, with minimal
experience with mass transit –so readily approve of a $1 billion (over 25 years)
tax increase? There are several keys to understanding the success of the
Charlotte measure. They include:
• The initiative originated within a critical part of the business establishment.
• The traffic congestion problem, and related difficulties, was severe enough
to create a sense of urgency among the business community and acceptance
among the general public.
• Both the city’s planning department and the local newspaper helped to
educate the public about the nature of the transportation challenges faced
by the community, further laying the groundwork for public acceptance.
• Supporters were careful to prepare measured responses to opponent’s
attacks, without elevating them to the level of equal footing with their own
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position.
Each of these four keys is discussed in more detail in the following
subsections.
Origin within the City’s Business Establishment
The key to the measure’s success appears to be linked to the fact that the
initiative and ongoing support for the measure came first from the area’s
influential business community. As mentioned earlier, in many communities
such an initiative originates among other elements of the community. Charlotte
is a community with an extremely influential core of financial institutions
whose executives perceived transportation as a key to the region’s continued
financial success. Once this group embraced the concept of mass transit as a
partial solution to the area’s long-term viability, the approach was evidently
legitimized for a large portion of the electorate. This point was further driven
home by selection of a former Republican mayor to act as the campaign’s
spokesperson. The opposition, moreover, was essentially marginalized to a few
council members who had few potential sources of financial support.
Public Perception of a Serious Problem
Why did the Charlotte financial community come to support the concept of
mass transit? The answer lies in a second critical aspect of the Charlotte
experience: the existence of a significant and worsening traffic congestion
problem. Polling conducted by several sources (the City, the Charlotte
Observer, and the supporter’s campaign) indicated that a significant majority
of the population perceived traffic and congestion to be serious problems in the
area. Pollution and the inability to meet federal air quality standards appeared
to strengthen this perception. Perhaps of equal significance, interviews with
local business executives indicate that many businesses were concerned that,
as congestion continued to worsen, their workforce would have increasing
difficulty accessing downtown Charlotte.
Support from a Key Political Figure
In addition to playing a critical role in lobbying the state legislature to
authorize the appearance of the tax measure on the ballot, Charlotte Mayor Pat
McCrory provided the campaign with a visible, credible campaign leader. As a
Republican, McCrory’s support did much to legitimize the campaign in the
eyes of more conservative voters. The Mayor’s role was quite visible, as he
appeared in television ads in support of the measure.
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Public Education Efforts
The initiative’s path was eased considerably by efforts to educate and prepare
the public for the concept of mass transit. Although an increasing portion of
Charlotte’s population has experience with mass transit in other cities, the fact
remains that most residents of Charlotte have little exposure to an effective
transit system. The city’s planning and corporate communications departments
led an ambitious effort to educate the community. Concomitantly, perhaps, the
Charlotte Observer published a series of articles that – although they fell short
of recommending it – perhaps helped to create a sense that mass transit was a
reasonable endeavor for a modern American metropolis. Education efforts
continued with the actual campaign, including speakers who were chosen on
the basis of their appeal to specific elements of the population.
Anticipating and Responding to Opponent’s Arguments
For the reasons stated above, opposition to the measure was relatively
disorganized. However, inasmuch as two members of the Charlotte City
Council were vocally opposed, it was important for the measure’s supporters to
anticipate and address potential attempts to sway voter perceptions and
attitudes. In this respect, the City Planning Department was judicious in taking
steps to hire a consultant who could diffuse many of the opponents’ arguments.
This was apparently successful, and was done so in a way that did not require
the supporters of the transit measure to elevate their opponents’ positions with
direct debate.
This case illustrates that Sunbelt cities without significant experience with
mass transit can successfully persuade voters to help marshal local funding via
tax increases. However, if a primary key to the success of this effort was
initiation by and the willful leadership of the business community, similar
metropolitan areas lacking such a condition may find it more challenging to
create the necessary broad-based, bipartisan support that occurred in Charlotte.
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A SUCCESSFUL SUPERMAJORITY
IN SANTA CLARA COUNTY
In November of 2000, supporters of Measure A, a tax initiative that would
fund the extension of the Bay Area Rapid Transit (BART) system into Santa
Clara County, California, (along with other transit improvements) successfully
convinced a required supermajority of voters to take up their cause. The local
newspaper called the outcome, “a little short of a political miracle” (San Jose
Mercury News, Nov. 8, 2000). The victory occurred despite a host of political
foibles and miscues that threatened to keep the measure off the ballot, much
less from garnering the necessary two-thirds supermajority vote. In fact, the
stunning success of Measure A demonstrated that at least some of the
conventional wisdom about the passage of such tax initiatives can be thrown
out the window when other conditions are met. In Santa Clara County, the
operant factor appeared to be a widely shared sense of urgency about
confronting the area’s traffic and congestion woes with public action. The
extent to which the lessons learned in this cradle of the Silicon Valley may be
readily applied to other communities, however, is less certain.
BACKGROUND: TRANSPORTATION AND TRAFFIC
Santa Clara County, which largely subsumes the Silicon Valley, lies
approximately 45 miles southwest of San Francisco. Until recent years, Santa
Clara County and its largest city of San Jose, stood in the shadow of San
Francisco. However, with the advent of the boom in high technology over the
past decades, the Silicon Valley emerged as the focus for a great deal of
economic growth. Increasingly, that economic growth has translated into more
and more traffic and congestion. Terrible traffic in the Silicon Valley is
essentially a by-product of an extremely high number of jobs, coupled with
inadequate housing that forces many workers to drive increasingly farther
distances to and from their places of employment, as well as a pattern of land
use that has not linked transportation improvements with jobs and homes.
Never good even before the halcyon days of the most recent technology boom,
traffic in and around Santa Clara County went from bad to truly horrible.
Recent figures from the California State Transportation Agency, Caltrans, have
indicated that seven of the 10 most congested highways in the San Francisco
Bay Area feed into the County. According to Caltrans, stop-and-go traffic costs
the Bay Area as a whole nearly $1.5 million a day in lost wages and wasted
fuel (San Jose Mercury News, September 21, 2000). Traffic congestion in the
region has risen an astounding 87% since 1995. In just one year, from 1998 to
A Successful Supermajority in Santa Clara County
Mineta Transportation Institute
122
1999, delays jumped 15%. For years, public opinion polls have typically found
traffic and congestion to be the number one policy concern of area residents.
Although the traffic situation was apparently reaching new extremes in 2000,
the area had not failed to act in the past when it came to providing transit
alternatives to the automobile. Santa Clara County voters have a record of
approving sales taxes dedicated to transit and other transportation
improvements. Most recently, in 1996 the electorate had approved by a slim
margin a 1/2-cent sales tax increase that funded expansion of the county’s
fledgling light rail system, along with other transportation improvements. That
increase (1996 Measure A) was passed in tandem with a companion measure
(1996 Measure B) that specified how the revenues collected by the tax would
be spent, a bit of legislative legerdemain that enabled the tax increase to be
approved by a simple majority. Without such a companion measure
arrangement, tax increases for specific purposes (such as transportation
projects) must, by state law, be passed by a two-thirds supermajority.
Although the County had a working light rail system, and had already
approved (via the 1996 Measure A) expansion of that system, that fledgling
system alone could not address a major component of the area’s traffic woes:
the constant stream of workers from outside the County, particularly from the
East Bay area of the region down Interstate 880 and Interstate 680. The Bay
Area transit alternative for such intraregional commuting is BART. But BART
extends only to the East Bay City of Fremont and to Daly City on the
northwest side of Santa Clara County. Decades ago, when the BART system
was first proposed and built, the Santa Clara County Board of Supervisors
declined to commit the County into the system. Moreover, the Board opted not
to place the proposal on the ballot to let voters decide. Beyond a series of
County bus systems, the only other transit option in and out of Santa Clara
County was CalTrain, a relatively slow commuter rail train that runs from
downtown San Francisco to downtown San Jose with no service at all to the
East Bay portion of the region.
As San Jose and the Silicon Valley became increasingly critical to the region’s
economic engine, public demand grew for an extension of BART into Santa
Clara County. Although alternative transit arrangements were occasionally
discussed by the various county transportation agencies, such as an enhanced
commuter rail system, it was always clear that BART was the transit mode of
choice in the Bay Area. Yet Santa Clara County voters never had a chance to
vote on the prospect of joining the area-wide BART system. With intraregional
traffic reaching crisis levels, the time appeared ripe to community leaders to
give voters that opportunity.
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BACKGROUND: POLITICAL HISTORY
Regional transportation policy is quite complicated. Each county has a
transportation agency that is primarily responsible for building and
maintaining roads, providing mass transit, etc. Additionally, BART is managed
by a special district with elected board members. Regional transportation
decisions may also fall under the purview of the Metropolitan Transportation
Commission, the area’s metropolitan planning organization (MPO). The Santa
Clara County transportation agency is known as the VTA (Valley
Transportation Authority). The VTA operates the local bus and light rail
systems, in addition to highway construction and maintenance responsibilities
on behalf of some localities. It is the executive agency charged with
implementing and managing most transportation policies. Its Board of
Directors consists of twelve members and five alternates appointed as follows:
• Five city council members and one alternate from the City of San Jose;
• Five city council members from other, much smaller municipalities in the
County; and
• Two members and one alternate from the County Board of Supervisors.
The decision of whether or not to build a BART extension, at least
theoretically, involves many of these decision makers and others. At least some
if not most, of the funding would have to come from Santa Clara County,
although some federal subsidy was a possibility for the future. Ultimately, the
BART Board of Directors would have to approve any extension and might
possibly require additional “buy-in” funds from Santa Clara County. The MTC
would also need to approve of the expansion in the context of regional
transportation policy.
As a practical matter, two ways of securing local funding for the BART
expansion were possible under State and County law. First, the County (via its
Board of Supervisors) could approve of a sales tax increase. For this to occur,
four of the five County Supervisors would have to approve of the proposal,
which would then go to voters, a majority of which would need to approve it
for the tax to succeed. Alternately, the VTA Board of Directors could also vote
to place a sales tax increase on the ballot – but such a measure would require a
two-thirds margin by voters because it would be a transportation-specific issue.
(Were the Board of Supervisors to approve of a tax measure, it could be framed
as a general revenue issue, and thus require only the normal majority vote.)
California counties generally lack a strong central decision making authority,
leaving major policy issues open to a variety of political pressures. In Santa
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Clara County, the Mayor of San Jose, by virtue of his or her authority over the
largest municipality, is potentially a major influence on policymaking. The
County Board of Supervisors, of course, is also important. Because of its
primacy in the local economy, the high-tech industry has, over the past two
decades, developed into a significant lobbying force with respect to a variety of
local and regional policy issues. Specifically, the Silicon Valley Manufacturers
Group (SVMG) – which represents 190 of the area’s largest high-tech firms –
has taken a substantial interest and leadership role in the field of transportation
policy. When transportation-related Measures A & B were successfully passed
in 1996, it was the SVMG that spearheaded both the fundraising and the
campaign. The influence of the SVMG, which includes such high-tech industry
heavyweights as Intel, Applied Materials, and Hewlett-Packard, is pervasive
enough such that it would be unlikely for a tax measure increase to succeed
without its support.
Compared to national and state norms, voters in Santa Clara County tend to be
quite liberal and generally supportive of reasoned public responses to policy
challenges. The area’s congressional and state legislative delegations are
exclusively Democratic. Although all local elections are officially nonpartisan,
most local elected officials are also known to identify with the Democratic
Party. Thus, the area is probably more potentially receptive than many to the
idea of enhancing local transportation facilities via tax increases.
More specifically, the public in Santa Clara County has always been perceived
(and public opinion polling later confirmed this perception) to be quite warm
to the prospect of linking San Jose and the Santa Clara County to the BART
system. Across the Bay Area, BART was generally viewed as a viable,
relatively efficient and effective mass transit alternative, and many Santa Clara
County residents had personal experience using the system from nearby stops
in the adjacent County of Alameda. Much, if not most, of the current voting
public was not present when the original decision to opt away from the BART
system was made in the 1960s, and few could understand how the Silicon
Valley could be excluded from such a popular transportation alternative –
particularly as the traffic situation was perceived to be worsening by the day.
DEVELOPING A TRANSPORTATION COALITION
In the context of the Silicon Valley described above, there was relatively great
consensus about the need for a public response to the problems of traffic and
congestion. Past campaigns and elections had demonstrated that a coalition
consisting of the high tech business sector, local elected officials, and a
generally sympathetic if not supportive electorate could successfully achieve a
great deal with respect to transportation improvements. However, the prospect
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of a massive project, such as potentially linking San Jose to the BART system,
was fraught with potential potholes in the form of disagreements about timing,
routes, and funding for alternative transportation and transit facilities. It was
such disagreement that would nearly forestall any action at all as efforts began
to take a proposal to the voters.
Due to the time constraints that ultimately arose – the campaign would only
have about 75 days – coalition building was not a focal point of the campaign.
Opposition did arise, and for the most part it was not from quarters that had any
philosophical opposition to expanding transit. Oddly, environmental groups –
specifically, the Sierra Club – wound up opposing the measure because they
favored emphasis on expanding the existing commuter rail. The area’s Central
Labor Council, which in the past had provided at least nominal support of such
measures, remained neutral perhaps in sympathy to the individual politicians
who opposed the measure. However, neither group has been a critical
supporter of past transportation measures, and so these developments were not
seen as being likely to doom the proposal
CREATING A TRANSPORTATION INITIATIVE
The path to the transportation initiative that eventually appeared on the
November 2000 ballot became a complicated one. Indeed, the process was so
circuitous and conflict-ridden that some observers believed the proposal that
emerged had little chance of success for that very reason.
The source of the leadership that produced the initiative came from the Mayor
of San Jose, Ron Gonzales. Upon his election to the office in 1998, Gonzales
had promised that the city of San Jose would be “connected” to BART. The
promise was vague enough to possibly encompass a number of alternative
means of establishing a link to BART. However, the Mayor’s commitment
proved to be firm and was probably pivotal to the eventual success of the
proposal. As stated earlier, discussion of linking San Jose to BART had
frequently surfaced before, but for the first time a major elected official was
proclaiming a positive effort to achieve it. Additionally, this push was to occur
in a context of great economic prosperity, which seemed to make such an
ambitious proposal even timelier in the eyes of many observers.
With the Mayor’s proclamation in the backdrop, the first concrete event that
propelled creation of a transportation initiative was the announcement by
California Governor Gray Davis of a state commitment of a $5.3 billion
matching grant to localities for the purpose of creating transportation
enhancements, including transit. Of this amount, the County of Santa Clara
was to receive $1 billion – with $726 million earmarked for a BART extension
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project. To receive the matching grant, the County would need to raise a like
amount – and that would require a new source of revenue.
For several reasons, the logical vehicle for securing the matching funds would
be the extension of a past sales tax increase – scheduled to expire in 2006 –
placed on the ballot by the Santa Clara County Board of Supervisors. Most
important, such a general sales tax increase approved by the Board would
require approval from only a simple majority of voters. Additionally, the Board
of Supervisors provides geographic representation for the entire County. With
this in mind, the Board embarked upon discussions of such a proposal in June
of 2000.
Although the Board appeared to be unanimous in its support for the idea of
bringing BART to the County, there was considerable disagreement about the
specifics of doing so. When supervisors first considered a sales tax proposal (in
late June), it was for a 20-year, 1/2-cent sales tax measure that would raise $3.8
billion. Under this proposal, about half of the money would be spent extending
BART 22 miles from Fremont, to downtown San Jose, terminating in the City
of Santa Clara. The remaining half of the money would be spent on a host of
other transit, highway and road projects. The road projects were seen in part as
enticements to voters and elected officials who would not benefit as directly
from the BART extension. Nevertheless, only one supervisor was solidly
behind that plan and the other four were undecided. More ominously, however,
two supervisors said that they would like to postpone the tax measure for a
year or more so that some crucial questions about BART could be answered
(San Jose Mercury News, August 4, 2000).
As discussions wore on, and as other alternatives were weighed by the Board
of Supervisors, Mayor Gonzales was steadfast in pushing for a more
immediate proposal that could be on the upcoming November ballot. Yet it was
clear that the two supervisors who had opposed the original proposal were
equally steadfast in their opposition to such a timeframe. They were adamant
in claiming that the issue required additional study, including a more precise
determination of the long-term costs, although some observers felt that the pair
resented the Mayor’s leadership in what was, at least nominally, a County area
of authority. Ultimately, the reasoning behind the Supervisors’ opposition
mattered less than the fact that it was sufficient to kill any proposal from the
Board to get a BART measure on the ballot. This was due to the fact that the
votes of four of the five supervisors were required to put a tax increase to the
voters, and only three of the five ultimately agreed to a 25-year sales tax plan.
In response to this apparent stalemate, Mayor Gonzales raised the stakes
surrounding the discussion by proposing an alternative means of putting the
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issue to voters: the VTA Board of Directors could also propose a tax increase.
Specifically, the Mayor proposed a 30-year, 1/2-cent increase that would be
used to fund transit projects only – primarily the BART extension, but funds
would also go to some other transit projects around the County. (The
“increase” was in fact an extension of the existing 1/2-cent levy, supported by
voters in 1996 with a nine-year expiration date, which was to expire in 2006.)
The alternative measure was probably even less attractive to the two opposing
members of the Board, because it would not present any funds for nontransit
improvements, i.e., highways, and it would effectively remove the Board from
transportation planning in the future. Ultimately, however, the gambit seemed
to fail because the Board failed to approve of the original proposal by a final
vote of three to none, with the two opposing supervisors abstaining and thereby
killing the proposal (San Jose Mercury News, August 9, 2000). The chances of
a BART-related measure coming to voters appeared dim.
However, Mayor Gonzales made good on his promise to take the matter before
the VTA Board of Directors. In fact, the day after the Board of Supervisors
rejected the BART proposal, Gonzales brought the matter to the VTA Board.
The 1/2-cent sales tax proposal would raise $6 billion in its 30-year life, and
would connect BART to the Santa Clara County cities of Milpitas, San Jose
and Santa Clara; as well as build rail connections from San Jose Airport to
BART and light rail; expand light rail throughout the county and electrify the
CalTrain commuter train to San Francisco. The proposal omitted any funding
for additional highway improvements (San Jose Mercury News, August 8,
2000).
Although the proposal quickly became identified with the BART system, in
reality only a minority of the revenues (approximately $2 billion of the total of
$6 billion) it would raise would go to the construction and operation of the
BART extension. The state matching funds, possibly coupled with federal
assistance, were to supplement funds for the BART project. It included more
than $1 billion in rail operating costs, but according to VTA staff, another sales
tax to cover operating costs for the life of the tax would probably be needed to
cover operating expenses in 2112 or 2114.
Although the plan reflected the wisdom of months of discussion and debate,
the details were drafted relatively quickly by a small group of supporters led by
Mayor Gonzales, and including the Silicon Valley Manufacturing Group
(Interview, Jude Barry). Although the measure explicitly proposed to bring
BART to Santa Clara County, many questions were left unanswered, including
such important details as the route of the BART extension, whether and how
much the County would need to pay to “buy into” the BART system, and the
cost of operating the extension, etc. Although the measure, if passed, would
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serve to secure the state matching funds offered by the Governor, the
availability of federal aid was far less certain. Supporters of the measure hoped
that its success might help ensure a federal subsidy.
The motion to put this increase before voters in November passed the VTA
Board of Directors 11-1, which was not a great surprise to most observers. Five
of the VTA Board members were from San Jose, which would perhaps benefit
the most from the BART extension. The other members were relatively easy to
convince; the addition of funds for light rail and CalTrain helped to achieve the
nearly unanimous vote. (The lone dissenter was one of the same supervisors
who had opposed the proposal the Board of Supervisors had rejected the
previous day.) Immediately, the two supervisors who had favored delaying
action on BART articulated their opposition to the proposal (San Jose Mercury
News, August 9, 2000).
Thus, the proposal had some important strikes against it from the onset.
• Two of five County Supervisors were outspoken, if not adamant opponents.
Both were experienced politicians who could be expected to wield local
influence.
• It would require a two-thirds supermajority of taxpayers, a threshold of
support met by only two of thirty-two previous proposals.
• Although it did contain some benefits for taxpayers outside of San Jose, the
proposal contained no funding for highways.
• Supporters would have only about seventy-five days to sell the proposal to
voters.
• The measure called for a 30-year tax increase, a longer period than nearly
every successful measure in the past.
• Additionally, two San Jose bond measures (for parks and library
improvements, respectively) were on the ballot.
USE OF RESEARCH TECHNIQUES
Research was critical to the decision to put the proposal on the ballot, in
shaping its provisions, and in designing the campaign for its passage.
Essentially, survey research conducted by both the supporters of the measure
and third parties established one very important fact: voters in Santa Clara
County liked BART, and they were willing to vote for a measure that would
bring it into the County and San Jose.
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A poll conducted by the SVMG in the spring of 2000 found that 62% of
County residents were willing to support a sales tax extension for 20 years as a
way of connecting BART to downtown San Jose. (The manufacturing group
was, of course, a key advocate of the tax.) Perhaps more encouraging than the
level of support – which would be insufficient for a supermajority vote – was
the fact that transit, and specifically, BART – was the most popular alternative
for addressing the area’s traffic woes. Bringing BART to San Jose, in fact, was
found to be more popular than filling potholes, a perennial public favorite
(interview with Jude Barry). In July, as discussion progressed before the votes
that enabled the measure to go to the voters, results from a survey conducted
by the Mercury News indicated that among a sample of 500 likely voters:
• Seventy percent favored a 1/2-cent sales tax to pay for an extension of
BART to San Jose;
• Seventy-nine percent wanted the issue on the ballot in November; and
• Seventy percent said that they believed BART would reduce traffic
congestion. (Mercury News, July 21, 2000).
The Mercury News poll found support for the ballot measure to be at least 60%
or more across all areas of the valley, rising to 75% and above in West San
Jose, Santa Clara, and Sunnyvale. In Palo Alto, Mountain View and Los Altos,
70% were behind the tax plan as compared to 62% in Gilroy, Morgan Hill, and
South San Jose. Support was strong across the board for all relevant
demographic groups (Mercury News, July 21, 2000). These figures certainly
emboldened supporters of the measure as they planned their approach to
getting it on the ballot. Coupled with the results from the earlier SVMG survey,
the survey suggested that support for a BART-related measure was strong and
growing. Supporters used this information to make BART the centerpiece of
their proposal. However, even with such high levels of support, supporters
faced the challenge of a very small margin to protect, in light of the necessary
two-thirds supermajority vote required for passage of the measure.
One important use of research was in targeting specific areas of the County for
direct mailings. Tracking polls showed no significant change in the broad-
based support for the issue, but they enabled supporters to isolate potential
“swing areas.” Second, and perhaps even more important, the surveys helped
document the enormous appeal of BART to public opinion. Both of these uses
are discussed in further detail in the next section. The supporter’s consultants,
to further identify nuances in public support for the measure, also convened
focus groups.
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DEVISING AND IMPLEMENTING A MARKETING AND CAMPAIGN
STRATEGY
With a severely limited time span and the need to keep every possible vote, the
supporters of Measure A worked quickly. The campaign was led jointly by
Mayor Gonzales of San Jose and his staff, and the leadership of the SVMG,
particularly President and Chief Executive Officer Carl Guardino. The
campaign raised more money in 75 days ($2.2 million) than had been raised in
six months ($1.6 million) in the Measure A & B campaign in 1996. (By
contrast, previous similar campaigns involved nine months in 1984 and two
years in 1992). The fundraising effectiveness was a tribute both to the
dedication of the supporters and their allies, as well as the unprecedented
prosperity being enjoyed by Silicon Valley companies. The SVMG supported
the campaign because its membership feels strongly about the need for
effective transportation. The community of high-tech firms views it as a
“bottom line” issue that employers are willing to invest in (interview with Carl
Guardino). By contrast, opponents of the measure raised only $10,000, not
enough to wage a serious campaign of this type.
The supporters hired the firm of Townsend, Raimundo, Besler and Usher,
which had served as the consultants to the SVMG for the previous three
successful transportation-related campaigns in Santa Clara County. Statewide,
the firm boasted an impressive track record, including victories in
approximately 80% of tax increase elections they steered across the state.
The overall strategy that supporters developed for the Measure A campaign
was, in a word, BART. BART was a proven magnet for popular support in
results from public opinion surveys. In the view of the measure’s sponsors,
BART was seen as the fastest and best transit option in the area. Due to the
overwhelming problems with congestion on area freeways and beyond,
supporters did not have to worry about convincing voters about the problem
and could instead focus on a positive response to the area’s traffic mess. Thus,
with a few exceptions, the campaign would emphasize the BART extension
that would be funded by the measure.
A second major strategy for the supporter’s campaign was to essentially ignore
the opposition. Polling data and focus group interviews supported the
conclusion that the opponents’ arguments did not resonate well with voters.
The supporters decided that to engage the opposition would only serve to
publicize it and elevate its standing among voters. Thus advertising did not
address the opposition arguments, nor did the proponents seek to debate
opponents.
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Media coverage of the election was most thorough from local newspapers.
Between August and the November election, the Mercury News published
approximately 30 news and editorial stories concerning the Measure A
election. However, the election occurred in the context of a closely contested
presidential race, and the Measure A coverage was probably not preeminent
during this period. The Mercury News did dutifully report the opposition’s
views, but on the whole its coverage was more focused on the difficulty of
getting a supermajority vote – not on the substance of the opposition’s views.
It is a commentary on the state of traffic congestion in Santa Clara County that
the Mercury News has a daily column on local traffic and transportation issues.
The writer of that column has generally taken a positive view towards the role
of transit in addressing transportation problems, such that he was recused from
writing about the Measure A campaign. Nevertheless, coverage about the
election never became sharply focused on the merits of the opposition’s
arguments, and the newspaper – to the surprise of few observers – endorsed the
measure in its editorial pages:
Particularly compelling is the fact that this is an
opportunity that may not repeat itself. We have the state
money in hand if we use it reasonably quickly. We have a
good economy, with sales tax returns that raise the tax
base...And Santa Clara County voters are thoroughly fed
up with traffic congestion...Measure A is more than a
BART proposal. The sales tax is meant to fund other
transit projects: CalTrain, light rail, Altamont Commuter
Express trains, more buses and a people-mover to link
BART, CalTrain and light rail with San Jose airport. For
these reasons and others, we recommend that you vote Yes
on Measure A (Mercury News, Oct. 22, 2000).
As stated earlier, the primary theme of the campaign was to be on BART and
the benefits associated with extending the system to Santa Clara County.
Within that general framework were, of course, more specific strategies and
messages. The campaign’s BART message was straightforward:
• BART was needed now – With traffic congestion at an all-time high, this
was a relatively simple proposition.
• BART is nonpolluting – This helped address environmental concerns that
might have been raised by the failure of the Sierra Club to endorse the
measure.
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• BART will help relieve congestion by taking pressure off of other arteries.
Because the most congested arteries (Interstates 880 and 680 from the east)
existed alongside the proposed BART route, this was a relatively easy
claim to make.
More specifically, the campaign claimed that 78,000 car vehicle trips would be
reduced daily due to the BART extension. This claim nearly led to a debacle
for the campaign, when the Mercury News published an analysis – including a
menacing graphical representation – that suggested that downtown San Jose
would resemble Manhattan if the projected numbers were to come true. The
article included interviews with local residents who were terrified of such a
prospect (Mercury News, Oct. 12, 2000). Fortunately for the campaign, the
article was published during a strike by newspaper carriers, and it is possible
that relatively few readers saw the article.
In a normal initiative campaign with a simple majority requirement for victory,
the BART-centric approach may well have sufficed. However, Measure A
supporters needed to not only maintain the support of normally pro-transit
voters, they also needed to preserve their more tenuous support from more
conservative voters. Therefore, although much of the campaign was aimed at
punching home the BART message to more conventional supporters, a second
message was honed for those voters considered to be more suspicious of tax
increases.
This message was to focus on the specific benefits that the tax increase would
impart. Direct mailings were helped to publicize the geographically
appropriate aspects of the package that would benefit specific demographics,
which were targeted via the survey research described earlier. Additionally,
plans for a citizens oversight committee – which focus group research had
suggested would be helpful in convincing more skeptical voters – were
publicized. Traditionally anti-tax public interest groups, such as the California
Taxpayers’ Association, as well as the locally well-known “rabble-rouser”
leader of the Santa Clara County Taxpayers’ Association were convinced to
help support the measure, enhancing the campaign’s credibility with potential
opponents.
Overall, with a relatively massive campaign war chest, the supporters of
Measure A were able to fund both a virtual blizzard of direct mail and a
significant amount of radio and television airtime. Campaign consultants and
other supporters of Measure A disagreed about which medium was most
effective, and perhaps both were of some benefit.
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Television was a more important part of a local transit campaign than in
previous elections. It was used strategically to help define the issues of the
campaign before the opposition could mobilize any public debate on the
subject. Drive-time radio was also used to help mobilize commuters who
would be likely sympathetic to the cause. And billboards were erected adjacent
to the heaviest commuting corridors, further establishing the measure in the
minds of commuting voters.
As stated previously, the direct mail component of the campaign was used to
“surgically” direct specific messages to specific demographic groups that had
been targeted via survey and focus group research. For example, areas that
were somewhat remote from the projected BART route received more
information about extension of the light rail or electrification of the CalTrain
system that the measure would also fund. Many households received as many
as eight pieces of mail from the campaign and its allied groups.
Additionally, the proponents made extensive use of a speaker’s bureau,
including over one hundred presentations to neighborhood associations and
other groups. Silicon Valley firms in the SVMG also provided in-house
campaign information to their employees, as they have in past successful
campaigns for transit-related and other issues.
EVALUATION
On November 7, 2000, the voters in Santa Clara County approved Measure A
by a margin of 357,866 (70.6%) to 148,893 (29. 4%), providing its supporters
with a stunning and rare victory in an election that required a two-thirds
majority. A variety of factors appear to have enabled the victory, which
occurred in the face of several significant hurdles beyond the two-thirds
requirement. Exit polls confirmed that support for Measure A came from
virtually every demographic group, including members of both major political
parties, all major ethnic and racial groups, and all age groups. Only in a few
instances was support from specific groups below the two-thirds threshold,
albeit only slightly.
In broad strokes, it is easy to depict the victory as the result of two enormous
and coinciding forces: (a) incredibly bad traffic and congestion, and (b) the
popularity of the BART system in the Bay Area. Without these two conditions,
it is unlikely the Measure A as written could have succeeded. Unfortunately for
supporters of transportation-related tax initiatives, not many communities can
appeal to these conditions to help them in their respective efforts. On the other
hand, there are some lessons from the Santa Clara County election that may
possibly apply to other contexts.
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Among the most important reasons that Measure A was successful are the
following:
• Urgency of traffic problem;
• Popularity of BART;
• Prosperity of region;
• Political leadership;
• Fundraising;
• A tax extension, not a bona fide increase;
• General election;
• Dismissal of opposition; and
• Direct mail, enabled by survey research.
Urgency of traffic problem
By objective measures and subjective perception, traffic in the South Bay area
was (and is) reaching epic proportions. Such a profound congestion condition
frustrates many citizens while prompting employers to lose time and money.
Even without a campaign, a supermajority of citizens was ready to spend
public funds to deal with the problem. The pervasiveness of the traffic problem
enabled supporters to avoid wasting time educating the public about the
negative side effects of traffic and to concentrate on the positive message of
their proposed solution. Without such an imminent problem, it is possible that
some sort of transportation-related measure might have passed anyway, but it
seems less than likely that an all-transit measure would have passed with a
two-thirds majority.
Popularity of BART
Citizens of Santa Clara County have long been frustrated by the inaccessibility
of the BART system to their residences. The decision to opt out of the system
occurred decades ago, the reasoning behind it obscure to almost all current
residents. Public opinion polls confirm that BART is a well-liked and trusted
transit alternative in Santa Clara County. Many residents occasionally use the
system to travel from its present endpoint in southern Alameda County, and
have thus come to appreciate its speed and dependable service. The November
2000 election was the first opportunity for Santa Clara County residents to vote
on the matter of extending BART. It is therefore plausible that many voters
would have voted for any measure promising to deliver BART, although a
supermajority might not have occurred in other circumstances.
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Prosperity of region
Supporters of Measure A realized that the incredible economic prosperity of
the Silicon Valley had created a positive environment for support of public
investments. It stands to reason that a region experiencing gains in personal
wealth will be also more amenable to supporting public expenditures. In fact,
the downturn of the high technology economy shortly after the November
election raises the question of whether it would have passed in the following
year.
Political leadership
Mayor Gonzales and SVMG President Carl Guardino were clearly the chief
political sponsors of Measure A. Without their personal commitment, and of
course the efforts of their respective staffs, the funds necessary for the Measure
A campaign might not have materialized. At least in hindsight, their strategic
approach to the campaign appeared to be soundly grounded. That being said,
the campaign for Measure A did not appear to hinge on personalities. Mayor
Gonzales was not as active in the campaign during its closing months, but the
measure did not appear to lose any support.
Fundraising
With nearly $2 million in campaign donations from Silicon Valley industry, the
Measure A supporters were able to fund an all-out media blitz on a scale
perhaps unprecedented in such a campaign. Most successful campaigns spend
closer to $1 million, at best. With this budget, support for the measure never
dipped below the critical two-thirds level, despite plenty of negative news.
A tax extension, not a bona fide increase
Because Measure A provided for an extension of the existing 1/2-cent sales tax
levy, supporters were able to accurately depict it as “traffic relief now, with no
increase in taxes.” The extent to which this was apparent to the average voter is
unknown, however, and this perhaps was counterbalanced by the fact that the
measure had a 30-year sunset date.
General election
The election occurred during a close presidential race. The preeminence of
national political events helped to minimize coverage of the opposition’s
arguments and enabled supporters to maintain control of the public debate (to
A Successful Supermajority in Santa Clara County
Mineta Transportation Institute
136
the extent that there was any). In an off-year election, there would have been
more opportunities for the opposition to attract attention and support.
Dismissal of opposition
The supporters were able to successfully ignore their opposition and its
arguments. Their decision to do so was based largely on survey and focus
group research, which suggested that the opposition arguments did not
resonate well with most potential voters. It was nevertheless a calculated risk
that could have backfired had the opponents been more successful in
establishing a presence in the local news media. However, in hindsight the
decision appears to have been a well-informed one that precluded the
opposition from getting attention on the coattails of the supporters’ campaign.
Direct mail, enabled by survey research
Supporters of Measure A are convinced that finely tuned direct mail messages,
which varied by the demographics of the locales to which they were sent, were
instrumental in maintaining the supermajority needed to pass Measure A.
Identification of Factors that Normally Lower the Supporting Voter
Percentage
With their success on Measure A, supporters were able to demonstrate that
some of conventional wisdom about supposedly fatal flaws to such campaigns
was questionable. Three of these factors are discussed below.
First, the measure had a 30-year expiration date, which is quite lengthy. Past
experience had suggested that voters favor tax increases with much quicker
expiration dates. In fact, our prior report recommended that expiration dates of
ten years or less should be used (Haas, Massey, et al., 2000). In Santa Clara
County in 1996, in fact, research had suggested that a nine-year expiration was
optimal for retaining voter support. This outcome demonstrates that under
some circumstances, such as with the extension of an existing tax, the public
will support a much longer tax period. In this case, the popularity of the BART
extension probably helped to overcome any reservations about the tax’s
longevity. The result in Santa Clara County of a high supporting percentage of
a measure with a lengthy expiration date is supported in four other cases
included in this study, including one case with no expiration date: Salt Lake,
Davis, and Weber Counties in Utah.
Second, the measure did not have a highway component. Frequently, tax
proposals are marketed in tandem with highway improvement or extension
proposals, either in the same ballot measure or with a companion measure.
Measure A was purely for transit. The VTA did pledge to devote existing
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residual funds to highway improvements, although this did not constitute an
increase. Opponents attempted to capitalize on their contention that the
measure would preclude highway improvements, but the proponents were
apparently successful in convincing most voters that funds would remain
available for roads. In addition, since a number of recent highway
improvements have taken place in the County, it was difficult to argue that
highways were significantly underfunded.
Third, some significant opposition existed. Once the supporters’ camp decided
to go with a VTA-sponsored measure – which required supermajority approval
– the conventional wisdom was that it would need a truly united front to gain
the needed margin. But from the outset, two experienced and well-known
elected officials (one with a strong transportation background) were vocal
opponents of the measure. Yet the supporters’ research-tested strategy of
ignoring them proved successful. With a token campaign fund and arguments
that apparently convinced few, the opponents were unable to seize control of
the discussion of the issue.
In sum, the success of Measure A appears to be the result of effective political
leadership taking advantage of extremely fortuitous circumstances with a
thoroughly researched strategy.
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FOUR RECENT BALLOT MEASURES
WITH A RAIL COMPONENT:
ALAMEDA AND SONOMA COUNTIES, CALIFORNIA;
SALT LAKE, DAVIS, AND WEBER COUNTIES IN UTAH;
AND AUSTIN, TEXAS
INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW
Although onsite interviews were conducted with the seven prior cases,
telephone interviewing was used with four November 2000 ballot measures.
While providing information similar to that provided by onsite interviewing,
telephone interviewing was used with these four most recent ballot measures to
facilitate timely completion of this project. Voters in Alameda County,
California, and in Salt Lake, Davis, and Weber Counties in Utah supported the
transportation measures. Voters in Austin, Texas and Sonoma County in
California did not support the transportation measures at the required legal
level. (Approximately 60% of voters in Sonoma County supported the transit
measure. However, this measure failed because California requires two-thirds
voter support for approval.).
Each of the four cases is discussed separately, in a sequence from the case with
the highest percentage of voter support to the case with the lowest percentage
of support. Instead of trying to draw conclusions about these four cases
collectively at the end of this chapter, the synthesis of these four cases, along
with those of the seven measures studied in prior chapters, will be deferred to
the next and final chapter.
ALAMEDA COUNTY IN CALIFORNIA
Introduction and Overview
On November 7, 2000, 81.5% of Alameda County voters supported a measure
to extend the 1/2-cent sales tax dedicated to both transit and highway
improvements for twenty years. Voters approved the 1/2-cent transportation
tax with a 15-year expiration date in 1986, and revenue collection began in
1987. Accordingly, the election in November of 2000 was the last chance to
have voters approve an extension of this tax, rather than voting to reinstate the
tax.
In 1998, Alameda County voters had been presented with a measure to extend
the 1/2-cent transportation sales tax for 15 years. Although this measure
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received support from 58% of voters, the 1998 measure did not pass because
the California Supreme Court ruled in 1995 that a two-thirds supermajority
was needed for special purposes, including transportation taxes.
The 1998 measure failed largely because environmentalists, as well as some
geographic segments, actively opposed the measure. Given the environmental
concerns of voters, combined with the need for supermajority support,
supporters focused their efforts on developing a multimodal transportation
package that would appeal to business, labor, and environmental organizations,
as well as to each geographic segment within the County. Based upon the
overwhelming margin of victory, the efforts to build a coalition representing
organizations with diverse and even conflicting interests, by involving them in
the planning process, was both necessary and successful. The challenge of
building a coalition among groups with fundamental disagreements was made
somewhat easier by a) the realization by all groups that transportation was a
significant problem in the County that would worsen significantly without
additional funding, and b) the perception that it would be significantly more
difficult to obtain support from two-thirds of voters once they were voting to
reinstate a tax that had expired.
Background: Description of the County
Alameda County is large and diverse. The 1998 population was approximately
1.45 million. Some of the communities within the County such as Berkeley
tend to be politically liberal, while other communities such as Livermore, tend
to be more conservative. Some communities, such as Fremont (approximately
40% Asian), tend to be ethnically diverse, while other communities such as
Dublin (74% white), tend to be less diverse. The eastern part of the County is
growing rapidly but, at the same time, still has some open space, while the
northern part of the county is not growing rapidly and has limited open space.
The diversity within Alameda County creates challenges when obtaining
support from county voters, particularly with transportation taxes that require
supermajority approval.
Background: the Transportation System
The primary components of the transportation system in Alameda County are
a) highways and roads, b) traditional transit systems consisting largely of buses
and paratransit, and c) Bay Area Rapid Transit (BART), which is a high speed
rail system. No light rail lines exist in the County and none have been
proposed. Most recent federal and state transportation funding has been
devoted to BART extensions as well as highway improvements, particularly
the addition of car-pool lanes. Most revenue generated from the existing 1/2-
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cent County transportation tax also has been devoted to these two components
of the transportation system. On the other hand, AC Transit, which is
responsible for the County transit system, received a much smaller portion of
the sales tax funds and found it necessary to make some service reductions as a
result of financial constraints from other revenue sources. The limited amount
of resources devoted to basic transit systems created what some community
organizations and Alameda County citizens perceived as an imbalanced and
inequitable allocation of resources. This perception of inequity created
challenges and conflicts with both the 1998 and 2000 ballot measures.
Based upon the results of a series of paired comparisons in a survey conducted
in December, 1999, a significantly higher percentage of residents placed higher
priority on extending BART than on either expanding bus service, or widening
highways. In a paired comparison with widening highways, 58.7% of
respondents attached higher priority to extending BART, compared to 36.1%
who attached higher priority to widening highways. In a paired comparison
with expanding bus service, 64.1% of respondents attached higher priority to
extending BART, compared to 29.2% who attached higher priority to
expanding bus service. In the paired comparison between widening highways
and expanding bus service, a slightly higher percentage of respondents
attached higher priority to widening highways (49.3%) than to expanding the
bus system (46.2%). The results of these paired comparisons might well have
been different if more specific information had been provided on the
magnitude of the extensions and expansions that could realistically be
accomplished with a specified budget.
Perceived and actual transportation problems exist throughout Alameda
County. For example, the number of daily vehicle hours increased from 18,800
in 1994 to 41,800 in 1998. In a survey conducted in August 2000, respondents
identified traffic and transportation as the most important problem facing the
County, with 50% of respondents indicating that traffic and transportation was
the most important problem. Education and schools received the second
highest number of mentions (38%). The magnitude of the transportation
problem in the County provided a motivation for the various interest and
community groups to reach a compromise transportation package.
Background: The 1998 Ballot Measure and its Campaign
The 1998 ballot measure proposed extending the 1/2-cent transportation sales
tax for fifteen years and it listed a large number of specific projects and
programs along with specific cost estimates for each project and specific
budgets for each program. The costs totaled to approximately $1 billion.
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The 1998 Transportation Package and the Process Used to Identify It
Although a significant amount of money would have been generated, the large
number of corridors within the County combined with the number of modes of
transportation involved, created a challenge in determining how to allocate the
estimated $1 billion that would be generated. A call for projects was conducted
in 1997 and projects totaling more than $7 billion were received. A steering
committee was established to prioritize these projects and eliminate projects
totaling approximately $6 billion. The steering committee consisted largely of
elected officials and representatives from different public transportation
agencies. This committee held public meetings that were contentious at times.
Given the difficulty of eliminating a large number of proposed projects with
strong differences of opinion about what should be eliminated, it is not
surprising that the elected officials on the steering committee were hesitant to
exert strong leadership. In addition, business organizations and particularly
environmental organizations, were less than satisfied with the process. They
wanted to have more involvement in the decision making process.
The five categories, along with the percentage allocated to each category with
the 1998 measure were:
• Capital projects, involving both highways and BART (46%);
• Local roads (22%);
• Transit operations (19%);
• Transportation for seniors (9%); and
• Bikes and open spaces (4%).
Opposition to the 1998 Ballot Measure
Many environmental organizations, most notably the Sierra Club and the
Environmental Defense Fund, actively opposed the 1998 ballot measure. As
mentioned previously, some of these organizations were unhappy with their
lack of involvement in the decision making process. More important, they
were unhappy with the transportation package. As might be expected, they
thought less money should be allocated to highway construction with more
money allocated for transit operations. In addition, some of these organizations
were opposed to BART expansion projects. Their opposition to the BART
projects was based upon a poor cost-benefit ratio, rather than a perception that
BART is bad for the environment. Since the 2000 package, which
environmental organizations actively supported, included the same BART
expansion projects that were part of the 1998 package, their opposition to the
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BART projects apparently was not a critical factor, in and of itself, in the
decision of environmental organizations to oppose the 1998 measure.
Environmental organizations were not highly dissatisfied with the
transportation projects identified for funding in 1998. In an interview, one
representative indicated that the 1998 measure gave them half a loaf while the
2000 measure gave them three-fourths of a loaf.
Largely because of environmental opposition, some prominent local politicians
opposed the 1998 measure. The environmental organizations also targeted
editorial staffs of newspapers and were partly successful in these efforts, as
both San Francisco newspapers took an editorial position in opposition to the
1998 measure. The other major newspapers supported the 1998 measure.
In addition to a grass roots campaign often used by opponents, the
environmental groups were able to raise sufficient funding to hire a political
consultant (This consulting organization was hired by proponents in 2000.) and
to conduct a targeted direct mail campaign, with mailers sent to about 20,000
households in Oakland and Berkeley.
The primary argument used by opponents was that the transportation package
included some pork items and this was expressed in their theme that “B stands
for a billion dollar boondoggle.” In support of this argument, they also argued
that a better transportation package could be developed before the current tax
expired. This latter argument was difficult for proponents to counter.
A Low Cost and Disorganized Proponents’ Campaign in 1998
Proponents raised approximately $120,000 in 1998. This amount is
significantly lower than many other supporting campaigns, including the 2000
campaign in Alameda County. The lack of fundraising success probably can be
attributed to the lack of involvement of prominent politicians in fundraising
efforts during this campaign.
Proponents did not even hire a political consultant in 1998 although they had
sufficient resources to do so. This decision suggests that they lacked a feeling
of urgency. Proponents knew ongoing funding would not be jeopardized by the
defeat of the 1998 measure, since another opportunity would exist to obtain an
extension if the 1998 measure failed. In effect, proponents may have viewed
the 1998 ballot measure as a type of “test market.”
Summary of 1998 Ballot Measure
Even with strong opposition and an ineffective supporting campaign, the 1998
ballot measure was supported by 58% of the voters. This result was more
encouraging than discouraging to those who decided shortly after the 1998
Four Recent Ballot Measures With a Rail Component
Mineta Transportation Institute
144
election to develop a new ballot measure. Proponents also were able to gain
valuable experience that they applied to the 2000 ballot measure.
The 2000 Transportation Package
Supporters of a transportation sales tax extension faced two major challenges
in revising the 1998 transportation package. First, they wanted to obtain the
active support of most, if not all major environmental organizations, while at
the same time, maintaining the support of business organizations and
ultimately increasing the number of supporting voters. Business organizations
and the majority of voters tended to want capital improvements to BART and
highways, while environmental organizations opposed both types of capital
improvements. Second, they wanted to obtain more voter support in targeted
geographic locations in which they obtained comparatively lower levels of
support in 1998, while not suffering a loss of support in other geographic
locations.
The first of the two challenges identified in the previous paragraph was the
most difficult one to resolve. The primary organization representing both
business and labor interests, the California Alliance for Jobs, strongly resisted
any reductions in the funding allocated to capital expenditures while
environmental organizations refused to support any package that did not
allocate more funding to basic transit improvements. The key factor in
resolving this conflict was a decision to increase the amount of revenue by
changing the expiration date on the extension from fifteen to twenty years.
This change added at least $200 million to the expected revenue pool.
Surveys had been conducted to test voter reaction to different expiration
periods for the extension both before and after the 20-year extension option
was seriously considered. The results were somewhat inconsistent. The first set
of results identified voter sensitivity to a 15 vs. a 20-year extension while the
second set of results identified less sensitivity to these two sunset periods.
With the use of a longer expiration date, the only project deleted from the 1998
transportation project was a highway construction project and this project was
deleted only because federal funds had been allocated for it. However,
additional funding was provided for a) transit operations, b) paratransit for
seniors and the disabled, and c) expansion and improvement of bicycle routes.
Differences between the 1998 and the 200 transportation packages in the
percentage of the revenue allocated to expenditure categories are identified in
Table 9-1.
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Table 9-1. Differences Between 1998 and 2000 Transportation Packages
Of the money allocated to capital projects with the 2000 transportation
package, approximately 58% was allocated to BART while approximately
42% was allocated for highways, transit bus, commuter rail, and local roadway
projects.
In interviews, representatives from both the California Alliance for Jobs and
the Sierra Club thought a compromise was facilitated by the perception that
this was the last chance to obtain voter approval of an extension prior to the
existing transportation sales tax expiring. In addition, both sides thought it
would be significantly more difficult to obtain the two-thirds supermajority
support after the existing tax expired.
The second challenge identified at the beginning of this section, namely
obtaining support throughout the entire County, was less difficult than the first
challenge to resolve. This second challenge was resolved by dividing the
County into four geographic segments of approximately equal numbers of
residents. These segments agreed that the percentage of revenue distributed to
each one would be equal to the projected percentage of the County population
of each group in 2005. A faster growing segment of the County initially argued
for using 2010 rather than 2005 as the year to use in the geographical
allocation of funding. However, once again, compromise was facilitated by the
rapidly approaching expiration date for the existing tax. Once the amount to be
allocated to each of the four areas was determined, each area was allowed to
select its projects, subject to the constraint of the categorical percentage
allocations identified previously in Table 9-1.
1998 Percentage
Allocation
2000 Percentage
Allocation
Capital Projects 46% 40%
Local Roads 22%‘ 22%
Transit Operations 19% 22%
Paratransit 9% 11%
Bicycle Routes 4% 5%
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The Proponents’ Campaign
Proponents raised approximately $900,000 for the 2000 campaign, with the
leader of the fundraising efforts being a prominent local politician who
opposed the 1998 measure.
To maintain the rather fragile coalition of business/labor and environmental
organizations, two political consulting organizations were hired. One
consultant was selected by business organizations and the other consultant was
selected by environmental organizations.
The campaign itself was rather typical and had no unusual features that needed
to be identified. Both focus groups and surveys were used to help frame the
message. Television was the primary medium used for advertising with some
use of direct mail and outdoor ads. Their main message was that the
transportation package was balanced and comprehensive and was supported by
a diverse group of politicians and private organizations. The campaign avoided
providing a list of specific projects, largely because they thought this could
generate controversy. Based upon the paired comparison survey results
identified previously, they also gave less prominence to the large amount of
money going to basic transit operations than to the other components of the
package. The campaign also emphasized that the promises from the prior ballot
measure had been kept.
Opposition
Largely as a result of the dedicated effort and pragmatic perspectives that
prevailed with key stakeholder groups, no organized opposition existed in the
2000 campaign.
Conclusion
The most interesting characteristic of the Alameda County case is the decision
to use a longer sunset period to build a consensus. Voters may be more willing
to accept a long sunset date with an extension of an existing sales tax than with
a new sales tax, particularly when past spending essentially has been consistent
with prior campaign claims, and when no new mode of transportation is being
included in the package. (Unlike a number of other communities studied,
which were proposing funding for the start of a light rail system, the rail
component of the Alameda County package involved extensions of the existing
and popular BART system.)
Obtaining a consensus also was facilitated by the ability to develop a
multimodal solution. The popularity of BART, combined with the absence of a
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light rail component, may have preempted one of the frequent sources of
opposition, namely organizations strongly opposed to light rail.
Finally, this case demonstrates that groups with conflicting views on
transportation packages may be more likely to reach an acceptable
compromise when an existing transportation sales tax is close to expiring.
Compromise is facilitated in this situation by a common perspective that the
current transportation system is unacceptable. This common perspective
definitely existed in Alameda County.
SONOMA COUNTY IN CALIFORNIA
Introduction and Overview
Two ballot measures involving the initiation of a County sales tax dedicated to
transportation were presented to voters in March of 2000. One measure
consisted of a 1/2-cent County sales tax for eight years, dedicated largely to
adding one lane in each direction to the highway on the one major corridor in
the County. The second measure consisted of a 1/4-cent sales tax for sixteen
years, dedicated largely to financing a commuter rail line along the same major
corridor. Both measures were supported by a significant majority of voters,
with the highway measure receiving support from 58.4% of voters, while the
rail transit measure received support from 60.2% of voters. However, since
dedicated county sales tax measures need a supermajority of two-thirds in
California, both of these measures failed.
This case demonstrates the difficulty of developing a transportation package
that both business and environmental organizations will support, even when
congestion is perceived as a significant problem by many voters. The use of
separate measures in the election of March 2000, combined with some
opposition to the highway measure from influential environmental
organizations, demonstrates a lack of consensus and coordination among
environmental and business organizations.
Given that proponents of the passenger rail measure did no fundraising, this
case also demonstrates that a well-funded campaign is not necessary to receive
a significant majority of voter support, when a) at least one recent well-funded
campaign existed, and b) little if any opposition exists.
In 1998, Sonoma County attempted unsuccessfully to obtain approval of a
single sales tax measure that included funding for almost all the highway
improvements in the 2000 highway ballot measure and all of the passenger rail
improvements in the 2000 passenger rail measure. This unsuccessful attempt
was studied in the earlier phase of our research and is described in our prior
report (Haas, Massey, et al., 2000). Since a detailed description of relevant
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background information is provided in this prior report, this section will
provide an abbreviated description of relevant background material. Interested
readers should read the prior report for a more detailed background
description. The abbreviated background description below will include a
comparison with Alameda County, which is in very close proximity to Sonoma
County, to help explain why Sonoma County has been less successful than
Alameda County in constructing a multimodal transportation package that
receives the support of both business and environmental groups.
Background: Low Population Density in Sonoma County
The population of Sonoma County (approximately 450,000) is significantly
smaller than the population of Alameda County (approximately 1.45 million).
Not surprisingly, given this population difference, population density is much
lower in Sonoma County (272 people per square mile) than in Alameda
County (1,858 people per square mile).7
The significantly lower population density in Sonoma County than in Alameda
County has two implications that can help explain why environmental and
business groups have had a more difficult time reaching a compromise on a
comprehensive transportation package in Sonoma County than in Alameda
County.
Stronger Anti-Growth Attitudes in Sonoma than in Alameda County
Anti-growth sentiment almost certainly is much stronger in Sonoma County
than in Alameda County. In a study previously discussed in the prior section on
Alameda County, 16% of respondents identified growth and urban sprawl as
the most important problem facing Alameda County. Although directly
comparable results were not identified with Sonoma County, in a 1990 survey
identifying attitudes towards growth, 72% of respondents identified
themselves as either being in favor of no growth (39%) or slow growth (33%).
The strong no-growth attitudes in Sonoma County are manifested in attitudes
towards transportation, particularly highway expansion. Some residents, who
are at least as concerned with limiting growth as with lessening congestion, are
likely to vote against any transportation package that is perceived as lessening
congestion if it also is perceived as encouraging growth.
The strong anti-growth attitudes in Sonoma County also make it very difficult
for any transportation package to receive support from a supermajority of
7A qualification needs to be provided to the population density figure for Sonoma County.
Approximately 70% of the population of the County lives along a single corridor within the
County and this corridor includes significantly less than 70% of the area of the County. In
other words, significant variance exists within Sonoma County in terms of population density.
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voters without the enthusiastic support of most of the numerous environmental
organizations within the County. At the same time, both prior surveys and the
results with prior ballot measures demonstrate that a passenger rail only
measure, without a companion highway measure, is unlikely to receive
supermajority support, even with the enthusiastic support of environmental
organizations.
A Poorly Developed Transit System and Limited Use of this System in
Sonoma County
It is difficult to design an efficient and effective bus transit system, let alone an
effective and efficient rail transportation system in a county with a low density.
Unlike Alameda County, which has both a large bus transit system and a well-
established rail transit system with additional communities competing for
BART extensions, Sonoma County has only a small bus system and no rail
system. As one example of the state of the bus system, even in Santa Rosa, the
largest city within the County, buses run at no more than 30-minute intervals.
With limited bus service, it is not surprising that bus ridership in the County is
quite low.
Given the low population density within Sonoma County, many
environmentalists are pessimistic that major investments in the transit system
will provide a significant benefit to citizens within the County. Accordingly,
many do not seem willing to support a transportation package with a
significant highway component even if it has a significant transit component.
The poorly utilized transit system also has influenced the business
community’s attitude towards improvements in the transit system. Unlike some
other communities studied, in which the business community often has
enthusiastically recommended a multimodal solution, many elements within
the business community in Sonoma County attach significantly higher priority
to highway improvements than to transit improvements.
Background: Business Distrust of Environmental Groups
Transportation tax measures were placed on the ballot in Sonoma County in
both 1990 and 1998. Some segments of the environmental community opposed
both of these measures even though the business community perceived that
environmental groups had agreed to not oppose these measures. As a result of
this distrust, the business community made no effort to try to work with the
environmental community in developing their transportation measure in 2000.
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Development of the Two Transportation Ballot Measures in 2000
The Highway Measure
The ballot measure consisting of a 1/2-cent increase in the sales tax for eight
years, with the revenues to be used solely for highways was developed first.
Most of the revenue would have been used to add one lane in each direction to
the highway on the major corridor in the County. Representatives from the
business community initiated this measure. With the exclusion of a small
portion of this highway, due to nonlocal funds being allocated for this segment,
the highway projects were identical to those in the 1998 measure.
A survey was conducted to help formulate this measure. This survey examined
sensitivity to both the tax rate and the sunset period, along with ascertaining
voter priority attached to highway vs. transit projects. According to one of the
leading members of the business representatives who developed this measure,
the results indicated that a) voters were unlikely to approve a sales tax rate
higher than 1/2-cent, b) voters were unlikely to approve a sunset period longer
than ten years, and c) higher priority was given to highway projects than to
transit projects. Although this group was not philosophically opposed to transit
improvements, they could not include both significant highway and transit
improvements with a 1/2-cent rate and a sunset period of less than ten years.
Since highway expansion was a higher priority than transit expansion among
respondents, their decision to focus on highway improvements was reasonable,
particularly given their not unreasonable perception that some environmental
groups would oppose the measure regardless of whether or not it included a
significant transit component.
The Passenger Rail Measure
The passenger rail measure, which included some funding for transit and
bicycling, was initiated by a County supervisor who was up for reelection in
the March election, and who was also opposed by a candidate supported by
many environmentalists. His stated motivation for placing the passenger rail
measure on the ballot was to give voters a choice.
This measure was virtually the same as the transit component of the 1998
measure. Without conducting any research, the supervisor assumed that it was
essential to keep the combined tax rate of the two measures at less than one-
cent. Since he already knew that the highway measure would be on the ballot
with a 1/2-cent rate, he decided to have a 1/4-cent rate with his measure. With
this rate, it was necessary to have the lengthy sunset period of 16 years to
provide the estimated revenue needed for the identified projects.
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Besides not conducting any voter research, the supervisor made no apparent
effort to organize a fundraising effort, nor did he engage in prior consultation
with environmental organizations to determine whether he had their support.
Proponents’ Campaigns
No organized campaign was developed in support of the passenger rail
measure, either by the supervisor who took the initiative to have the measure
placed on the ballot or by some environmental groups that supported the
measure.
Proponents of the highway measure raised more than $800,000 which is a
considerable amount of money in a county with a population of less than
500,000 people.
Since the focus of this report is on ballot measures with a significant rail
component, the nature of the highway campaign will not be specifically
described. However, based on a comparison with other campaigns, it appeared
to be a solid one. The primary media used were television and direct mail.
Research was conducted to help formulate the content and arguments used, and
the arguments also were developed in anticipation of the opponents’
arguments. In addition, the proponent campaign directly responded to
opponents rather than ignoring them, and they also appeared to take a proactive
approach with the news media.
Given the failure of both measures to use a coordinated multimodal approach,
the Sonoma County Transportation Authority did not support either measure.
Each measure had at least a few endorsements from elected officials, but each
also had at least a few elected officials who opposed the measure.
Opposition to the Two Ballot Measures
Little organized opposition to the passenger rail measure existed, although the
Greenbelt Alliance did oppose the measure. This organization threatened legal
action against both measures. A taxpayers association, which opposed the
1998 measure largely because of the rail component, chose not to oppose the
2000 passenger rail measure. It decided to focus energy on supporting the
highway measure rather than opposing the passenger rail measure.
Environmental organizations conducted an energetic campaign against the
highway measure, using a low cost grass roots campaign. This campaign relied
on door-to-door contacts, encouraging press coverage, and placing ballot
arguments in the voter information pamphlet. Their primary argument was that
highway expansion would generate growth and sprawl and would do nothing
to relieve congestion in the long run. Since some nonlocal funding had been
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provided for highway expansion after the 1998 election, opponents also argued
that local funding was not required.
Conclusion
The importance of trying to minimize credible opposition might be the most
important conclusion to draw from the 2000 Sonoma County case. This
tentative conclusion is based upon the highway measure obtaining a slightly
lower percentage of voter support (58.4%) than the passenger rail measure,
(60.2%) even though a) survey results indicated that voters were more
supportive of the highway measure than the passenger rail measure at the
beginning of the campaign, and b) the highway campaign was much stronger
than the nonexistent passenger rail campaign. Under these conditions, the most
plausible explanation for the passenger rail measure doing better than the
highway measure, is the difference in the opposition with the two measures.
The passenger rail measure had virtually no opposition while the highway
measure had active and credible opposition. This conclusion is supported in
some other cases studied in which ballot measures have not passed when active
and credible opposition exists even when proponents have a substantial fund-
raising advantage. At the same time, this conclusion needs to be qualified. The
primary opposition to the highway measure in Sonoma County consisted of
environmental organizations. These organizations have credibility in Sonoma
County, as evidenced by the strong anti-growth sentiment in the County.
However, the credibility of environmental organizations probably is higher in
Sonoma County than in many other local communities throughout the country.
In addition to demonstrating the importance of trying to minimize active and
credible opposition through coalition building, the Sonoma County case also
demonstrates the difficulty of developing a transportation package and ballot
measure that is successful in building a coalition that minimizes this
opposition. Reasons for the difficulty that Sonoma County has encountered in
building a coalition between business and environmental groups have been
described previously in this case analysis.
Finally, the Sonoma County case demonstrates that an existing legal
framework can make it very difficult to obtain voter acceptance of funding for
a transportation package. In this case, as well as in the other two cases from
California, a two-thirds supermajority was required for passage. Although both
Alameda and Santa Clara Counties have demonstrated that achieving this
supermajority threshold is possible, it is, nevertheless, a difficult threshold to
achieve. Many proponents of transportation improvements are skeptical that a
two-thirds supermajority support can be achieved for any transportation
package in Sonoma County in the foreseeable future. Accordingly, they along
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with others, are trying to persuade the state legislature to lower the supporting
threshold needed for success and also trying to persuade Governor Davis to
support this legislation. To date, these efforts have been unsuccessful.
Although neither one of the 2000 transportation ballot measures received the
supermajority support needed for passage in Sonoma County, both measures
received more support than other successful measures, such as the one in
Charlotte, and the one discussed immediately below in the greater Salt Lake
City area.
SALT LAKE, DAVIS, AND WEBER COUNTIES IN UTAH
Introduction and Overview
In November of 2000, voters in Salt Lake County, along with two other
counties within the service area of the Utah Transit Authority (UTA) were
presented with separate but identical ballot measures. Each ballot measure
proposed a 3/4-cent increase in the dedicated transit sales tax from the existing
level of 1/4-cent.8 No expiration date existed for the increase, nor does an
expiration date exist with the current 1/4-cent tax. UTA indicated that the
increased revenues would be used to a) expand basic bus service in each
county that approved the tax, b) expand the light rail system in Salt Lake
County if it approved the tax, and c) develop a high speed commuter rail
system through all three counties if all three counties approved the tax. The
amount of money allocated to each of these three uses was not identified, on
either a dollar or percentage basis.
Tha measure received majority support in each of the three counties. The
measure received the highest margin of support in Davis County, with 57.5%
of voters supporting the measure, compared with percentages of 53.6% in Salt
Lake County and 52.8% in Weber County.
The primary lesson from this case is that success can occur even when a
number of conditions normally associated with failure are present. More
specifically, at least four critical conditions normally associated with failur4e
existed within Salt Lake County. These conditions are a) proponents only spent
$163,292 on the campaign, b) no expiration date existed with the tax increase,
c) a specific expenditure plan did not exist, and d) a survey conducted at the
beginning of the campaign indicated the measure was behind by about 10% in
Salt Lake County. In addition to these four factors, organized opposition
8Although it is appropriate to use the term “ transit” rather than “transportation” for this tax,
legislation passed in 1992 required that Salt Lake County use 25% of the revenues generated
from the existing 1/4-cent sales tax for I-15 highway improvements. This legislation also
applied to the 1/4-cent sales tax increase with the 2000 ballot measure.
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existed, although the opposition had difficulty developing a credible message
for reasons discussed later.
Three factors probably combined to compensate for the negative factors
identified in the preceding paragraph. First, UTA was quite aggressive in using
its funds to communicate with voters through both a comprehensive mailing
and through the paid use of television during the campaign. This factor
compensated for the minimal amount of campaign funds raised and it also
probably had a major impact on the percentage of support for the ballot being
approximately 10 percentage points higher than the percentage of support
expressed in a survey at the beginning of the campaign. Of course, having a
well-financed campaign is unlikely to be effective without a credible message
that resonates with voters, and two conditions existed in Salt Lake County that
provided this resonance. One condition was the popularity of UTA’s existing
light rail line. The second condition was a significant amount of highway
congestion resulting from delays in highway construction. This condition
probably generated more sympathy for transit, along with generating antipathy
toward highway construction as a solution to congestion.
Background: The Transportation System and A Prior Ballot Measure in
1992
In 1974, voters approved a 1/4-cent sales tax dedicated for transit. This
revenue was used for bus and paratransit. In 1992, voters in Salt Lake County
only were presented with a ballot measure to increase the existing sales tax by
1/4-cent. This measure was quite similar to the 2000 measure in that it did not
have a sunset date, nor did it have a specific plan. It did propose using the
money to expand and improve the bus system along with constructing and
operating a light rail system. This measure was defeated by a margin of 57% to
43%. Observers interviewed attributed this defeat to a) congestion not being
viewed as a critical problem at that time, and b) uncertainty about the impact
that light rail would have on congestion. As is typically the case, the opposition
to the 1992 measure focused on the light rail component, arguing that it was
costly and would be used primarily by existing transit users.
Even with the 1992 defeat of the tax increase, UTA was able to obtain funding
for a 15-mile light rail line, with most of the construction funding provided by
the federal government. Additional funding came from the existing 1/4-cent
tax. Both population growth and a strong economy provided sufficient funds to
UTA to use its existing funding source for light rail without diverting funds
from its bus and paratransit service. This light rail line opened in December of
1999, and construction was completed on time and within the budget
established. The only controversy during construction involved the closure of
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Main Street in downtown Salt Lake City for up to six months during
construction. This closure resulted in a lack of access to a number of
downtown businesses. All people interviewed, including a lead opponent,
indicated that the light rail line was very popular, with the cars being full and
ridership being higher than projected. It is interesting that ridership is even
higher on Saturday (about 21,000) than on Monday through Friday (about
19,000). The high weekend ridership suggests that a number of residents
probably are only occasional riders of light rail.
After the defeat of the 1992 measure, the area did receive approximately $2.5
billion of federal funding to widen I-15, which is a very important corridor in
each of the three counties. State and local funding also were used for this
project. The construction began in 1995 and was still ongoing during the 2000
campaign. Only two lanes have been open in each direction during most of this
time, with frequent evening and weekend closures. Although this highway
widening may have a positive impact on congestion once it is completed, it has
had a significant negative impact on congestion during its lengthy
construction. All people interviewed agreed that the lengthy construction on I-
15 contributed to the success of the 2000 ballot measure. The construction
problems made it difficult for opponents to argue, as they often do, that
highway widening is a higher priority than transit improvements. In addition,
the construction problems increased the number of residents who viewed
highway congestion as a significant problem and also may have increased
voter appeal of the commuter rail line component in the 2000 package, since
this line was proposed for the I-15 corridor. The lack of popularity of highway
expansion during the 2000 campaign is evidenced by the decision of
proponents to not make any mention of the use of 25% of the 1/4-cent sales tax
increase in Salt Lake County for highway improvements on I-15. Still further
evidence of the lack of popularity of highway expansion in 2000 due to the
I-15 construction problems is provided by the reasoning stated by a few
mayors in Salt Lake County for their neutral position on the ballot measure.
They said they could not support the measure as long as some of the revenue
would go to highway improvements. In other words, these neutral mayors
would have supported a ballot measure that truly was a transit-only measure.
Background: Geography of the Three Counties
As mentioned in the introduction to this case, Salt Lake, Weber, and Davis
Counties each had separate, but identical, ballot measures in 2000. Although
separate measures were involved, funding would not have been available to
fund all the projects described by proponents unless each of the counties
passed the measure. Passage in Salt Lake County was particularly essential as
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significantly more revenue is generated from the sales tax in this County than
the combined revenue of the two remaining counties.
According to 1999 figures, the combined population of all three counties was
1.275 million, with Salt Lake County having approximately 67% of the total
population for the three counties. The population estimates for each of the
three counties was 850,243 for Salt Lake County; 239,364 for Davis County;
and 185,469 for Weber County.
Davis County is immediately north of Salt Lake County. It consists of a
number of smaller communities, with the largest one being Bountiful, with a
population of approximately 37,000 people. Most of the communities are on
the I-15 corridor and approximately 47% of residents work outside the County.
Weber County is immediately north of Davis County with most of its
population also residing on the I-15 corridor. A significant number of Weber
County residents live in Ogden (approximately 80,000 population) and
surrounding areas.
Most of the population of Weber and Davis Counties exists on the I-15 corridor
because the Great Salt Lake constrains population growth, as well as highway
corridors, west of this corridor; while the Wasatch Mountain range constrains
both population growth and highway corridors east of the I-15 corridor.
The 2000 Transportation Package
The mayor of Ogden, in Weber County, appeared to be the prime mover for the
2000 ballot measure. His primary motivation involved obtaining funding for a
commuter rail line that would run the approximately 35 miles between Ogden
and Salt Lake City. As soon as he heard that the Governor was trying to obtain
a right of way agreement with the Union Pacific Railroad that could be used
for the commuter rail line, he obtained agreement from other mayors in Weber
County to place the 1/4-cent sales tax measure on the ballot. The commuter rail
line also seemed to be the main reason why the mayors in Davis County then
agreed to place the measure on the ballot.
Since Salt Lake County is significantly larger than Davis and Weber Counties
combined, the commuter rail project could not have been funded without a
sales tax increase in Salt Lake County. Salt Lake County had difficulty even
getting the measure on the ballot. Approval apparently was needed from the
three-person Salt Lake County Commission. One of the commissioners was
strongly opposed to placing the measure on the ballot. However, the other two
members eventually voted in favor of placing the measure on the ballot, with
one of these members apparently being rather undecided until the actual vote.
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Since the commuter rail line would have benefited residents of Davis and
Weber Counties more than those in Salt Lake County, transit improvements
beneficial to residents in Salt Lake County were needed. This was done by
including five light rail spurs in the transportation package, with each spur
existing within Salt Lake County. Bus service expansion also was included to
offer service later at night, initiate service on Sundays, and expand feeder
service to the light rail system. These bus service improvements would occur
in each of the three counties.
As noted in the introduction, neither the ballot measure nor communications
from proponents, provided estimates of the percentage of revenues allocated to
each of the three components of the transportation package; nor were any
numbers provided on the percentage of funds allocated to each of the three
counties. In addition, a time line for completion of the commuter rail line was
not identified.
Proponents’ Campaign
The campaign apparently began only about two months prior to the election
and the mayor of Ogden was a leader in organizing the campaign, through an
ad hoc group labeled “People for Sensible Transportation.” Compared to most
other measures studied, fundraising efforts were not very successful.
Proponents raised and spent approximately $160,000 on the campaign. This
was a sufficient amount to hire a political consultant and do a targeted direct
mail campaign combined with drive-time radio advertising, yard signs, and a
proactive effort to obtain free media coverage. Each of these components is
briefly described below.
One mailing of direct mail pieces was sent to approximately 65,000
households. All households were in Salt Lake County. As mentioned in the
introduction, some survey results indicated that the measure was behind by
about 10% points in Salt Lake County and the commuter rail line could not
have been funded unless the measure passed in this county. Only households
who resided close to one of the proposed light rail spurs were sent direct mail,
with each piece focusing only on the spur closest to each household.
Several radio ads were developed. Given the need to focus on appealing to
voters in Salt Lake County, these ads focused mostly on the light rail spurs,
emphasizing that $640 million in federal funding would be lost if the measure
failed, arguing that a number of other communities were competing for these
federal funds.
Approximately 4,500 lawn signs were distributed, with about 3,500 of these
signs being placed in Salt Lake County. Most of the signs were placed along
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major thoroughfares. The signs in Salt Lake County included a visual
rendering of a light rail train, while those in the other two counties included a
rendering of a commuter rail train.
A critical and legally risky part of the proponents’ strategy consisted of an
expensive and aggressive public education campaign paid for with UTA funds.
UTA mailed a four-page information piece to all households in each of the
three counties in October and it also ran over 300 paid television “ads,” with
slightly less than half of these ads running in September, and the remainder
running in early November.
The theme of the UTA mailer was “Even if you don’t ride it, you still use it.”
As is usually the case, this theme was emphasized by linking the measure to
traffic relief and better air quality. The only statistic cited was that
implementation of the “full, long range plan could increase the number of cars
eliminated from our roads to 250,000.” Similar to the radio ads and the
campaign’s direct mail piece, light rail extensions received the most emphasis,
followed by the bus service improvements, with the commuter rail component
receiving the least emphasis.
UTA ran two different television ads and both used the theme identified in the
previous paragraph. One ad depicted a person driving on an empty highway
and attributed this to UTA taking 81,000 cars off the road every day and this ad
also had a visual towards the end of a light rail train traveling adjacent to the
highway at the same speed as the car. The second ad conveyed the same theme
in a different manner. It showed a congested highway with a light rail train
adjacent to the highway moving by quickly while the cars were inching along.
The audio component said that UTA could take a “couple hundred thousand
cars off the road.”
The Salt Lake County commissioner who voted against placing the measure on
the ballot also took offense to UTA’s aggressive information campaign and
sued UTA, as a public citizen, for illegal use of public funds. The court initially
ruled in favor of UTA, and an appeal has been dismissed.
Opponents’ Campaign
With virtually the entire political establishment supporting the three ballot
measures, the opposition was led by two citizen organizations, the Utah
Taxpayers Association and a second ad hoc organization consisting primarily
of people opposed to light rail. Since the opposition was surprised by the
decision to place a measure on the November 2000 ballot, they did not have
much time to organize a campaign. As is typically the case, opponents had
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little money available for advertising, although they were able to run some
radio ads the week prior to the campaign.
The ad hoc group of opponents used the frequent approach of attacking light
rail. The second opponent group, the Utah Taxpayers Association, decided to
take an unusual approach. They made no attempt to argue against transit
improvements, including expansion of the light rail system. Instead, they
argued against using the sales tax as the revenue source. They argued that this
was a very regressive tax, partly because food purchases were included in the
sales tax. The impact of this argument was neutralized when the NAACP and
other organizations representing lower income people publicly supported the
measures.
The aforementioned popularity of the light rail line, combined with the I-15
construction difficulties, made it difficult for the opposition to mount an
effective and persuasive campaign. The popularity of light rail made it difficult
to argue that light rail was costly and inefficient, while the I-15 difficulties
made it difficult to argue that highway improvements would solve congestion
without rail transit. In addition, since UTA had completed the previous light
rail project on time and within budget, it was difficult for opponents to argue
that the vagueness of the plan with its lack of cost estimates would result in the
additional revenue being used inefficiently. In addition, UTA was able to
counter this argument by saying that many other similar communities had a
higher tax rate than the 1/4-cent rate that UTA had prior to the election.
Opponents were able to obtain some free media coverage, although this also
was hampered by the short length of the campaign and a presidential election.
Opponents were able to organize only one debate and it was not televised.
Conclusion
As mentioned in the introduction and overview section, this case demonstrates
that success is possible even when a number of conditions normally associated
with failure exist. Although the specific combination of both the failure and the
countervailing factors existing in Salt Lake County might be atypical, this case
demonstrates that no common recipe for success exists that can be applied
across the board.
This case also demonstrates that an incremental approach to constructing a
light rail system can be effective in diffusing the common argument of
opposition that light rail is costly and ineffective. This incremental approach is
most likely to be effective when voter approval is not needed with the starter
line and when light rail expansion can be combined with expansion of basic
bus service, such as including Sunday bus service. Of course, this incremental
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approach will work only if the initial line generates high ridership and is
popular with the public. All of these conditions beneficial to the incremental
approach existed in Salt Lake County.
AUSTIN, TEXAS
Introduction and Overview
On November 7, 2000, approximately 200,000 residents in Austin, Texas, in
the remaining smaller communities in Travis County, and in a few
communities in Williamson County voted on whether to use part of an existing
one-cent sales tax dedicated to transit to fund a 52-mile light rail system
estimated to cost approximately $1.9 billion. The measure was narrowly
defeated by 1,956 votes, which was a margin of approximately .8% (49.6% to
50.4%). The measure was supported by a very small majority of voters in the
city of Austin (50.6%), but the larger percentage of voters who rejected the
measure in the remaining communities that contributed sales tax revenues to
Capital Metro, the transit agency, was large enough to defeat the measure even
though the vast majority of voters resided in the city of Austin.
Although the margin of defeat was quite small, the measure failed even though
a) proponents had a significant spending advantage over opponents, b) an
existing tax, rather than a tax increase, would be used to fund the proposed
light rail system, c) virtually no prominent politicians or organizations opposed
the measure, and d) congestion was perceived to be a significant problem.
Given these positive factors, the case demonstrates the difficulty of obtaining
voter approval of an expensive and comprehensive light rail system when
arguments can be made that highway improvements are comparatively
underfunded, and when the transit organization has a history of financial
mismanagement.
Background: Transit Funding and Capital Metro
In 1985, voters in the greater Austin area approved, by a large margin, a full
one-cent dedicated transit sales tax, with the understanding that a
comprehensive light rail system would be constructed and operated with a
portion of the revenues generated with this tax. Due to delays and problems in
quickly moving forward with the light rail system, the Capital Metro Board
reduced the tax to a 3/4-cent rate in 1989. The Board then reinstated the full
one-cent tax rate in 1995, with the intention of using the incremental 1/4-cent
to create a reserve for a light rail system.
Based on a comparison with other communities, which tend to have a 1/4- to
3/4-cent sales tax dedicated to transit, if they even have a dedicated source of
transit funding, Austin is susceptible to the criticism that its transit budget is
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larger than needed. Charges that some of the revenue dedicated to transit
should be diverted to other purposes, including highways, intensified after a
federal audit, conducted in 1997-98, revealed that Capital Metro had engaged
in financial mismanagement. As a result of this audit, the state legislature
mandated the replacement of the entire Capital Metro Board of Directors. Most
of the management team was subsequently replaced.
With Austin being the state capital of Texas, state legislators were aware of
concerns about Capital Metro’s budget and the financial mismanagement. The
legislature has threatened to divert some of the transit revenues to highway
improvements and/or to local jurisdictions within the Capital Metro service
area. Given the involvement of the state legislature, Capital Metro thought they
needed to a) obtain voter approval before moving ahead with a light rail system
even though no tax increase was required, and b) act quickly to obtain voter
approval to prevent the legislature from diverting funds from their budget.
Background: The Highway System
The lead opposition consisted of an organization with the acronym ROAD,
which stands for “Reclaim Our Allocated Dollars.” This organization selected
an acronym that communicates its orientation that the highway system has
been significantly underfunded and is not capable of meeting the needs of the
population. Data from the Texas Transportation Institute seemed to support this
conclusion. Austin was ranked eleventh in the entire country in traffic
congestion in 1999 as measured by person—hours lost due to congestion. Each
of the ten communities ranked above Austin is significantly larger than Austin.
Fast population growth has contributed to the highway congestion. The
population of the city of Austin grew from 465,622 in 1990 to 642,994 in 2000,
which is an increase of 38%. In addition, the community voted in 1985 to
prevent a loop highway system from being constructed and this constraint has
contributed to the highway congestion.
Although in the mid-1980s, Austin voters were opposed to an extensive
highway system, the results of the November 2000 election suggest that the
attitude of the voters toward highway construction had changed. The mayor of
Austin had two highway bond measures on the same ballot as the light rail
measure. One $150 million bond measure was for the city of Austin, while a
second $28 million bond measure was for Travis County, which includes
Austin plus some smaller surrounding communities. Both of these bond
measures passed with over 60% of voters supporting each one.9
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Background: The Role of the Chamber of Commerce
In most other communities studied, The Chamber of Commerce has supported
the ballot measure. The Austin Chamber did eventually support the light rail
measure. However, the Chamber also conducted a well publicized study that
may have helped the opposition. This study was initiated because a consensus
initially did not exist within the business community on the light rail ballot
measure. The report, which was released in the middle of August through a
series of public forums, reported findings rather than making
recommendations. Both proponents and opponents found positive things in the
report. However, it seemed to provide more support to opponents on the
critical issue of the impact of the light rail system on highway congestion. It
concluded that light rail would reduce highway congestion by about 3% and
that improving the highway system was a better short-term solution to highway
congestion.
Background: Population, Demographics, and Voter Tendencies
Austin’s population was slightly over 656,000 in 2000. Most of the city is in
Travis County, which had a population of 749,426 in 2000 but a smaller part of
the city is in Williamson County.
Austin is a diverse community, with 28.3% of the population consisting of
Hispanics and 11.5% consisting of African Americans. As a percentage of the
population, the Hispanic community is growing. It is not surprising that both
proponents and opponents attached high priority to targeting both African
Americans and Hispanics because collectively they make up slightly more than
40% of the population of the city of Austin.
The 1985 vote (mentioned in a previous section) opposing development of a
loop highway system suggests that Austin may have liberal voting tendencies.
The vote in the 2000 presidential election reinforces this conclusion. Even
though George Bush was the Governor with Austin being the state capital, he
received only 46.9% of the vote in Austin. The liberal voting tendency also is
reinforced by the percentage of votes received by Ralph Nader (slightly more
than 10%).
9The mayor was a supporter of the light rail measure. Proponents suggested that these bond
measures were placed on the same ballot as the light rail measure to help the light rail measure
by suggesting that a multimodal approach was being used. However, given the imbalance
between the amount of highway money involved in the two bond measures ($178 million)
compared to the $1.9 billion cost of the light rail system, the inclusion of the specific highway
bonding measures may have helped reinforce opponents’ primary argument that a spending
imbalance existed between transit and highways.
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The Transportation Package and the Process Used to Develop It
Capital Metro had been considering a light rail system for a number of years
prior to the management and Board turnover in 1997-98 resulting from the
federal audit. The new management team essentially started the planning
process again in early 1999. Thus, the light rail system was developed rather
quickly and with limited voter research and political input. As examples of the
speed of development, engineering studies had not been completed prior to the
election and routes seemed to change during the campaign. If the previously
mentioned legislative pressure had not existed, Capital Metro probably would
have included their ballot measure in a later election, both because they wanted
to have more time for planning and outreach and because they wanted more
time to improve the image of Capital Metro, after the image was hurt in 1997-
1998 with the audit and the financial mismanagement issue.
Opponents did attack the vagueness of the plan and linked this argument with
questions about Capital Metro’s ability to properly manage a $1.9 billion
project given their recent past history. Some proponents also suggested that the
vote was adversely influenced by the lack of time available for longer-term
community outreach and education. For example, although the Capital Metro
Board decided over a year prior to the election to extend the first phase route
into predominantly African American neighborhoods, some voters in these
neighborhoods were confused about this routing issue. This confusion
probably contributed to the less than expected support for the measure in these
neighborhoods. This confusion might have been lessened if more time was
available for community outreach.
The state legislature dictated the ballot language that Capital Metro needed to
use. The language essentially precluded a single package with both a rail
transit and a highway component. Thus, Capital Metro was prevented from
developing a multimodal transportation package that some other communities
have used successfully. This was an important constraint, since it is easier to
provide benefits to different geographic segments within the voting area with a
multimodal approach, consisting of road improvements, bus improvements,
and a rail transit component than it is with a rail only measure. With a rail only
measure, a comprehensive and expensive system is required to provide access
to most geographic segments within a community. Voters may not accept such
a system due to the combination of high costs and uncertain ridership. On the
other hand, voters may not accept a starter system because many residents
would not have convenient access to this system.
Even with an expensive and extensive light rail system, many residents did not
have convenient access to the light rail system. The likelihood of voter support
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was positively correlated with voter proximity to the proposed light rail
system. Of those who lived within one-half mile of the proposed system,
55.9% voted for the light rail measure.
Proponents’ Campaign
According to the Austin America-Statesman, proponents raised close to
$900,000. This budget allowed proponents to conduct extensive research,
along with doing an extensive amount of advertising. Television was used as
the primary medium, with over $500,000 spent on television advertising.
Billboards, radio, and newspapers also were used with limited and late use of
targeted direct mail.
Three different television ads were used. One used the local and well respected
cycling and cancer survivor celebrity, Lance Armstrong, to endorse the light
rail measure. To take full advantage of this advertisement, it was run primarily
during the Summer Olympics, even though this meant running it in the early
portion of the campaign. The second advertisement, which was run closer to
the election, had the mayor endorse the measure and also tried to take
advantage of Austin voters’ liberal tendencies and dislike of Houston. Houston
has relied primarily on highways as a mode of transportation and it has a high
level of air pollution. The third television advertisement, also run in the late
stages of the campaign, attacked a misleading television ad run by opponents.
More will be said about the opponents’ television advertisement in the next
section.
The radio ads were similar to the second television ad. They used the mayor as
a spokesperson and stressed that Austin should not use the Houston solution,
which relied almost exclusively on highways.
A single direct mailer was sent out in late October to approximately 100,000
households in the northern portion of the city and county. Unfortunately, this
mailer was sent out after a number of people had already voted through early
voting.
Due to the large percentage of Hispanics in Austin, proponents did some
advertising with Spanish language newspapers and radio stations. According to
a voting analysis conducted by Capital Metro, the measure lost in
predominantly Hispanic precincts in spite of strong efforts by proponents to
target them. The voting pattern in these precincts also was somewhat
surprising because the starter line was accessible in these precincts and some
residents in these precincts were transit users. The representative from Capital
Metro interviewed about the voting results attributed the lower than expected
Four Recent Ballot Measures With a Rail Component
Mineta Transportation Institute
165
support in Hispanic precincts primarily to concerns about gentrification and
development that might ensue as a result of the light rail line.
Proponents also spent a considerable amount of effort targeting the African
American community. They thought they should be able to obtain strong
support from these voters but they got off to a bad start. First, as mentioned
previously, initial descriptions of the 20-mile starter route did not include
predominantly African American neighborhoods. Second, the only city
councilperson who opposed the light rail measure was an African American
and other prominent African Americans, including a popular radio personality
also opposed the measure. Proponents tried to overcome resistance and distrust
within the African American community with a predominantly grass roots
campaign. Here, as with Hispanics, the efforts of the proponents were less than
highly successful based upon voting analysis provided by a person with
Capital Metro. He concluded that the measure lost in predominantly African
American precincts on the east side of Austin.
The light rail issue received a significant amount of media attention,
particularly in the newspapers and on radio. In addition, at least three debates
were widely televised. Given the media attention, along with being aware that
opponents typically focus on free media due to limited funding available for
advertising, proponents should have realized the importance of having a well-
conceived strategy for dealing with the newspapers and radio stations. Their
failure to even have a campaign person whose primary responsibility involved
this critical planning component until the middle of October suggests that
proponents did not attach as much importance this component as needed.
In an issue oriented campaign in which the opposition tends to focus heavily
on obtaining free media coverage, including debates, someone from the
proponents’ campaign must be aware of the arguments that opponents are
likely to use and also have the knowledge of light rail to be able to counter and
possibly preempt these arguments. A lead proponent campaign person
acknowledged that this was an underlying problem with their campaign. More
specifically, she said that opponents tended to put the proponents into a
defensive posture of reacting to the arguments of opponents and often not
having an effective immediate response. Opponents were able to stay on the
offensive in part because they changed some specific aspects of their
arguments over time. This campaign person concluded that competitive
research along with more preparation time would have been useful and this
seems to be an insightful conclusion. This research is not that difficult since
most of the arguments used by opponents against light rail in Austin have been
used in a number of prior campaigns.
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In summary, although hindsight suggests that proponents could have
conducted a more effective campaign in some respects, campaign mistakes are
essentially inevitable when quick decisions need to be made during the course
of a campaign. However, particularly since limited time was available for
campaign planning, fewer mistakes probably would have been made if
consultants had been used who had prior experience with light rail measures.
Opponents’ Campaign
Compared to other opponent campaigns studied, the opponent’s primary
organization, ROAD, was quite successful in its fundraising efforts, raising
approximately $230,000, even without adjusting for the smaller population of
Austin compared to other communities studied. The budget allowed them to
conduct a reasonable amount of television and radio advertising in the last few
weeks prior to the campaign. Both the radio and television advertising focused
on Capital Metro’s financial mismanagement problems and this decision was
based upon results of a survey conducted by the opposition. The advertising
proved to be quite controversial and the Austin American-Statesman threatened
a lawsuit if the advertising was not modified. The issue of contention with this
ad was the implication that the financial mismanagement was a current, rather
than a prior problem. Under legal pressure, opponents did modify the ad. As
mentioned in the prior section, proponents took advantage of this opponent
blunder by attacking their credibility through depiction of the misleading
advertising.
Even though opponents were able to conduct a reasonably aggressive
advertising campaign, they also were very aggressive in obtaining free media
coverage, relying heavily on scheduling a series of debates in which
proponents agreed to participate. As mentioned previously at least three
debates were widely broadcast and at least six radio debates took place. A lead
opponent also was on public access television at least ten times and wrote three
opinion editorials in the Austin American-Statesman. They relied heavily on
statistics provided by Wendell Cox and other critics of light rail, along with
some from the aforementioned report from the Chamber of Commerce.
Opponents also made extensive use of yard signs, with their message being
that light rail “costs too much, does too little” and they did a lot of
neighborhood outreach, particularly in the African American community and
with small businesses. They appealed to African American distrust of
government, in part by arguing that basic bus service would deteriorate with a
light rail system designed primarily to serve the middle class. Their basic
appeal to small businesses was that the construction of light rail would disrupt
business through restricting access.
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In summary, with the exception of having a significantly larger budget than
opponents typically have had, the opposition campaign in Austin is similar to
campaigns in other communities with a few minor differences. The differences
were a) an ability to claim that some of the existing full one-cent sales tax
should be allocated to the deficient highway system, b) an ability to attack the
credibility of Capital Metro based upon mistakes made by a Board and
management group that no longer existed, and c) greater media access than in
campaigns in some other communities as a result of public interest in this
measure and the transportation system. This measure was the primary local
issue on the ballot.
Conclusion
Public concern with the significant amount of highway congestion, a
population that opposed a highway loop in 1985, a ballot measure that did not
involve a tax increase, a well-financed proponent campaign, and limited
opposition from prominent politicians and organizations combine to suggest
that Austin’s light rail ballot measure might have been expected to pass by a
large margin. One tentative conclusion of the defeat of this ballot measure,
given the above circumstances, is that it is difficult to obtain voter support for
an expensive light rail only measure when a reasonable argument can be made
that the money could be better spent on highway improvements.
At the same time, the results in Austin may well have been significantly
different if either Capital Metro had not encountered its prior financial
mismanagement problems, or if there had been more time for the new
management of Capital Metro to change its image prior to the election.
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CONCLUSIONS: CRITICAL FACTORS AFFECTING
OUTCOMES OF TRANSPORTATION TAX INITIATIVES
INTRODUCTION: CAVEATS ON FINDINGS
The eleven cases presented in this report represent a wide variety of urban
environments, including different transportation systems and political milieus.
In the course of collecting data for these cases, and on the basis of patterns
identified in the previous volume of this study, a number of factors that seem to
be systematically associated with success or failure of these ballot measures
have been identified.
The approach used here is to consider a number of common factors that were
deduced from the data collected for the case studies (as well as the preceding
study) and to consider how important they appear to be, either contributing to
the passage or to the failure of transportation tax measures. Rather than seeking
to identify quantitative relationships, this report addresses the logical
possibilities about the importance of such factors. To what extent does each
factor appear to be critical to the success or failure of transportation tax
initiatives? For the most part, because the requisite data is lacking to assure
that causal relationships exist, the factors are discussed in terms of being either
necessary or sufficient for the passage of a transportation tax initiative.
Even though these cases do include nearly every major transportation tax
initiative with a rail transit component completed during the past four years,
the identification and verification of generalizable causal relationships are
beyond the scope of this study for a number of reasons. First, the independent
variables often are correlated with each other. For example, a) the degree to
which the business community enthusiastically supports the measure, b) the
degree to which the business community was involved in selecting the
transportation package (likely to contribute to business enthusiasm), c) the
amount of money available for proponents in the communications campaign
(likely to be influenced by business enthusiasm), and d) the ability to use an
integrated communications campaign with extensive use of both television and
direct mail advertising (which can be done only with successful fundraising)
tend to be highly correlated. Given these correlations, it would be virtually
impossible to isolate the impact of individual variables even if a sufficient
number of cases existed.
Second, because significant interactions exist among the variables identified
here, it is extremely difficult to make reasonable generalizations about the
degree and nature of the impact of independent variables upon voting behavior.
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Such elections appear to be highly idiosyncratic and the possibility exists that
certain factors may interact with unique circumstances in some localities
creating anomalies that may confound otherwise valid interpretation. For
example, the need and importance of having a transportation package that
includes a highway component depend on a) the current status of the highway
system (which would influence the priority that voters attach to including
highway improvements in the package), b) the degree of impact that
environmental groups may have on voting behavior if they oppose the measure
(which they are likely to do if it has a substantial highway component), c) the
degree of importance that environmental groups place on beginning or
improving a passenger rail system (which would influence their willingness to
accept a highway component because these groups tend to support transit and,
more specifically, rail transit), and d) the extent that environmental groups
perceive that an immediate solution is needed to improve the passenger rail
system (which also would influence their willingness to compromise and thus
support a rail ballot measure with a highway component or with a linked ballot
measure with a highway component).
Third, because factors that vary over time can influence the results and because
all the ballot measures studied occurred within a four year interval, with most
occurring within only a one year interval, the results may not be generalizable
to the future. At least three factors, namely a) changing economic conditions,
b) recently approved federal tax changes, and c) future ridership on rail transit
systems funded by ballot measures included in this study, along with the costs
of constructing these systems, are likely to cause the results of future ballot
measures to be different than the results of the recent ballot measures included
in this study.
ORGANIZATION OF REMAINDER OF CHAPTER
Independent variables that could be defined with reasonable precision and
which also were relevant to most, if not all cases are identified below in Table
10-1. Ten of the 11 cases are included in the table (The Sonoma County case is
not included in the table because it is difficult to determine whether to classify
this case as a success or as a failure. This measure technically failed, even
though it was supported by approximately 60% of voters, which is a higher
percentage than two of the successful measures. It failed because California
requires a two-thirds supporting threshold for specific purpose local tax
measures.). Each case is classified on each of the 17 independent variables
included. To facilitate ease of interpreting the results in the table, only three
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categories were used with each independent variable, even though more than
three possible categories, or levels, exist with many of these variables.
Some relevant independent variables were not included in Table 10-1, typically
because some of these variables do not lend themselves to a simple description
or label. Many of these variables involve detailed aspects of the
communications campaign used by proponents. A discussion of some of these
campaign variables follows the discussion of those variables included in the
table.
ANALYSIS OF FACTORS INCLUDED IN TABLE 10-1
To briefly explain the cell entries in Table 10-1, an upward arrow indicates that
the factor did exist or was associated with the specified location; a downward
arrow indicates that the factor was not present. A horizontal double arrow is
used to indicate a middle category between the two extremes, realizing that
many of the independent variables are not truly dichotomous in nature. For
each factor, upward arrows are expected to correspond with passing initiatives,
whereas downward arrow should correspond with failing initiatives. Note that
several factors are expressed as the lack of a condition; in these instances, an
upward arrow means that the case did lack the specified item, whereas
downward facing arrows signify cases that did not lack this item. This enables
a consistent pattern of upward facing arrows for items associated with passage,
and vice versa.
Finally, in instances where the existence of a factor did not correspond with the
outcome of the cases, the cell is shaded. This signifies an anomaly, where the
case and the specified factor did not match the hypothesized pattern. With
successful cases, an anomaly exists when the factor is not present. With
unsuccessful cases, an anomaly exists when the factor is present.
Classifications in the middle category are not considered to be anomalies, but
are not counted when evaluating the overall match of the factors.
To facilitate meaningful comparisons, the cases are arranged with the cases
that passed first, followed by the cases that failed. More specifically, the cases
are sequenced by the supporting voting percentage. The case with the highest
supporting percentage, Alameda County, is at the far left, while the case with
the lowest supporting percentage, San Antonio, is at the far right
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Table 10-1. Status of Each Case on Selected Critical Influencing Factors
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Global Evaluation of Table 10-1
On the whole, the factors in Table 10-1 tend to fit the hypothesized relationship
with the passage or failure of each measure. In only 30 of 155 testable
instances (19.4%) were the outcomes of the election in direct conflict with the
hypothesized existence of a factor (or lack thereof) (The two cells in which a
case was classified as “not applicable” and the 13 cells in which the value of a
case was in the middle category are excluded from the total number of cells
(170) in determining the number of testable instances.).
Only two of the 17 independent variables had more than three anomalies and
only one variable, namely whether the measure had an expiration date of ten
years or less (six anomalies) had more than four anomalies.
Insights can be gained by examining the number of negative factors separately
for the unsuccessful and for the successful cases. This number is identified
with each case in the last row of Table 10-1. Each of the four unsuccessful
cases had at least 10 negative factors. Particularly because Austin, which is one
of the four unsuccessful cases, was supported by nearly 50% of voters, even
though 10 negative factors existed in this case, this finding, by itself, suggests
that a measure can succeed even if a moderate number of negative factors
exist. However, a tabulation of the number of negative factors with the
successful cases indicates that this suggested conclusion is erroneous. None of
the six successful cases had more than three negative factors when the
expiration date variable is excluded.
The distribution of the number of negative factors per case, that involves
clusters at both extremes (When the expiration date variable is excluded, 10 or
more negative factors exist with each unsuccessful case compared to four or
less negative factors with each successful case.). The fact that no case has
between five and nine negative factors suggests that many of the independent
variables are positively correlated with each other. When independent
variables are positively correlated, a negative value on one of these variables
can result in negative values on a whole cluster of them and vice versa.
Given the existing positive correlation among some independent variables, it is
important to identify the specific variables that tend to be correlated, along
with identifying the specific variables most likely to cause the correlation.
Based upon a combination of the results and reasoned judgement, nine
independent variables appear to be at least moderately correlated with each
other. These variables are listed below, with the sequence being based upon
possible causal relationships.
• Traffic congestion crisis;
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• Multimodal transit and/or a highway component included in or linked with
transit ballot measure;
• Reputation of transit agency;
• Degree of public involvement in planning process;
• Degree of enthusiasm of business community support;
• Degree of enthusiasm of support by key elected officials;
• Degree of fundraising success;
• Extensive use of combination of direct mail and television advertising; and
• Effectiveness of opposition.
Although the values on each of the first four of the variables in the above list
tend to be the same within each case, reasoned judgement suggests that some
of these correlations may be artifacts. For example, a traffic congestion crisis
can exist in a community in which the transit agency has a good reputation or
in one in which the agency has a poor reputation. As another example, a high
degree of public involvement in the planning process could exist both with a
transit agency with a good reputation, or with an agency with a tarnished
reputation. The first four of the variables in the above list are included
primarily because each is likely, both individually and collectively, to influence
directly or indirectly each of the last five variables in the above list. More
specifically, both the business community and key elected officials are most
likely to enthusiastically support a ballot measure when a) voters perceive that
a traffic congestion crisis exists and the solution of this crisis is a high priority
among most voters, b) the transit agency has a sufficiently strong reputation
and are perceived as being able to use the funding provided both effectively
and efficiently, c) the business community and key elected officials are
enthusiastic about the specifics of the transportation package and involved in
the planning process, and d) the transportation package does not consist solely
of rail transit (because the business community and the public tend to be more
supportive of a balanced solution to a traffic congestion crisis than of a solution
that relies solely on rail transit). The enthusiastic support from both the
business community and key elected officials certainly facilitates fundraising,
and fundraising is needed for the extensive use of both direct mail and
television advertising. In addition, opposition tends to be isolated and has more
difficulty persuading the public to vote against funding when a positive value
exists on each of the first six of the above variables.
To summarize, the first four variables in the above list probably are the most
critical ones as they tend to influence each of the remaining five variables. In
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other words, it is very difficult to be successful with a ballot measure unless a)
a perceived traffic crisis exists that is seen as a high priority problem, b) the
transit agency is perceived as having the ability to use funding effectively and
efficiently, c) extensive public participation in the planning process exists, and
d) the transportation package does not consist solely of rail transit.
Each of the 17 variables is discussed below in a separate.
Traffic congestion “crisis”
Definition: This factor refers to the perception, real or not, that a community is
facing traffic congestion of such magnitude that it is a high or very high
priority for most citizens. Typically, survey data may be used to determine the
extent to which transportation problems are considered to be a “crisis” in a
given community.
Rationale: If the traffic problem is perceived to be harmful to the economy,
the environment, and/or the quality of life of a community, it can motivate
voters to support tax increases that will fund transportation improvements.
Failing a crisis atmosphere, citizens may be less motivated to do so,
particularly when the opposition creates uncertainty about the ability of rail
transit to take a significant number of vehicles off the road.
Fit to data: Excellent (1 anomaly and 1 ambiguity). In only one community,
(Austin) did this factor fail to predict the outcome of an election. Communities
where transportation is a front burner issue all passed tax increases in support
of transportation improvements. Cities like San Antonio—where congestion is
regarded as relatively mild—failed to pass them.
Evaluation: The outcomes suggest that this factor may well represent a
necessary condition for passage of a transportation tax increase. Communities
that are not experiencing a traffic congestion “crisis” will face an uphill
struggle to demonstrate the need for a tax increase. At the same time, the
existence of a perceived congestion crisis is unlikely to be a sufficient
condition for success because the transportation package may not be perceived
as having a significant impact on the crisis. Such was the case in Austin. It had
a major congestion crisis but the proposed transportation package, consisting
solely of a comprehensive light rail system, was not perceived as providing an
effective and efficient solution to the crisis.
Enthusiastic support by business community
Definition: This factor refers to the degree to which the local business
community actively supports the transportation tax increase. In most instances,
this means that local business leaders play an active, if not a key role in
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creating and campaigning for the passage of a transportation tax initiative. It
does not necessarily connote financial support, although the two are generally
closely linked.
Rationale: Support from business leaders helps measures pass by legitimizing
the need for a tax increase; voters may look to local business leaders for cues
on tax increases. Additionally, business leaders can communicate their support
to their employees. Absent such support, voters may regard tax increase
measures as self-serving for local transit agencies or government officials.
Fit to data: Very good (1 anomaly and 3 ambiguities). With the exception of
Salt Lake, in which the business community supported the measure but was not
prominent in the campaign and was unsuccessful in fundraising, each of the
passing measures received notable support from the respective business
communities, although one measure failed despite such support (St. Louis) and
two measures failed with moderate support (Austin and Columbus). It is
noteworthy that three cases were in the middle category with this variable. This
occurred largely because the business community is not a single group and
differences can exist within the community. Such was the case in Austin, for
example. Some prominent members of the business community were very
enthusiastic supporters and extremely successful in raising funds. At the same
time, one of the leading opponents was a prominent member of the business
community. In addition, the Chamber wrote an influential mixed report. This
mixed nature allowed both proponents and opponents to use parts of this report
in their campaign.
Evaluation: This factor would seem to typically be a necessary condition for
passage of a transportation tax measure. It is difficult to imagine passage of
such a measure absent explicit and tangible support from significant segments
of the business community. However, as demonstrated in the St. Louis case,
such support clearly does not assure passage. Thus, this factor is not a
sufficient condition for success. In addition, support from the business
community often may be mixed and measures can succeed when business
support is mixed.
Enthusiastic support by key elected official(s)
Definition: This factor involves the combination of one or several key elected
officials taking a visible leadership role in the promotion of the tax initiative
and virtually no officials opposing the measure.
Rationale: Voters look to community leaders for cues on issues like tax
increases. Mayors and other well-recognized officials can marshal support
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among a variety of groups and help to squelch disagreements among political
factions. Absent such leadership, voters may perceive an initiative to be
relatively unimportant or receive cues from opposing groups.
Fit to data: Excellent (0 anomalies and 1 ambiguity). In each community that
passed a transportation tax, the leadership of one or more key elected officials
was closely involved. In Santa Clara, for example, Mayor Ron Gonzales made
passage of transportation improvement a keystone of his campaign for mayor
and followed through with political leadership. Three of the four communities
that failed to pass a measure lacked such leadership; the fourth had only
limited leadership.
Evaluation: This factor is quite probably a necessary condition for passage.
Because no failed measure had strong enthusiastic support, the data do not
allow the rejection of this as a sufficient condition. However, if all local
funding initiatives are included, certainly many of them fail even with
enthusiastic support from most, if not all, local elected officials. Thus, this
factor does not appear to be a sufficient condition for success.
Fundraising near $1 million
Definition: Fundraising for the transportation tax initiative nears or exceeds $1
million.
Rationale: Effective campaigns require significant expenditures for
consultants, research, publicity, media, direct mail, etc. This is particularly the
case with tax increase initiatives that voters may oppose unless they are
confident the funding will have a substantial impact on a high priority problem.
Because it is often easy for opponents to attract media attention without
spending much money, a poorly funded campaign can easily fail.
Fit to data: Excellent (1 anomaly and 1 ambiguity). With the exception of Salt
Lake, each of the successful campaigns had very large campaign war chests.
Salt Lake was not a true exception because the transit agency compensated for
the lack of private funding by using a substantial amount of its public funds for
a public education campaign consisting of both television ads and direct mail.
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Three of the four losing campaigns failed to raise sufficient funds. Only one
city, Austin, had a large campaign fund and failed to pass its tax measure.
Evaluation: Although obviously not a sufficient condition (see Austin), this is
probably a necessary one. Campaigns that lack significant funding seem
destined to lose.
Recent initiative experience
Definition: Some communities put a tax initiative on the ballot shortly after a
preceding effort. Because there is little reason to do this if the preceding effort
was successful, this typically is done after an unsuccessful prior effort.
Rationale: The experience of creating a proposal and carrying out a campaign
enables supporters of a tax initiative to learn from their mistakes (or success)
and prevail the next time around. Some observers believe that voters are more
likely to approve of a second proposal after rejecting the first because they feel
they are getting a better “deal” from public officials. Communities without
such experience are more likely to make major mistakes, typically by
proposing overly ambitious projects without adequate grass roots support. In
addition, much can be learned about the arguments used by the opposition
when a recent prior campaign exists.
Fit to data: Good (3 anomalies). Only one campaign (Charlotte) was
successful in a community without a recent transportation tax campaign.
Charlotte was successful despite its inexperience because of extensive support
from the business community coupled with political leadership and a
sophisticated campaign. Two communities failed in spite of a recent
experience (Columbus and St. Louis). St. Louis is unusual in that they were
successful on their first attempt but failed on their second attempt. This
suggests that success may breed overconfidence, which is one of the
explanations for the failure of the most recent measure in St. Louis.
Evaluation: Although clearly neither sufficient nor even necessary to win,
experience seems to promote more palatable proposals and more effective
campaigning. Experience does not guarantee victory, but it does seem to help
many campaigns.
Enthusiastic support from environmental groups
Definition: Local environmental groups endorse and/or campaign for the
measure and no opposition exists from any of these groups.
Rationale: Many communities have active environmental groups that endorse
and offer support for transportation tax measures; this support can provide a
cue for some voters, while its absence can signal political dissension and
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negative publicity. Their opposition of a transit only measure may be very
credible because they tend to be perceived as being pro-transit. At the same
time, this perceived pro-transit orientation may lessen their credibility as
supporters of a transit only ballot measure.
Fit to data: Mixed, very good with successful cases but poor with
unsuccessful ones (4 anomalies, each with an unsuccessful case and 1
ambiguity). Although five of the six successful campaigns obtained
enthusiastic support from environmental groups, so did each of the four
unsuccessful campaigns. Environmental groups tend to be supportive of
transportation measures that fund mass transit, so this is not surprising.
Evaluation: Although environmental opposition did not exist with any of the
most recent ballot measures studied in each community, this opposition did
exist with failed prior measures in both Sonoma and Alameda County. The
environmental opposition was considered to be an important reason for failure
in both instances. Thus, although the evidence is quite limited, it does suggest
that avoiding environmental opposition may be necessary for success in some
communities.
Multimodal proposal
Definition: Tax initiative contains a proposal for funding of more than one
mode of transit. The inclusion of a highway component is considered
separately under the next variable. Thus, the definition of “multimodal” is a
narrow one that essentially considers whether a bus component is included in
the package in addition to a substantial rail component.
Rationale: Multiple modes attract different kinds and groups of voters.
Whereas many voters prefer rail transit, many existing transit users are reliant
on bus routes that may not be served by future rail routes. In addition, it is
much easier to provide benefits throughout the geographic area when a bus
component exists. Finally, inclusion of a bus component tends to create more
of a challenge for the opposition, which typically focuses their criticism on rail
transit.
Fit to data: Excellent (1 anomaly and 1 ambiguity). Only one proposal that
passed (Denver) was not multimodal in a narrow sense. However, this measure
was multimodal in a broad sense because a separate highway measure was
closely linked to the light rail measure.
Evaluation: Although it is conceivable that a rail only measure can be
successful in rare instances, the data suggest that it is necessary to combine a
rail component with a bus and/or a highway component. At the same time,
because including multiple modes tends to increase the cost of the package,
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this strategy is not a sufficient condition for success. Moreover, the tradeoff
between this variable and the costs of the package creates a challenge when
designing a specific multimodal package. This challenge is demonstrated by
the failure of prior multimodal measures in some of the communities, such as
Alameda County, Sonoma County, and Phoenix.
Highway funding
Definition: Proposal (or companion proposal) contains funding for highway
improvements along with transit enhancements.
Rationale: Providing funds for highways helps allay opposition from
opponents of transit systems; it is also a way of spreading benefits that may be
concentrated in transit systems, thereby broadening support. Failure to include
funds for highway improvements risks alienating transit nonusers, who may be
a majority.
Fit to data: Mixed. Fair at best with successful measures but good with
unsuccessful measures (3 anomalies, each with a successful measure and 1
ambiguity, also with a successful measure). Of the six proposals that passed,
only two included increased funding for highways. Phoenix, Salt Lake City,
and Santa Clara did not, yet measures in those communities passed. However,
it is important to note that recent or current ongoing highway construction
existed in each of these three communities. None of the failing measures
included highway funding however and the lack of this funding appeared to be
an important reason for failure with Austin and San Antonio.
Evaluation: This factor is difficult to evaluate, because its efficacy may
depend on the quality of existing highways, traffic conditions, and fiscal
resources for highway improvements. Highway funding is clearly not
necessary for the passage of a measure, although lack of highway funding may
be sufficient to kill a measure when recent highway improvements have not
occurred and when the business community perceives that highway funding is
required in addition to transit funding.
Benefits distributed throughout area
Definition: Proposal contains provisions for transportation improvements that
are dispersed throughout a wide portion of the jurisdiction voting on the
measure.
Rationale: Distributing the traffic relief, transportation, economic and other
benefits associated with transportation tax measures helps to broaden the
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political base of support. Failure to disperse benefits may lead to
geographically based pockets of opposition, creating divisions among voters.
Fit to data: Excellent (1 anomaly). Only one successful measure (Denver) did
not provide widespread benefits and an important caveat needs to be stated
with this case. It did not involve either a tax increase or an extension of an
existing tax. Voters living in communities that did not benefit from the light
rail extension may have been less likely to support the measure if it had
involved a tax increase. No measure that failed did spread benefits, although
the failure to spread benefits did not appear to be an important reason for
failure in any of these cases.
Evaluation: Given the caveat with the only anomaly, the spreading of benefits
appears to be a necessary condition for success. Although the evidence from
the most recent cases in the table does not allow us to reject this variable as a
sufficient condition, the prior 1997 measure in Denver demonstrates that this is
not a sufficient condition. In order to provide benefits throughout the large
region with a rail only measure, Denver needed to propose an extremely
expensive package. The measure failed, with the extremely high cost of the
package being instrumental in the defeat.
Sunset provision of 10 years or less
Definition: Proposal contains a time limit of ten years or less on the imposition
of the tax. A decision was made to use 10 years as a threshold because our
prior report, as well as other prior studies, recommended a short expiration
date.
Rationale: Voters are more likely to support measures with finite time limits,
particularly with rail transit when the community has no prior experience with
this transit mode. Indefinite tax periods make the measure more vulnerable to
opponents.
Fit to data: Very poor (6 anomalies). None of the five relevant successful
cases had an expiration date of ten years or less and two of them did not have
any expiration date. In addition, two of the three relevant unsuccessful cases
had an expiration date of ten years or less.
Evaluation: The idea that short sunset provisions might enhance the
probability of passage was derived from the previous study (Haas, Massey et
al., 2000). This prior conclusion is definitely inconsistent with the cases
included in this study, possibly as the result of improved economic conditions.
However, due to selected characteristics of each of the five successful cases
that involved use of a sales tax for funding, the finding that voters seem to
place little importance on the length of the tax should not be generalized to
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many other cases. More specifically, this finding should not be generalized to
ballot measures that involve a) a sales tax increase above an existing dedicated
sales tax for a basic transit system, b) the transportation package consists
primarily of rail transit, and c) the community has no existing rail transit
system when the ballot measure occurs. None of the five relevant successful
cases had the combination of these three characteristics (The issue of a sunset
date is not applicable in the successful Denver case because this case did not
involve either a tax increase or extension.). The Alameda case did not meet any
of these three characteristics; the Santa Clara case did not meet the first and
third of these characteristics; the Charlotte and Phoenix cases did not meet the
first and second characteristics; and the Salt Lake case did not meet the third
characteristic.
Extension of existing rail transit
Definition: The community had a rail line or lines prior to the most recent
ballot measure.
Rationale: Voters are more likely to support an incremental improvement than
creation of a system de novo. Creation of a new system is more vulnerable to
opponents' arguments, whereas an existing system can presumably stand as an
example of success.
Fit to data: Good (3 anomalies). When the conditions with the two anomalies
with successful cases are considered (Phoenix and Charlotte), they are not
strong anomalies. In Phoenix, the light rail component was only about one-
third of the total package and it was not a comprehensive system. Charlotte de-
emphasized the light rail element of their package. It was communicated to be
a transit package and the light rail component was not specified. The anomaly
with the unsuccessful cases (St. Louis) is an important one. It demonstrates that
disputes over existing plans can result in failure, even when the initial system
is very popular.
Evaluation: This variable does not appear to be either a necessary or a
sufficient condition for success. At the same time, it appeared to be a very
important contributing factor to the success of the Alameda, Santa Clara, and
Salt Lake measures and to the defeat of the Austin and San Antonio measures.
For example, Salt Lake opponents acknowledged that they could not use the
normal approach of criticizing light rail in this campaign because the initial
light rail line was so popular. As another example, Santa Clara positioned its
measure as a BART extension, even though a significant majority of the
funding was devoted to other elements. It positioned it as a BART extension
because of the popularity of BART. In addition, voters in both Austin and San
Conclusions
Mineta Transportation Institute
184
Antonio were hesitant to vote for a comprehensive light rail only package
when they had no prior experience with light rail in their communities.
Lack of problems with existing transit system
Definition: Some transit agencies develop a reputation for poor management
(deserved or not), or have been beset by controversy about service levels,
routing decisions, empty buses, inefficient use of resources, etc.
Rationale: Keeping a positive image of competence and efficiency helps
instill trust in the electorate. Conversely, any negative publicity can promote
lack of trust and provides an easy target for opponents.
Fit to data: Excellent (0 anomalies). Austin demonstrates the importance of
this factor. Opponents focused on prior mismanagement by the transit agency
as one of their major themes and the measure failed even though no tax
increase or extension was involved.
Evaluation: If a transit system or agency has a bad reputation, it appears to be
very difficult for a measure to pass. At least in the cases studied in which the
agency/system had a bad reputation, the opposition focused much of their
attack on this issue. At the same time, because two of the successful cases
(Alameda and Phoenix) had recent failures and the transit agency had no
problems at the time of these failures, this variable is not sufficient for success.
Extensive stakeholder participation in the planning process
Definition: The extent to which the business community, environmental
groups, citizens, and elected officials are involved in the planning process used
to develop the transportation package. Holding public hearings, which is
almost always done, is not sufficient or necessary for extensive public
participation. However, the use of surveys to make important decisions about
the package would constitute extensive citizen involvement. Yet, extensive
citizen involvement does not, by itself, constitute extensive participation if
other stakeholder groups are not involved.
Rationale: Important stakeholders, such as the business community,
environmental groups, and elected officials expect to be involved in the
process. Because compromises may need to be made, it is important to get
agreement from relevant groups that the compromise is acceptable before
going forward with the package. Systematic input on citizen preferences
through surveys obviously is relevant because these people will eventually
express their views through their ballots. At the same time, preferences
expressed through surveys may not always be reliable. For example, two
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different surveys were used in Alameda to measure attitudes towards
expiration date thresholds and conflicting results were obtained.
Fit to data: Excellent (1 anomaly). The only anomaly existed with Salt Lake.
Actually, this is not a strong anomaly. The package was initiated in the political
arena so this stakeholder group was involved. However, neither the business
community nor the public was involved. At the same time, because the
popularity of the existing light rail system was well known, as was public
dissatisfaction with the ongoing highway construction on a critical corridor, it
probably was not necessary to use a formal process to determine voter
preferences prior to going forward with the measure.
Evaluation: The involvement of one or more groups almost certainly is
necessary for success. At the same time, when strong conflicts exist, an
acceptable compromise may not be reached even with significant involvement.
Such was the case with prior measures in Alameda and Sonoma. Thus,
extensive involvement is not a sufficient condition for success.
General or congressional election
Definition: A measure is placed on the ballot to coincide with a presidential or
congressional election.
Rationale: Two different rationales exist. First, placing an issue on a
nongeneral ballot further isolates the issue, which may enable opponents to
garner free publicity for their cause because there are fewer distracting events.
Opponents almost invariably need at least moderate coverage of the ballot
measure in the news media because they typically have little if any funding
available for advertising. Second, transit dependents are likely to support these
ballot measures and this segment, as well as other segments likely to support
these measures, may be more likely to vote in a general election than in other
elections.
Fit to data: Good (3 anomalies). The two anomalies with successful cases
(Phoenix and Denver) can be explained by the absence of energetic opposition,
which is required to exploit the opportunity for substantial news coverage.
A discussion of the extent of fit existing with the two hypothesized conditions
identified in the rationale subsection is needed because, unlike most other
explanatory variables, the general election variable is unlikely to have a direct
impact on voter attitudes towards these ballot measures.
Although a rigorous and systematic analysis was not conducted, the amount of
news coverage typically was substantial when few if any other issues were on
the same ballot. Such coverage appeared to be less substantial in some general
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elections. However, Austin is an important exception to this tentative
observation. The amount of coverage was substantial in Austin even though
the campaign took place during a presidential election. This case demonstrates
that energetic opposition can be successful in stimulating substantial news
coverage in a general election, at least when the measure is controversial and
when a transportation crisis exists that is newsworthy.
Exit polling or other post election survey data is needed to identify voting
patterns among different segments. As indicated in chapter 1, this data
typically was unavailable. Accordingly, sufficient data does not exist to either
tentatively support or reject the hypothesis that supporters of these ballot
measures are more likely to vote in a general election.
Evaluation: This variable is neither a necessary or sufficient condition for
success; moreover, it apparently does not directly influence voting behavior. At
the same time, the potential for substantial news coverage in a special election
creates an opportunity for energetic opposition to exploit, particularly if the
opposition has some potentially effective issues to exploit. This combination of
conditions existed in three of the four unsuccessful cases (St. Louis, San
Antonio, and Columbus).
Consultant with initiative campaign experience
Definition: The campaign for the transportation tax measure is managed by a
consultant who has successfully managed prior initiative campaigns. The prior
campaign did not need to be a transportation initiative.
Rationale: The complex decisions entailed in a tax increase campaign require
the judgment of an experienced professional.
Fit to data: Excellent (1 anomaly and 1 ambiguity). Every successful
campaign retained the services of a consultant with considerable experience in
the task at hand. Unsuccessful campaigns tended to be managed by amateurs or
consultants without directly relevant campaign experience, although San
Antonio is a notable exception to this assessment. Some of these consultants
(Phoenix, Charlotte, and Salt Lake) had no prior experience with transportation
initiatives but were familiar with the local environment. This demonstrates that
consultants with both local experience and successful prior experience with
transportation initiatives may not exist.
Evaluation: This factor is somewhat subjective, in that evaluating the
experience and expertise of a campaign consultant is difficult, and evaluating
the quality of the campaign is even more subjective. However, the data
collected for this study point strongly to the conclusion that the successful
campaigns hired outstanding, experienced consultants who used advanced
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research techniques coupled with sophisticated campaign strategies. They
suggest that the use of such consultants is indeed a necessary step for a
successful campaign. The anomaly with the San Antonio case, which lost by a
huge margin (only 30% support) even though the consultants had substantial
and successful experience with prior initiatives, demonstrates this variable is
not a sufficient condition for success.
Extensive use of targeted direct mail and television ads
Definition: The campaign makes extensive use of both (a) direct mail that is
targeted to selected audiences on the basis of survey research, and (b)
television advertising for general audiences. Other means of communication
may also be used. This variable is highly correlated with the previous
fundraising variable. Extensive use of both television and direct mail cannot
exist without a sufficient budget and consultants will almost invariably use
both direct mail and television advertising when a sufficient budget does exist.
Rationale: Television advertising helps create general awareness and enables
the campaign to publicize its overall message, while targeted direct mail
enables focusing on key demographic groups that may “swing” support for the
measure. Over reliance on a single medium fails to capitalize on both of these
strengths; particularly, failure to use direct mail risks an overly broad message
that fails to move key demographic groups.
Fit to data: Excellent (1 anomaly). Each of the successful campaigns used the
mixed approach suggested by this factor. One of the unsuccessful cases (St.
Louis) did have this combination and still was unsuccessful. This case
demonstrates that extensive advertising will not compensate for public
concerns about a transit agency, at least when partisan bickering exists.
Evaluation: In many communities, obtaining majority support for a tax
increase, or even a tax extension, is challenging. Voters may be unlikely to
support such an initiative unless they are confident that it is needed. Organized
opposition usually exists and this opposition usually is able to obtain at least
moderate and balanced coverage of the initiative in the local newspaper or
newspapers. Significant advertising appears to be a necessary condition to
compensate for the public’s hesitancy to support tax initiatives and balanced
newspaper coverage. At the same time, St. Louis demonstrates that this is not a
sufficient condition for success. Extensive advertising probably will not
compensate for negative publicity, nor will it compensate for a poorly
conceived transportation initiative presented prior to the existence of a
perceived traffic crisis.
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Lack of effective opposition
Definition: Opposition to the tax measure is disorganized, unfounded, or
nonexistent. Given the existence of some opposition with each of the ten cases,
a judgment needed to be made about the effectiveness of this opposition. We
initially considered using the amount of funds raised by the opposition as a
means of classifying cases on this variable, as this is an objective means of
classification. However, this means was not used because it is not a good
indicator of the effectiveness of the opposition. The effectiveness has been
evaluated using a) the degree of effort exerted by the opposition particularly in
attempting to get their message heard, b) their prominence and credibility
within the community, and c) the arguments used.
Rationale: Because the opposition almost always has little funding available
for advertising, it must rely on grass roots means of communication along with
extensive news coverage. These means of communication require both energy
and credibility.
Fit to data: Very good to excellent (0 anomalies but 3 ambiguities). The three
ambiguities, or middle classifications, demonstrate that this variable is both
subjective and is not conducive to a simple dichotomous classification.
Evaluation: Effective opposition did not exist with any of the successful
cases. These results suggest that the avoidance of effective opposition is a
necessary condition for success. However, this conclusion probably is
incorrect, particularly given the large margin of victory in two of the successful
cases that also had moderately significant opposition (Santa Clara and
Phoenix). A well-conceived transportation package, combined with a well-
funded and effective campaign, based on both competitive and voter research,
which utilizes a proactive approach with the news media, can be successful
even when effective opposition exists.
IMPACT OF COMMUNICATIONS CAMPAIGN USED BY
PROPONENTS ON VOTING BEHAVIOR
Only one of the variables included in Table 10-1 could be classified as a
characteristic of the communications campaign (extensive use of both direct
mail and television advertising). Because they do not lend themselves to
simple definition or classification, many relevant communications campaign-
related variables are omitted from the table; this despite the fact that the data
suggest that they may have a substantial impact on voting behavior. In this
section, the potential impact of a few of the apparently more significant aspects
of campaign communications is discussed.
Conclusions
Mineta Transportation Institute
189
Content of Advertising
Determining the content of advertising typically does not appear to be a
difficult decision, as the advertising themes tend to be quite similar from one
campaign to another. For example, virtually all campaigns focused on the
magnitude of the congestion crisis and at least implied that the transportation
package will help solve the crisis. In addition, although most advertising
campaigns did not discuss the cost of the transportation package, many did
mention federal funding that would not exist if the measure failed. Readers
should refer to relevant prior chapters, most notably the Phoenix and Denver
chapters, to obtain more detail about advertising content.
Although it was stated in the prior paragraph that content decisions typically
are not difficult, one decision—namely the degree of specificity to use in
describing the transportation package—does appear to be a difficult one. This
is a difficult decision because providing either limited specificity or substantial
specificity creates a platform for opposition criticism, albeit different
platforms. When the specifics are not disclosed (e. g., St. Louis), opponents
criticize the plan as lacking specifics and argue that approval basically involves
giving a government agency a blank check. In addition, the opposition may
argue here that proponents are afraid to describe the specifics because they fear
that the specifics will not be enthusiastically accepted by voters.
On the other hand, if the proposition provides a specific description of the
transportation package, the opposition then begins to criticize some of the
specific characteristics. For example, the opposition often criticizes specific
routing for rail lines along with criticizing construction issues that may
increase costs. They also will criticize changing cost estimates, estimated
travel times if they are provided, etc. (Austin and San Antonio). On the
surface, it is difficult to generalize about which of these two vulnerabilities is
worse. In addition, it is difficult to see a consistent pattern when examining the
results with the successful cases studied. Santa Clara, Charlotte, and Salt Lake
provided very little detail in their advertising while Denver, Phoenix and
Alameda provided a higher degree of specificity.
Although no single appropriate level of specificity appears to exist, a few
observations are identified below.
• If specifics are presented, it is important to try to maintain focus on general
themes, such as the underlying importance of the transportation crisis and
the typically balanced nature of the transportation package. This approach
was used successfully in Phoenix. A rather specific description of the
transportation package was presented though a limited number of direct
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mailers, combined with a high frequency television and/or radio
advertising campaign that focused on general themes.
• Research can be used to identify specific segments of undecided voters
who are unlikely to support the measure unless they are provided with
some specifics. Targeted direct mail can then be sent to these specific
segments. This approach was used successfully in Denver.
• A moderate amount of specificity on the critical issue of rail routes can be
effective. This approach was used successfully in Phoenix, where first
phase routes were specified, but only options for later phase routes were
presented.
• Voters are more likely to accept less than complete specificity on rail routes
if a reasonable process for decision making both has been used with any
routes that are specified in the package and that will be used with any
unspecified routes, probably with citizen involvement in this process. This
approach was used in Phoenix and the approach was described in some
advertising.
• It may be more important to avoid cost specificity in advertising.
Particularly because opponents will tend to seize on these estimates and
question them, the campaign can quickly degenerate from a focus on
benefits to a focus on costs. Such a focus will almost certainly benefit the
opposition. This happened in Denver with their prior 1997 measure and
also happened in San Antonio. One way of avoiding cost specificity, while
at the same time, not avoiding costs totally, is to provide an approximate
percentage distribution of funding to the different components of the
package. This approach was used successfully in both Alameda and
Phoenix.
Use of prominent political figures in advertising
Some proponent campaigns had at least a portion of their ads involve
endorsements from prominent current or previous office holders. In most
instances, the use of prominent elected officials seemed to have little positive
impact on voters. For example, both Austin and San Antonio in their
unsuccessful campaigns, had a significant portion of their television
advertising consist of endorsements from political figures. The endorsement of
prominent elected officials often may have limited credibility specifically with
tax measures because these officials often are seen as being supportive of tax
increases, which was the case in both Austin and San Antonio. However, these
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endorsements can be effective when made by an official who typically is
opposed to tax increases. For example, this endorsement approach was
successful in Denver. The person used in Denver, a conservative Republican
governor, had credibility because he typically is critical of both rail transit and
of tax increases.
Strategies for dealing with opposition: Overview
As mentioned earlier in this chapter when discussing the variables in Table 10-
1, the degree of effective opposition appears to be an important independent
variable as each of the unsuccessful cases had effective opposition and none of
the successful ones had effective opposition (although three of these successful
cases were in the middle category on this variable). Given the degree of impact
that the effectiveness of opposition has on voting behavior, it can be important
to try to develop a transportation package and a coalition that both minimizes
and neutralizes opposition. In addition, because developing a transportation
package and coalition can only lessen the probability of effective opposition,
rather than preventing it, a plan for lessening the impact of effective opposition
on voting can be effective. Each of these two dimensions of dealing with
opposition is discussed below.
Developing a transportation package to lessen and/or neutralize
opposition
Both the Alameda and Denver cases demonstrate that the nature of the
opposition can be influenced by the transportation package. In each of these
two cases, the opposition was substantially greater with a prior measure that
failed than with a more recent successful measure. The 1997 Denver measure
was opposed by one of the two main newspapers and by many prominent
elected officials, primarily Republicans. Both the relevant newspaper and most
of the relevant elected officials switched positions and actively supported the
1999 transit measure, primarily because significant changes were made to the
1997 transportation package to lessen opposition. In Alameda, environmental
organizations lead the opposition to the 1998 measure. As a result of this
opposition, some newspapers and some prominent elected officials also
opposed this measure. However, in 2000, virtually no opposition existed as a
result of differences between the 1998 and 2000 transportation packages that
were made to gain the support of environmental organizations.
One of the more effective means of lessening opposition involves having a
transportation package that includes a highway component as well as a transit
component. Such a package may gain the support of highway advocates and
organizations who are less than enthusiastic about transit and also gain the
support of transit advocates who are less than enthusiastic about highways.
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This was the approach taken in both Denver and in Alameda. Yet, as
demonstrated by the 1998 ballot measure in Sonoma County discussed in our
prior report, as well as in the 1998 measure in Alameda County (that did
attempt without success to obtain support from environmental groups), it is
very difficult to develop a specific combination that both sides will support
because each side essentially opposes one component in the combination.
Special circumstances existed in both Denver and Alameda that contributed to
the relevant package being acceptable to both camps. In Denver, highway
supporters endorsed the transit measure partly because no tax increase was
needed (which is rather atypical) and partly because passage of the transit
measure was needed to prevent a new environmental impact study from being
conducted prior to commencement of highway construction. In Alameda,
highway and transit advocates both realized that the 2000 election was the last
opportunity to obtain an extension of the existing sales tax.
Because it is very difficult to lessen potentially effective opposition in many
communities, proponents in a few communities have been successful in
neutralizing the opposition. Because the opposition generally has focused their
arguments on rail transit rather than on bus transit, a transit package with a
substantial bus component can be effective in partially neutralizing opposition.
Phoenix, Salt Lake, and Charlotte provide positive examples of using this
strategy to neutralize opposition and opponents in Phoenix and Salt Lake
acknowledged that this strategy did, indeed, make it more difficult for them to
mount an effective campaign. Another option involves attempting to construct
a starter rail line in the community utilizing the existing budget, combined with
federal and/or state funding. If this starter line is successful and popular, it
becomes difficult for opponents to use statistics in other communities, which is
what they tend to rely on, to argue that rail transit is inefficient and ineffective.
Salt Lake and Denver, to a lesser extent, have used this strategy successfully.
Of course, this strategy will backfire if the starter line or system is
unsuccessful.
Plans to lessen the effectiveness of the opposition
Identification of likely opponents and their arguments
Proponents interviewed in communities with effective opposition, such as in
Columbus, San Antonio, Austin, and Denver in 1997, indicated that they were
surprised by some of the tactics and arguments used by the opposition and
thought they lost control of the campaign because of their failure to even
attempt to carefully anticipate the opposition. This recurring experience
demonstrates that a necessary and preliminary step in developing a plan to
cope with opposition involves the attempt to anticipate both the identity of the
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opposition as well as the arguments that the opposition is likely to use. This
appears to be a critical step partly because the opposition tends to rely on the
news media to communicate their message and short response times exist
when dealing with these media.
Because organized opposition to transit only packages usually originates with
a) anti-tax groups or elected officials, and/or b) anti-rail groups, with
environmental organizations being a third source of opposition to a
transportation package with a highway component, the identification of likely
sources of opposition is relatively easy. Identification of the arguments likely
to be used by the opposition also is relatively easy, as many of the general
arguments, as well as some of the specific arguments used against measures
with a substantial rail component have been repeated in a number of
campaigns throughout the country. This repetition occurs largely because
much of the data used by local opposition is provided by the same people, such
as Wendell Cox and the Texas Public Policy Foundation. Their arguments,
along with the statistics supporting them, appear on their websites and in
position papers. Some of the arguments used, along with possible responses,
were discussed in our prior study (Haas, Massey, et al., 2000).
Appropriate preparation for such arguments can be facilitated by using outside
experts with thorough knowledge of the arguments and statistics that
opponents are likely to use and possible responses can be prepared in advance.
Opponents have used outside experts with some degree of success in such
places as Denver with the 1997 ballot measure, Sonoma County in 1998, and
the most recent measures in Austin, San Antonio, and Columbus. Of the cases
studied, Charlotte is apparently the only one in which proponents used an
outside consultant in this capacity.
In terms of recent tactics, the opposition took legal action in two communities
(Salt Lake and San Antonio) against transit agencies for using public funding
for campaign purposes. Another tactic used involved attending and
participating in most public outreach meetings organized by the transit agency
(San Antonio). Still another tactic employed in selected communities, such as
Columbus, San Antonio and Austin, involved attacking the credibility and
management ability of the transit organization. This tactic is implemented in
part by closely examining statistics presented in literature from the transit
agency as well as in major investment studies and long range transportation
plans.
One common observation is that proponents in a number of communities have
modified the transportation package and/or their campaign after an
unsuccessful ballot measure in the community. Given the successful passage of
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a number of recent ballot measures, opponents are likely to modify some of
their arguments and tactics.
Planning for debates
Because the opposition typically has a very limited budget, it relies primarily
on a) grass roots efforts, b) debates, and c) the news section of newspapers and
radio talk shows to communicate their messages. Of these three components,
the debate mode is the one that proponents have the most influence on the
ability of the opposition to use. If proponents do not agree to engage in
debates, then the debates will not take place.
The results in the cases studied seem to support the conclusion that debates
tend to benefit the opposition more than proponents. A series of debates were
conducted in four of the communities studied (Austin, Columbus, Phoenix, and
San Antonio). The ballot measures were unsuccessful in three of these four
communities. Debates appear to help the opposition more than proponents for
a number of reasons. First, proponents typically have sufficient funding
available for substantial advertising. Thus, proponents should, as a rule, prefer
advertising, with which the message is controlled, to debates, with which the
message is not controlled. Second, debates provide underfunded groups
communicate with a forum and can give them credibility, at least if they are
well prepared and they carefully select their spokespeople. Third, the debates
tend to be covered by the news media, which extends both the reach and
frequency for the opposition arguments. Fourth, debates are conducive to
opponents of tax initiatives because generating doubt among a majority of
voters typically is sufficient to defeat these measures. Opponents often use this
forum to cite statistics from reputable sources that can be effective in
generating such doubt.
Although agreeing to debate with the opposition often does not appear to be in
the best interests of proponents, refusing to debate can be risky. It allows the
opposition to suggest that proponents have something to hide or that they are
afraid to debate because they know that their arguments cannot withstand
scrutiny. The news media may then begin to cover this issue, which can result
in the refusal of proponents to debate becoming a campaign issue.
Planning publicity
For the same reasons as stated in the previous subsection on debates,
proponents typically would prefer that newspapers would provide no more
than minimal coverage to the ballot measure. Because such coverage tends to
be balanced, it will provide a means for an underfunded opposition to
communicate their message and it may allow the opposition a means of
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focusing attention on specific issues that benefit them. However, unlike
debates, which will not exist if proponents do not agree to debate, newspapers
may provide extensive coverage even if proponents are not accessible to the
reporters. In fact, coverage in the newspapers typically has been at least
moderately extensive in most of the communities studied, even when the ballot
measure is on the same ballot as a presidential election (Austin, Alameda, and
Santa Clara). Extensive coverage tends to exist because transportation tends to
be a newsworthy issue in many communities that consider transit ballot
measures. Many of these communities have a transportation crisis and many of
the newspapers have a designated transportation reporter. In addition, the
opposition often encourages extensive coverage, knowing that it may be the
only available means of communicating their message through mass media.
Proponents in such communities as Denver in 1997, Sonoma County in 1998,
Phoenix in 1997, San Antonio, and Austin acknowledged that they might have
been more successful if they had taken a more proactive approach with the
news media. The successful campaigns with the most recent campaigns in
Phoenix and Denver provide examples of such a proactive approach.
CONCLUSION
The results of this study indicate that a) the nature of the transportation
package, b) the process used to determine it, and c) communications
campaigns used by both proponents and opponents influence voting behavior
on ballot measures involving funding for a transportation package with a
substantial rail component. Two tables, Table 1-1 and Table 10-1, illustrate the
findings that support this conclusion.
Table 1-1 demonstrates that voting results can change quickly and dramatically
within the same community. For example, a transportation package presented
to Alameda County voters on a ballot measure in 2000, which was similar in
many respects, but also different in some important specific respects, to one
presented to these voters in 1998, received support from 81.5% of voters in
2000 compared to 58% support in 1998. Such rapid and large within
community differences, corresponding to differences with the transportation
package and the communications campaigns used by proponents and
opponents, demonstrate that characteristics of the transportation package and
the process used to determine it, along with characteristics of the
communications campaigns used by proponents and opponents, can have a
significant influence on voting results.
Table 10-1 demonstrates that the actual results with 15 of the 17 explanatory
variables in the table are consistent with the expected results. A number of
these variables appear to approach being necessary for success but none seem
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to be sufficient for success. Conversely, the absence of some of them appears
to be close to being sufficient for failure.
Additionally, the results in this table demonstrate that a number of the
explanatory variables appear to be correlated with each other. Involving the
business community and prominent elected officials, as well as environmental
organizations in some instances, often leads to the development of a
multimodal transportation package. Such a transportation package, presented
when a perceived traffic crisis exists, often results in enthusiastic support from
these groups. This may result in a well-funded campaign that uses a
combination of mass media and direct mail advertising, and may even result in
lessening or neutralizing opposition.
The results also demonstrate that the nature of the transportation package is a
critical, but also a difficult decision. Appropriate packages vary across
communities, but also over time within a community. The unfixed nature of an
appropriate transportation package is demonstrated by the conditional nature
of the analysis with variables in Table 10-1 pertaining to the nature of the
transportation package, such as whether and how a highway component is
involved in the package and the extent that an incremental approach is used
with a rail component of the package.
Although it is not reflected either by the simple classification used in Table 10-
1 or by the discussion of each variable following the table, some of the case
chapters demonstrate that the details of the transportation package are critically
important and that these details can be difficult to determine when multiple
stakeholder groups, with different priorities, are involved in the decision
making process. Both the Alameda and the Phoenix cases (chapters five and
nine) demonstrate the importance and difficulty of reaching a consensus on the
details of the transportation package. For example, it was difficult in Alameda
County to reach a consensus on the specific percentage allocation to different
modes of transportation.
The mean supporting percentage with the most recent ballot measure across all
eleven communities (56.4%) is well over the 50% threshold typically required
for passage, suggesting that the probability of success is somewhat better than
the probability of failure. However, this interpretation is misleading. First, a
recent prior attempt had been made in four of the eleven communities with
significantly lower supporting percentages (see Table 1-1). Second, although
the focus of study in this report is on decision or actionable variables, many
environmental variables can influence the results and some of these
environmental variables can change quickly over time. The significant
volatility in voting behavior within a community discovered in this study
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suggests that voting results can be influenced, both positively and negatively,
by these environmental variables.
One essentially uncontrollable environmental variable is the nature of the
opposition. The results with our study suggest that the opposition does modify
their strategies and tactics over time. Opposing groups almost certainly will
continue to make these modifications, requiring in the strategies and tactics
employed by proponents. The probability of success with future measures also
will depend in part on the degree of success with building and operating the
rail lines and systems that were approved in the six successful ballot measures
included in this study.
Finally, the uncertainty concerning results based on the case methodology must
be borne in mind. Whereas there is little doubt that some of the variables this
study has emphasized are indeed critical to the success or failure of the typical
initiative, the limitations of this method do not enable precise descriptions of
how important each is. The rather vague estimates provided here are based
primarily on reasoned judgment and direct observation. Extreme caution and
common sense ought to be exercised with regard to embracing these factors in
practice.
Much of this report has been expressed in terms of the interest of the
supporters of transportation tax initiatives. Careful reading, however, will
reveal much that is of use to opponents. Perhaps most significantly, in none of
the eleven cases did a measure prevail against an organized, reasonably well-
funded opposition. That fact alone should inveigh in favor of caution in
applying the results of this research.
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